United Nations S/PV.4979

Security Council

Fifty-ninth year

Provisional

4979th meeting

Thursday, 27 May 2004, 10 a.m.

New York

President:	Mr. Akram	(Pakistan)
Members:	Algeria	Mr. Baali
	Angola	Mr. Constantino
	Benin	Mr. Adechi
	Brazil	Mr. Sardenberg
	Chile	Mr. Muñoz
	China	Mr. Cheng Jingye
	France	Mr. De La Sablière
	Germany	Mr. Trautwein
	Philippines	Mr. Baja
	Romania	Mr. Dumitru
	Russian Federation	Mr. Konuzin
	Spain	Mr. De Palacio
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Thomson
	United States of America	Mr. Holliday

Agenda

The situation in Afghanistan

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-154A.

04-36659 (E)



The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Afghanistan

The President: I should like to inform the Council that I have received a letter from the representative of Afghanistan, in which he requests to be invited to participate in the discussion of the item on the Council's agenda. In conformity with the usual practice, I propose, with the consent of the Council, to invite that representative to participate in the discussion, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Farhâdi (Afghanistan), took a seat at the Council table.

The President: In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, and in the absence of objection, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Jean Arnault, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I invite Mr. Arnault to take a seat at the Council table.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

At this meeting, the Security Council will hear a briefing by Mr. Jean Arnault, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan and Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. I now give him the floor.

Mr. Arnault (*spoke in French*): As this is the first time I am briefing the Council, allow me to begin by warmly thanking the Council for its confidence in me, shown by its support for the Secretary-General's decision to appoint me his Special Representative for Afghanistan, for its strong support for the extension of the mandate of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) in its most recent resolution on that matter, resolution 1536 (2004).

(*spoke in English*)

A few months separate us from the holding of the national elections that will mark the end of the transitional Government. I would like therefore to focus my briefing on the main challenges confronting the country in the preparation of that event. In keeping with the format of previous Security Council briefings, and in view of the critical impact of security conditions on the political process, I would like to begin this briefing with a review of the security situation in the country.

In his latest report on Afghanistan to the Security Council, last March (S/2004/230), the Secretary-General observed that insecurity in Afghanistan continued to follow a well-known pattern. The most recent United Nations security map bears that out, with little change in the identification of low-risk, middle-risk and high-risk provinces. Within that pattern, however, the situation has evolved negatively in recent months in the more risky areas — and particularly in the south — with a tangible increase in the number of incidents and in the number of resulting casualties.

That increase is consistent with the spring surge in extremists' attacks, which the coalition had been expecting. The modus operandi — anti-Government forces operating in small groups of 10 to 20 men and targeting Afghan police, the Afghan National Army, the civilian administration, non-governmental organizations and Government representatives — also confirms the shift in the strategy of the Taliban and other groups that was observed last year. According to the coalition, various extremist groups are involved, including Taliban operating in the south, foreign fighters in the south-east and Hezb-i-Islami/Hekmatyar in the east.

At the same time, one must be cautious in establishing responsibility for events taking place in the south, east and south-east. Drug-related violence is an important factor of insecurity. Militias involved in combating the Taliban are also widely believed to be responsible for a high percentage of incidents in the areas where they operate. A recent attack against an electoral assessment mission in the south-east turned out to have been organized by the local border brigade commander, perhaps in connection with criminal

activities. In addition, in the context of ongoing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programmes, there have been warnings that commanders targeted by DDR would get involved in incidents aimed at creating a perception of a security vacuum.

Many of these factors are also present in other parts of the country. In particular, the province of Farah has become increasingly insecure as a result of rivalries among local factions. In the north and north-east, tensions between the Jumbesh and Jamiat factions remain high following clashes that took place in March in the provinces of Faryab and Balkh. However, deployments there, and in Herat, of the new Afghan army have had a stabilizing impact and have prevented further escalation.

In Kabul, even though no deadly suicide attacks — like those directed against the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) last winter — have taken place another ISAF patrol was attacked last week with rocket-propelled grenades, causing the death of one Norwegian soldier. Earlier, a rocket landed at ISAF headquarters, fortunately without fatality. In addition, in recent weeks the number of arms caches uncovered by ISAF has been increasing, and multiple signs of heightened anti-Government activity have appeared, indicating that the spring surge under way in much of the country may be ongoing in the country's capital as well.

While the aid community continues to keep a low profile in insecure areas in order to reduce its vulnerability, the expanding voter registration process — to which I will come back later — has been affected by the overall increase in incidents. So far, four attacks have taken place against registration teams, involving improvised explosive devices — one in the south, one in the north-east and two in the east — fortunately, in all those cases, without fatalities. In addition, grenade attacks took place in the province of Wardak and two improvised explosive devices were found in Logar, near a registration site, last week. It is still unclear, however, whether those attacks have been directed against the electoral operation per se or whether they are intended, like many other similar attacks, against Government targets.

The level of violent opposition to the electoral process is therefore still difficult to gauge, but precautions are, of course, being taken, as registration is now pushing into the rural areas. In particular, very close coordination has been developed with coalition forces. The deployment of a new United States Marines unit in Uruzgan and Zabul has allowed access to the registration process in areas that until now have been forbidden to internationals. The coalition has now reorganized its forces into three regional commands that cover the territory as a whole and that liaise with electoral authorities to allow registration to take place.

I will now turn to voter registration and the electoral process. Upon completion in April of voter registration in the eight major population centres, the process entered its second and final phase, which is to cover the rest of the country over the next couple of months. The second phase started with 160 sites in early May and has now expanded to almost 600 sites in 31 of the 34 provinces, with more than 1,000 registration teams operating simultaneously.

Since the beginning of May, close to a million people have been registered, which brings the total number of registered voters today to 2.7 million. Contrary to initial expectations, the participation of women has not dropped as voter registration expanded beyond the main urban centre.

After a slow start between December and March, women's registration has picked up in the past two months, accounting now for between 37 per cent and 38 per cent of registrations over that period. However, we also have to take into account the fact that significant under-registration of women continues in the south-east and east, where women account for less than 30 per cent of registrants.

As mentioned earlier, with the active support of the coalition, the high-risk provinces of Uruzgan and Zabul, which have been off-limits to international agencies for two years, are now open to registration, though on a reduced scale, and we hope to expand to the remaining high-risk provinces of Paktika and Nuristan in the coming days.

In order to meet registration targets, further expansion is planned in the short term, from 600 currently to approximately 800 sites by 1 June. This is needed to enable voter registration to achieve the minimum required cruising speed of at least 75,000 registrations per day.

Although the process is well under way, a number of concerns remain that I would like to share with the

Council. I have already mentioned the problem of security and the distinct possibility that insecurity could lead to under-registration in some provinces. The figures today are revealing: altogether, the nine provinces of the south and south-east represent a mere 12 per cent of registered voters. If that pattern should last, it will give rise to a second issue — namely, that of a lack of balance in registration between various provinces. Ultimately, under-registration in one province relative to another should have little impact on the outcome of the elections to the Lower House, since the number of seats for any one province will be based on population estimates rather than registration figures. But registration figures will still have an impact in terms of creating a perception that some parts of the country have been — perhaps deliberately — disenfranchised. Much is riding, therefore, on providing to unsafe areas of the south an equal opportunity to participate in the electoral process.

Another challenge relates to the determination of population figures themselves. Indeed, under the new Electoral Law, the figures that will be used to define the number of representatives per province will be based on a current survey done by the Central Statistical Office. Unfortunately, again due to insecurity, it is now quite likely that the provinces of Zabul, Helmand, Paktika and Uruzgan will not be surveyed, or only very partially. Based on the trends identified in the country as a whole, census experts are still confident that they can produce fairly reliable figures for those four provinces, but, again, given the sensitivity involved in all matters related to representation, that lack of survey is also bound to compound the suspicion already created by low registration figures.

A third challenge is, of course, funding. The voter registration process itself is almost fully funded, with a shortfall of just $2.6 million, but the election itself is only partially funded, to a very limited extent. To date, the figures are as follows: of the $107.8 million needed to cover presidential and parliamentary elections as well as out-of-country registration and voting, as well as security, only $66.1 million were pledged at the Berlin conference in April, and only $27.7 million have been secured so far. This creates a particularly serious problem for refugee voting, which I will come back to later.

Following lengthy debates within the Cabinet and the Joint Electoral Management Body, the Electoral Law has now been finalized. The main point under discussion has been the role of political parties during the transitional election. Because the creation of single-member constituencies for all 240 seats in the future Lower House was not an option, at least for the Transitional Government, the point of departure for the recently adopted electoral system is the establishment of multi-member constituencies based on the boundaries of the current provinces.

Some have argued that, in order to promote multi-party democracy, it was advisable to encourage existing political parties to serve as intermediaries between the voters and their representatives in Parliament through the creation of party lists. Others feel very strongly that the electoral system should not rely on political parties — which still have a largely negative image in public opinion — and should, on the contrary, promote a direct relationship between voters and their representatives in Parliament. The latter view has prevailed, and the current law places political party representatives and independent candidates on the same footing. The system chosen — the Single Non-Transferable Vote — has the merit of being simple to explain and fairly simple to operate, but it also tends to spread the vote widely among candidates, leading, therefore, to a potentially very fragmented representation in Parliament. In order to try to contain those disadvantages, some prerequisites for the nomination of candidates have been included in the Law which are meant to mitigate the problem of fragmentation. As to the representation of women, the Electoral Law ensures compliance with the constitutional requirement that, on average, two women per province be elected to the Lower House by providing that the best- performing women will automatically get the seats that the provincial quota requires.

A few words now about local elections and also about refugee participation in the elections. In February of this year, it was agreed that the elections to be held in September would include only the presidential election and elections to the Lower House. Local elections, it was agreed, would take place in a staggered way over a period of six months, and the full Upper House would be constituted soon after. This, it turns out, was a wise decision, since the settlement of disputes concerning district boundaries — obviously, a precondition for local elections — has not yet been completed and is likely to take quite some time.

I referred briefly to the issue of out-of-country registration and voting. It is hoped that a final decision will be made soon by the electoral authorities, in consultation with the central Government. Certainly, the participation of refugees in the upcoming elections is important, but one has to understand that the challenges are considerable. Indeed, with the goal of enabling more than 2 million refugees to vote, this is the largest out-of-country voting operation ever undertaken in a post-conflict context.

In Berlin, we had presented the international community with a bill for full registration and voting in Iran and Pakistan amounting to $37.6 million. Some donors were concerned about the high price, in particular if it covered only presidential elections — which is the choice of the Cabinet. Together with the Afghan Electoral Commission, we have been working on less expensive options, but they raise some issues of credibility, particularly where the identification of eligible voters is difficult. Again, we hope that a solution that meets electoral standards and provides franchise for the overwhelming majority of refugees will soon be found.

A few words now about political parties, obviously key actors in the electoral process. The registration of political parties has been slow and difficult. This is in part because the Political Party Law sought, understandably, to limit the right to operate legally to those groups that were not related to military organizations. But that criterion has proved very difficult to implement — and let us remember, after all, that the main partners in the coalition Government are, or have been, in fact, heads of political or military organizations themselves. As of today, 16 parties have been registered, out of the 48 that have applied. We continue to encourage donors to provide some capacity to those registered parties — on an equal basis — in order to enable them to participate meaningfully in the upcoming elections.

The status of political parties takes us directly to the all-important issue of the political environment in which the upcoming elections are to take place. You may remember, Mr. President, that in August of last year, Ambassador Brahimi circulated to the Council a draft work plan that contained a series of security and political benchmarks that the country had to meet in order to be able to hold free and fair elections, leading, as the Bonn Agreement requires, to a fully representative Government.

Those political measures included the adoption of a Political Party Law; the registration of political parties; the revision of the existing Press Law to enhance the protection of journalists; the creation of a Media Monitoring Commission; a Code of Conduct for political parties; and the issuance by the central Government of clear instructions to officials, both military and civilian, regarding their behaviour during the electoral campaign.

Those measures are at various stages of implementation today. As I mentioned earlier, the Political Party Law has been adopted, and political parties are being registered, albeit slowly. A new Media Law has been passed which has some shortcomings but is overall considered to be a major improvement over the Press Law adopted in 1992. Following the adoption of the Electoral Law, the electoral authorities are now in the process of establishing a media monitoring commission, which will have to start operating 60 days before the elections. A code of conduct has now been approved by the electoral authorities and is open for signature to political parties. Finally, the organization of a campaign of verification of political rights is now being discussed between the Afghan Human Rights Commission and UNAMA and we hope that it will start in the next couple of weeks.

Among the benchmarks for the holding of free and fair elections, one stands out in the minds of an overwhelming majority of Afghans: disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. The importance of DDR goes, of course, beyond the elections themselves. It is a critical component of a larger process aimed at addressing one of the most dangerous legacies of the lengthy war in Afghanistan, namely, the continued existence of multiple armies that jeopardize the building of a viable Afghan State and constitute a permanent threat to civil peace.

But the significance of DDR for the shorter-term electoral process cannot be overestimated. Indeed, Afghans, irrespective of geographical origin and ethnic affiliation, have reaffirmed on countless occasions since the Emergency Loya Jirga that a genuine exercise in electoral choice could take place only if the grip of local militias on the political process was loosened. The principal goal of the 2004 elections — strengthening the legitimacy and authority of the next Afghan Government — would no doubt be compromised if public perception should prevail that

the election was distorted by military intimidation and interference.

This is why UNAMA has been insisting that DDR, while negotiable, is not optional, but both a central and urgent task of the Transitional Government. Naturally, it is also a very complex and sensitive task. Coercive disarmament is not an option in Afghanistan. Even if the central Government had the will to conduct compulsory demobilization, it does not have the means to match. The process of disarmament is therefore, unavoidably, a voluntary process. It requires a combination of factors that include a measure of overall confidence in the institutions of the State, in particular the Ministry of Defence; the confidence of soldiers and commanders in the sustainability of reintegration; and the confidence of factional leaders in their security and their integration in the political future of the country.

As members are aware, following the completion of the pilot projects from December 2003 to February 2004, the Government and the international community have reached an agreement on the main phase of DDR, which is to include, by June, 40 per cent of the militia forces and, by July, the full cantonment of heavy weapons under a reliable safekeeping arrangement. The implementation of this agreement, however, has encountered very serious delays. Senior commanders have been reluctant to cooperate with the process on a variety of grounds. They have cited a lack of balance in DDR between rival armed formations; Taliban operations in the South; and a lack of confidence in the prospects for reintegration, including political integration. Some of these concerns can be entertained and have been addressed through adjustments that have been made in the past few days to the DDR plan. As a result, we expect more cooperation with the plan from a variety of senior commanders from now on.

With regard to political integration, discussions have been taking place on and off for many months. We hope that an understanding can now materialize and, just as importantly, that this understanding between the Government and senior commanders will advance the main priorities on Afghanistan's national agenda: disarmament, the strengthening of national institutions, the rule of law, the observance of human rights and the all-important fight against drugs.

As to heavy weapons cantonment — an important component of the DDR process — the country-wide survey is now complete. So far, about 3,000 functioning or repairable weapons systems have been surveyed. Heavy weapons cantonment is now about to start in Gardez and in Kandahar and will take around a month to complete in each location. I should also stress that in Kabul, where heavy weapons cantonment started last November, ISAF hopes that full cantonment will be achieved in one week to 10 days.

In conclusion, I would like to stress that there is no doubt about the positive impact that the holding of genuine national elections can have on the consolidation of peace in Afghanistan. This election can be an invaluable means to a critical end, namely, that of broadening the legitimacy of the new State and strengthening its authority to address the persisting problems of violent extremism, factionalism, drugs and what is still a sombre picture in terms of human rights. Surprisingly, perhaps, in a country without a strong electoral tradition, voter registration has mobilized the population at large, which is insistently demanding participation in the electoral process. This certainly should allay the concerns of those who may fear that these elections have no popular support. There is momentum and there are expectations. Those — not a small number — who were disappointed after June 2002 by the composition of the Transitional Government — deemed too unrepresentative of the nation as a whole — have now transferred their hopes to the national elections.

But this momentum and these expectations also place a considerable burden on the electoral process and the environment in which it will take place. As I said before, a process that is perceived to be biased and distorted could deeply undermine hopes, which were enhanced by the adoption of the new Constitution, that differences among Afghans can be settled through peaceful political means. Let us not make any mistake in that regard: the requirements of freedom and fairness are not a foreign standard. They are deeply a prerequisite for the holding of an election that will further peace, stability and national reconciliation in Afghanistan. Much of the responsibility for providing this environment will certainly rest with the Afghans themselves. In particular, those Afghan leaders who aspire to the authority that stems from a national election must know that the anticipated legitimacy of its outcome is predicated upon the legitimacy of the process itself. But the burden also rests on the international community.

Let me conclude, as I started, with a mention of the security issue and take advantage of this opportunity — perhaps the last — to call upon the States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to respond to the appeal of their Secretary General and allow that organization to meet the commitments it has given to the people of Afghanistan. Security in general, and that of the electoral process in particular, is ultimately an Afghan responsibility, but it is a responsibility that Afghans currently cannot shoulder without international assistance. A widespread, robust international military presence in support of domestic security forces remains absolutely critical. The persistent woes of Afghanistan — terrorism, factionalism and criminal networks — are as much at work today as they were two years ago and their ability to subvert State-building and a genuine political process is hardly diminished. Whether it is counter-terrorism, electoral security, counter-narcotics or control of factional fighting, at this critical juncture for the Afghan peace process international security assistance continues to make the difference between success and failure.

The President: In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, I should now like to invite Council members to informal consultations to continue our discussion on the subject.

The meeting rose at 10.50 a.m.

United Nations S/PV.4980

Security Council

Fifty-ninth year

Provisional

4980th meeting

Friday, 28 May 2004, 10 a.m.

New York

President:	Mr. Akram	(Pakistan)
Members:	Algeria	Mr. Baali
	Angola	Mr. Gaspar Martins
	Benin	Mr. Adechi
	Brazil	Mr. Sardenberg
	Chile	Mr. Maquieira
	China	Mr. Wang Guangya
	France	Mr. Duclos
	Germany	Mr. Trautwein
	Philippines	Mr. Baja
	Romania	Mr. Motoc
	Russian Federation	Mr. Konuzin
	Spain	Mr. Yáñez-Barnuevo
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Mr. Thomson
	United States of America	Mr. Holliday

Agenda

Complex crises and United Nations response

Letter dated 24 May 2004 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2004/423)

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04-36779 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

Complex crises and United Nations response

Letter dated 24 May 2004 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General (S/2004/423)

The President: In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Jan Egeland, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I invite Mr. Jan Egeland to take a seat at the Council table.

In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council' prior consultations, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Ms. Marjatta Rasi, President of the Economic and Social Council.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

I invite Ms. Marjatta Rasi to take a seat at the Council table.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members of the Council have before them a letter dated 24 May 2004 from the Permanent Representative of Pakistan addressed to the Secretary-General, contained in document S/2004/423.

The Security Council is holding an important debate today. Over the past several years, complex crises and emergencies have increasingly afflicted different parts of the world, particularly in Africa.

Complex crises are characterized by the interlinkages among their military, security, political, economic, social and humanitarian dimensions. The overall political, economic and humanitarian costs imposed by these complex crises are of serious concern to the entire international community. Preventing and effectively responding to these crises must therefore be a matter of high priority for the Security Council in particular and for the United Nations system as a whole.

Over the past several months, the Security Council has held several debates focusing on individual aspects of complex crises and the international response to them, including, among other issues, the protection of civilians in armed conflict, the proliferation of mercenaries, small arms and light weapons, justice and the rule of law, cooperation with regional organizations, the role of the United Nations in post-conflict stabilization and the role of business in conflict prevention, peacekeeping and post-conflict peace-building.

This debate on complex crises and the United Nations response is intended to take a strategic look at the interrelated issues constituting complex crises and to see how long-term, comprehensive, integrated and composite approaches can be developed and implemented with enhanced, system-wide coordination.

I shall now give the floor to the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mr. Jan Egeland, to give the Council the perspective of the United Nations Secretariat on this issue.

Mr. Egeland: A discussion of complex crises and the United Nations response is important to have at a time when so many people remain trapped by conflict and caught up in long-term complex crises, issues which are integral to my role as Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator.

Complex emergencies and their aftermath embody not only military and security dimensions but fundamental political, economic, social and humanitarian dimensions as well. They are longer-running crises where the very process of conflict has had a dramatic impact on societal structures, government institutions and the ability of extended families and communities to support each other. That is why there is a responsibility and a need for international assistance. A comprehensive and integrated approach is crucial if real and sustainable

achievements are to be made. In situations of transition, for example, progress on security and political developments need to be accompanied by corresponding progress on the humanitarian, social and economic fronts if the peace is to take hold.

It is therefore the collective responsibility of all of us — the Security Council, the General Assembly, individual Member States, regional organizations, the various United Nations departments, agencies and programmes and non-governmental organizations — not only to perform our respective roles as effectively as possible, but to respond to these issues together, as a cohesive whole. We all have an important role to play, whether in addressing the underlying causes of conflict, preventing armed conflicts from taking root, intervening during armed conflict to protect civilians and provide lifesaving humanitarian assistance, supporting peace processes or assisting countries emerging from conflict through the delicate period of transition into situations of consolidated peace and sustainable development.

Every day men, women and children in conflicts around the world are being actively and deliberately targeted by parties to conflicts and subjected to extreme violence and other grave human rights abuse. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo alone, more than 2 million people have been killed as a result of long-term conflict, and tens of thousands of women and children have been subjected to unspeakable forms of sexual violence. Currently, a staggering 50 million people have been displaced from their homes by conflict, and many of them are struggling to survive in harsh conditions. The suffering inflicted on civilians in complex emergencies is all too often aggravated by the denial or restrictions on humanitarian access to populations in need.

The current crisis in the Darfur region of the Sudan provides an alarming example: more than 1 million civilians, mostly women and children, have been displaced and are in dire need of shelter, water, food and medical supplies. Complex emergencies increase vulnerability, and when natural disasters occur concurrently the effects are extreme, as the devastating floods in Haiti this week demonstrate. These grave concerns demand a concerted response by us all.

In situations of armed conflict, Governments bear the primary responsibility to provide humanitarian assistance and to protect civilians. It is when Governments do not have the capacity or are unwilling to provide assistance and protection that the United Nations must execute its special role and responsibilities. All United Nations departments and humanitarian agencies stand ready to carry out this important work whenever and wherever it is required. But we cannot do so when we are denied access to populations in need, when the safety and security of our personnel is threatened and when we do not receive adequate funding for our humanitarian work.

Tragically, it is those who most need our assistance who are often denied it. In 20 conflicts around the world, humanitarian access is being either denied or obstructed for an estimated 10 million people in need of food, water, shelter and medical care. Restrictions on access continue to deny life-saving assistance to some 500,000 civilians in Liberia, 2.2 million in the Central African Republic and 1.5 million in Côte d'Ivoire. A similar situation exists in Afghanistan, where access to 1 million people in rural areas in the southern and eastern parts of the country is very limited and insecure.

Assistance to civilians in need is also undermined by the skewed flows of humanitarian funding for complex emergencies. In 2003, humanitarian appeals for 13 African crises sought $2.2 billion, and less than half of that amount was received. Meanwhile, the $1 billion sought by the United Nations appeal for Iraq alone was fully met by donors. This reflects the harsh reality that political interests, strategic priorities and the media spotlight create enormously disproportionate responses. I encourage the Security Council to consider carefully the links between the maintenance international peace and security and inadequate funding in certain crises.

Post-conflict situations exemplify the importance of ensuring that adequate funding is provided not only for life-sustaining humanitarian assistance, but also for other programmes that will impact significantly on sustainable peace. Effective peace and reconciliation processes require effective social and administrative structures. It is important, therefore, that schools and their teachers, health centres and their workers, local administrative offices and local welfare and community structures not be neglected by the international community.

Our experience with the consolidated appeals process, however, reveals that while donor countries

are willing to support initiatives that address immediate humanitarian needs, the longer-term or medium-term tools of peace, such as education, health care and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes, are often under-funded.

The Security Council has a critical role in responding to complex emergencies and protecting civilians. Thus, in resolution 1296 (2000), the Council requests the Secretary-General to bring to its attention situations of grave concern in respect of the protection of civilians in armed conflict. We should make more frequent use of that mechanism. It is equally critical that we bring situations of concern to the attention of the Council as early as possible. Greater use should therefore be made of resolution 1366 (2001) on the prevention of armed conflict, which encourages the Secretary-General to convey to the Security Council his assessment of potential threats to international peace and security.

Early warning is critical to conflict prevention. Timely and effective early-warning analyses play a key role in helping the United Nations and the broader international community to detect and prevent complex humanitarian crises. For example, in Guinea-Bissau, contingency planning enhanced United Nations preparedness in the event that humanitarian assistance is required. But there is no point in contingency planning if we do not have the resources to do something about it.

Today's conflict management cannot be successful without the strong and decisive involvement of regional organizations. For example, the African Union's current involvement in the Darfur crisis is critical to the international community's response. Similarly, the timely deployment of the Economic Community of West African States Mission in Liberia forces was instrumental in responding to the political opportunity of bringing stability to that war-torn country.

Issues such as human trafficking, the illicit flow of arms, the illegal exploitation of natural resources and the cross-border movement of displaced persons and combatants require regional mechanisms and commitments if they are to be properly addressed. The regional and international communities, in turn, have a responsibility to provide targeted long-term assistance to weak States to strengthen their institutions, to respond at an earlier stage in humanitarian crises and to maintain a robust presence in post-conflict countries to promote respect for human rights, the consolidation of good governance and peace-building processes.

At the root of most conflicts are issues of poverty, corruption, deliberate manipulation of minority groups and social inequity and exclusion. Dealing effectively with complex crises requires us to address these root causes. In countries recovering from conflict, peace and national reconciliation ultimately depend on changes in attitude and behaviour within society. This is particularly the case in societies that have become polarized. Far too often, peace processes are seen as the prerogative of combatant forces, but lasting peace and national reconciliation will depend on developing a social climate that seeks to sustain peace. All sectors and elements of society, not just fighting forces, need to be brought together to this end of reconciliation. The critical role of women in peace processes must be recognized and actively supported.

It is the millions of voiceless that require our attention and commitment. It is the father who is powerless to protect his family from brutal attacks, the mother who has no access to medical care and is helpless to save her sick child, the young child who wakes up each morning faced with the trauma of war and violence and a life without a future, and the teenage girl who has been brutally raped and may never fully recover from the internal injuries she has suffered.

Those are the people who are depending on us. They will judge our success, a success that will be determined by the number of people we are able to assist and protect as a result of swift and decisive action. The Security Council's continued commitment to this shared goal is vital.

The President: I thank Mr. Jan Egeland for his very insightful briefing.

I now give the floor to Ms. Marjatta Rasi, President of the Economic and Social Council.

Ms. Rasi: Thank you very much, Mr. President, for inviting me to participate in this important discussion in my capacity as President of the Economic and Social Council. It is indeed an honour for me to be here today.

I warmly welcome today's debate on complex crises, which continues and consolidates the Security Council's debates held over the past years focusing on

individual aspects of complex crises and international response. Complex crises necessitate collaborative responses in which the various organs of the United Nations have a complementary role.

Recently, the most important contribution of the Economic and Social Council to the response by the United Nations to countries in crisis has been its involvement in African countries emerging from conflict. This involvement materialized with the creation of Ad Hoc Advisory Groups on Guinea-Bissau and on Burundi, whose mandate is to examine the humanitarian and economic needs of the countries in question, review international support programmes, provide advice on their effectiveness and make recommendations for a long-term programme of support based on a comprehensive approach to peace, security and stability.

The Economic and Social Council has started to assess the work of these Groups in preparation for the debate to be held at the substantive session of the Council in July. The discussions held so far have clearly highlighted the relevance and usefulness of the Groups as mechanisms for promoting a comprehensive approach to peace and development and mobilizing support for the countries to avoid their relapse into conflict. Although the Groups are mandated to work on countries emerging from conflict, the lessons learned from their work are also relevant to other crisis situations, as what is at stake here is to ensure a coordinated approach between major stakeholders and proper consideration of the multiplicity of causes behind a conflict.

The Economic and Social Council's Ad Hoc Advisory Groups have fostered a coordinated approach to the situations in Guinea-Bissau and in Burundi within the United Nations system at large: the Secretariat and its political, economic and social and humanitarian branches; the heads of United Nations political offices in the countries concerned; the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), both at headquarters and at the field level; and the funds, programmes and specialized agencies of the United Nations. The Groups have had to rely on them all to have a clear picture of the situation, make policy recommendations and propose mechanisms to support those countries. By doing so, the intergovernmental process has advocated and pushed for greater coherence in the work of the United Nations system. The Economic and Social Council, as an open forum involving United Nations agencies, civil society and, increasingly, the private sector, is in a unique position for this task.

In addition, the Groups have engaged in close interaction with the Bretton Woods institutions, a major aspect of the evolution of the work of the United Nations in the economic and social fields. Working relations between the Economic and Social Council and those institutions are a reality today in the financing for development process and in the debates on sustainable development. They remain less systematic in the security and political fields, and could be strengthened so that Bretton Woods institutions' analysis and capacity of action can be fully used in synergy with United Nations efforts. The role of those institutions in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants, as in the case of Burundi, also awaits stronger ties between us.

To ensure coherence, these initiatives by the Economic and Social Council must be linked to the work of the Security Council. I am pleased that our respective bodies are interacting in a more frequent and coherent way, as illustrated by the reference to the Economic and Social Council Groups in the Security Council's presidential statements on issues of common concern. We must not lose this progress through which our two Councils, with their respective roles and responsibilities under the Charter, can make the comprehensive approach to peace and development that the United Nations system has called for a reality.

The United Nations Development Group/United Nations Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs working group on transition issues, established by the Economic and Social Council in response to the Secretary-General's 2002 report on strengthening the United Nations (A/57/387), recently submitted its report. The report on transition issues is based on experience from very different countries. It reflects a number of variations of transition and reveals clearly the problems in the system-wide response. Key findings of the report, for which we now need to find concrete solutions, include the following.

Humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction can and will overlap. These actions must often be accompanied by continuous crisis mitigation and prevention to avoid setbacks.

Peacekeeping and security must be part of a coherent approach. Ownership at the central

Government level and the local level in the affected country is essential. As the responsibility rests with the country itself, capacity-building, a participatory approach and strengthening of the decision-making process are key elements of a real transition. Cross-cutting issues of gender and human rights must be taken into account in all planning and action.

Questions related to justice and rule of law issues are often at the core of conflicts, and their importance is becoming increasingly recognized in planning the response of the international community to various crisis situations. As addressing issues related to the rule of law is necessary throughout the conflict cycle, the development of an effective response by the United Nations system to the challenges posed by complex crisis situations would benefit from increased cooperation between our respective bodies and throughout the United Nations system.

Adequate, flexible and sustained funding is required. There are important ongoing discussions regarding external donors and conflict-related assistance, and this will surely be reflected in the various segments of the Economic and Social Council as well.

In conclusion, I would like to draw the attention of the Council to the upcoming Economic and Social Council event on 12 July, as part of its substantive session, on the transition from relief to development. That event is a significant start and the first initiative of its kind at the intergovernmental level. It deserves an inclusive follow-up in some form. I trust that the debates at, and outcomes of, that event will also be of great relevance to the Security Council, as they will contribute to improved United Nations interventions in this critical phase of crisis situations.

The President: I thank the President of the Economic and Social Council for her statement.

Mr. Yáñez-Barnuevo (Spain) (*spoke in Spanish*): At the outset, Sir, let me welcome the initiative taken by your country's presidency to convene this open meeting of the Security Council. This provides an excellent opportunity for joint reflection on United Nations response to so-called complex crises.

As the presidency emphasizes in the paper that has been distributed as a basis for our discussions, such complex crises are conflicts that have not only military and security dimensions but also political, economic, social and humanitarian aspects. They often spill over national borders and increasingly are taking on regional dimensions.

The briefing we heard this morning — for which we are most appreciative — by Mr. Jan Egeland, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, emphasizes the tremendous challenges posed by such complex crises for the peoples afflicted, the regions most directly affected, the entire international community and, of course, the United Nations system.

It is generally agreed that the emergence of failed or collapsed States poses a threat to regional stability and even, in some cases, to global stability. Accordingly, the international community must decisively tackle such situations.

Political instability is but one factor — although an important one — in the emergence of such complex crises. Other factors also play an important role, whether by provoking such crises or by aggravating them, and are often a result of the crises themselves. I refer here to environmental aspects and to problems such as extreme poverty, inadequate sanitation, difficulties resulting from serious social or gender-related inequalities, and the forced displacement of peoples, among others.

The challenges inherent in complex crises are quite unlike those posed by other, more traditional, types of threats, and, as a result, prompt the international community to engage in a discussion on the necessary balance between State sovereignty and collective action. We are speaking here of threats that do not respect borders and can be dealt with only through international cooperation and effective international action.

In an analysis of complex crises, the line between conflict prevention and the maintenance and building of peace becomes blurred. Peace-building often starts in the peacekeeping phase, as reflected in the mandates adopted in recent years by the Security Council for certain complex and multidimensional missions. The peace-building phase also has an important preventive aspect, in order to prevent the fragile situation typical of States emerging from a crisis from degenerating into yet another armed conflict.

Let us not forget that the majority of conflicts today are essentially internal and that they often recur. Approximately 40 per cent of States that have emerged

from a conflict situation find themselves once again involved in a dynamic of armed confrontation relatively soon — a percentage that rises to 60 per cent in the case of Africa. Thus the prevention of conflict recurrence is as important — perhaps even more important — than prevention of conflict emergence. That aspect must be given due consideration in the work of the Security Council.

In tackling complex crises, prevention, as emphasized by Mr. Egeland, plays a pivotal role. Conflict prevention must be based on a broad concept of security that comprises political aspects, good governance, sustainable development, respect for human rights, and combating inequality and marginalization.

In terms of prevention, early warning must be accompanied by an early response. It is not very useful to get the necessary information on a potential crisis if the international community is not prepared to take decisive action to prevent it. Sometimes the need to deal with ongoing crises distracts us from potential conflicts. Early warning is of no use either if no effort is made to contain and mitigate the conflict situation immediately. Early warning and response require an analysis of the situation that includes the root causes of the crisis, follow-up to the processes and factors involved, and an intervention complemented by mechanisms and measures geared to responding to the root causes of the crisis.

Early warning and response require an understanding of a situation achieved by analyzing the bases of a conflict, anticipation through an analysis of the processes of a conflict and its particular contextual circumstances, and intervention based on a broad inventory of ways and means suitable to that situation.

While there are many early warning systems within the United Nations, we believe that the time has come to give serious consideration to how they can be coordinated so that the information at their disposal can contribute effectively and immediately to the decision-making process. In that connection, the role of the Secretary-General pursuant to Article 99 of the Charter is critical. In particular, the Secretary-General's initiative to appoint a special adviser for the prevention of genocide and other especially serious crimes is promising, in that it will ensure that the relevant information will reach the highest decision-making bodies early enough.

In the prevention of a crisis or its recurrence, the Security Council should not be the only body involved. The task must be shared by the system's agencies and organizations. This raises the crucial issue of the Organization's requisite institutional architecture. We must determine whether it is suitable, in particular in the post-conflict transitional phase, for moving towards stabilization, rehabilitation and reconstruction.

Increased interaction between the Security Council, other major United Nations bodies and the High Commissioners for Refugees and Human Rights has become ever more necessary to providing a consistent and integrated response to the challenges inherent in complex crises. In this regard, I wish to welcome among us the President of the Economic and Social Council. We highly appreciate her contribution to the discharge of tasks and the adoption of measures undertaken by the Security Council in this connection. The Economic and Social Council is certainly highly suited to performing such work, pursuant to Article 65 of the Charter. One specific example of the increased interaction between the Economic and Social Council and the Security Council will be the participation of representatives from one of the Economic and Social Council's ad hoc advisory groups in the Security Council's forthcoming mission to West Africa in June.

Once a crisis has erupted and the Security Council and other bodies of the United Nations system have begun to respond to it, it must be met by the joint and consistent implementation of the following measures.

First, there must be strong local leadership with a broad social base that enjoys the firm support of the international community. Otherwise, international efforts to provide assistance may be doomed to failure, particularly in the humanitarian sphere. Secondly, we must prepare an integrated plan, adapted to the situation on the ground, and resist the temptation to make a hasty exit. Initial military success does not guarantee the resolution of the deep-rooted cause of a complex crisis or emergency. Thirdly, we must mobilize sufficient resources to implement the integrated plan and make consistent use of the appropriate tools with a view to ensuring that those resources are not wasted. Fourthly, we must maintain constant monitoring of the plan and of the evolution of the situation on the ground with a view to responding to changing circumstances.

In the context of complex crises, we cannot fail to note the relevant role of the competent regional organizations and, with respect to African crises, of the African Union and such bodies as the Economic Community of West African States in particular. In the European sphere, of which Spain is a part, we would emphasize the active work of the European Union to implement the Joint Declaration on strengthening cooperation in the civil management of crises, signed with the United Nations in September 2003.

The role of international civil society, in cooperation with Governments and international organizations, is also critical. In this connection, I would note the adoption in Dublin in April of an Action Agenda on the Prevention of Violent Conflict. The Agenda is the outcome of dialogue among more than 200 participants, including organizations from civil society, Governments and multilateral organizations. It contains interesting recommendations on cooperation between civil society and the United Nations system in the areas of early warning and response and of assessing post-conflict situations.

Ultimately, the success of efforts to change the dynamics of conflict that characterize complex crises into a dynamic for peace depends on the firm long-term commitment of the international community, including through an integrated plan with clear objectives, the firm resolve of the authorities of the State emerging from crisis, the implementation of measures necessary to building peace and ensuring national reconciliation, the political and financial support of the international community for transitional institutions, and the provision of tools adapted to the challenges of peace-building in the post-conflict period.

Mr. Wang Guangya (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): I wish to thank you, Sir, for taking the initiative to convene today's meeting. I also welcome the presence and statements of the President of the Economic and Social Council, Ambassador Rasi, and Under-Secretary-General Egeland.

Since the end of the cold war, some regions of the world have been afflicted by frequent conflicts, mostly intra-State, with ethnic and religious dimensions as well as political, economic, social and humanitarian facets. In many cases, such conflicts also affect the peace and stability of neighbouring countries and regions. The important issue of how effectively to address such complex crises calls for serious consideration by the Security Council and the United Nations membership as a whole. In that context, I wish to make the following comments.

First, priority must be accorded to prevention. Conflict prevention is the first and a significant step in the resolution of complex crises. In recent years, in the face of multiplying complex crises, the Secretary-General has repeatedly emphasized that the United Nations should move from a culture of response to a culture of prevention. The Security Council and the General Assembly have adopted resolutions on the prevention of conflicts. We support the increased efforts of the United Nations to add preventive diplomacy to the arsenal of important instruments available to fulfil its functions.

The Security Council, with its primary responsibilities in that regard, should formulate an integrated preventive strategy suited to the characteristics of complex crises. The General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the various United Nations agencies, on the basis of their comparative advantages and acting within their respective competences, should develop synergy in their conflict prevention efforts.

Secondly, priority must be attached to development. Granted, the resolution of complex crises calls for a series of measures, including the containment and resolution of conflicts, security sector reforms, the provision of humanitarian relief, the establishment of the rule of law and the promotion of good governance. To eliminate the underlying root causes of crises, development must be made a top priority.

Post-cold war crises and conflicts occur mostly in underdeveloped countries and regions, basically because of their chronic poverty and backwardness and failure to benefit from economic globalization. Therefore, the United Nations should devote greater attention to development, vigorously foster a culture of development, strive to help developing countries eradicate poverty and develop their economies and increase its involvement in post-conflict regional and national reconstruction. The Economic and Social Council can play an even greater role in that regard.

Thirdly, the synergy and coordination between United Nations and regional organizations must be enhanced. Regional organizations have a unique

advantage in maintaining the stability of regions. In recent years, the Security Council has had fruitful cooperation with the African Union (AU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and other regional and subregional organizations on the questions of Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire and Burundi. In order to further enhance such synergy and cooperation the Security Council, in addressing complex crises, should seek the views of regional organizations on a wider basis, share its information with regional organizations and achieve mutual complementarity with them.

The Secretary-General's special envoys can join the special envoys of the AU and other regional organizations in their good offices and mediation efforts. In addition, the United Nations should increase assistance to regional organizations such as the AU, to help them enhance their overall capacity in early warning, peacekeeping and other endeavours.

United Nations experience has shown that there is no single formula that is universally applicable to the resolution of complex crises. Any solution must be tailored to local conditions, varying cultures and historical backgrounds. At the same time, in the process of crisis resolution the will of the people of the countries concerned should be respected and their views fully sought. Only thus can the settlement plans surely contribute to the resolution of crises and the attainment of peace.

Mr. Sardenberg (Brazil): Mr. President, I wish to express our appreciation to you for convening this public meeting on a fundamental issue such as complex crises, which call for a United Nations response. We are also pleased to have among us Under-Secretary-General Jan Egeland, head of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, and Ambassador Marjatta Rasi, President of the Economic and Social Council.

We believe that our response to crises throughout the world has not been entirely appropriate — the military approach to security has been superseding the human approach, and as stated in your non-paper of 18 May, we consider that "the intrinsic link between peace and development must remain at the core of UN response" to complex crises.

The President has laid down a series of questions that this debate on complex crises should attempt to address with clarity and objectivity. My comments shall focus on two of those topics: preventive diplomatic action and post-conflict peace-building.

Concerning preventive diplomatic action — or what we could call conflict avoidance — we believe that a much more energetic and consistent role must be played by the whole collective security mechanism provided by the United Nations Charter. That actually means a rededication of our Organization and all its Members to the resolve of "the peoples of the United Nations" made clear in the Charter's Preamble. That also means a renewed commitment to the lofty aims of the Purposes and Principles contained in the Charter. The sixtieth anniversary of the United Nations in 2005 represents a golden opportunity that must not be missed. It should be the culmination of the many efforts now being carried out in the field of peace and security.

International realities are changing at an alarming pace, thus requiring institutional change in the Organization, including a reform of the Security Council, as its composition and procedures have clearly become inadequate for current needs related to its primary responsibility — the maintenance of international peace and security.

A revitalization of the General Assembly is also required. Along with updating its work methods, it must make full use of the potentialities envisaged in Articles 10, 11 and 13 of the Charter.

In that connection, the General Assembly should play a larger role in considering the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of international peace and security and in drawing the attention of the Council to situations that are likely to endanger peace and security. The Assembly should also significantly increase its role in promoting cooperation in the political field, thus enhancing its contribution to the strengthening of international peace and security. Appropriate recommendations should be made to that effect.

The instrumentalities relating to the pacific settlement of disputes, and actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression, as well as regional arrangements, should be urgently revisited. I refer to Chapters VI, VII and VIII of the United Nations Charter.

Regional organizations have an increasingly important role to play in the overall international effort

for peace and security. Some weeks ago we had examples when we were briefed by the Chairman-in-Office of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

But we see the primary role of the regional organizations as one of a preventive nature. Their particularly important contribution lies in addressing the root causes of conflict and violations of human rights before they escalate into major conflicts. Smaller regional organizations are more flexible and are closer to the sources of conflict than the United Nations. They are in a better position to detect the early symptoms and act promptly, thus preventing intrastate differences from evolving into intolerance, prejudice, hatred and conflict.

Moreover, the root causes of conflict are often region-specific: in Kosovo they might be very different from those in Darfur, which might in turn widely differ from the Haitian question. Preventive diplomacy should be consistently taken up by regional organizations. We believe that partnership between those organizations and the United Nations ought to be expanded.

We welcome the periodic meetings with regional organizations promoted by the United Nations and aimed at optimizing the use of resources and avoiding duplication. In many cases, the international community must provide assistance to enable regional organizations to shoulder their responsibilities.

Needless to say, when prevention fails and enforcement actions are needed, military action should remain the prerogative of this Council. The Council may, as well, empower regional arrangements to enforce action, as stated in Article 53 of the Charter, when such possibility is foreseen in their constitutive act.

Underdevelopment and under-education are found at the root of most conflicts in the world. Economic inequalities and poverty exacerbate differences and intolerance and invariably kindle friction and, ultimately, conflict. From a strictly academic perspective, it is worth noting that the root causes of conflict will recur after any peacekeeping intervention if sufficient attention is not paid to sustained development, thus creating a very vicious circle.

This brings me to the second topic: peace-building, in the sense of post-conflict efforts that must follow a peacekeeping operation. As we have seen in our recent debate on the issue, among the 15 peacekeeping operations now being deployed by the United Nations, eight are considered complex.

In complex crises, the State and society have eroded. Therefore, the United Nations cannot limit itself to military security. A much broader concept of security has to be applied to these situations: the population must be protected, humanitarian assistance delivered, reconciliation among factions forged, combatants disarmed and reintegrated, interim authorities put in place, law and order reestablished, elections organized, Government institutions reformed, and infrastructure and the economy rebuilt. That is a long list, but it may not be a complete one.

We believe that the element of economic reconstruction has not been underscored enough in our resolutions. We need to apply more time and energy and to spend our resources more effectively in quick-impact economic programmes that could in a short period of time transform the daily reality of individuals and of small communities. We believe that the only way to sustain peace is by enhancing the development components of peacekeeping operations.

Since the Council is the primary organ for peace and security in the world, it is therefore our responsibility to ensure that peacekeeping operations are effective. But they can be effective — and cost-effective — only if we incorporate mechanisms of sustained peace into our resolutions. Otherwise countries and populations may easily fall back into conflict. We have to be more creative in our common objective of sustained peace, requesting direct involvement of the Economic and Social Council and of United Nations development agencies. Our concept of exit strategies must primarily be linked to realistic benchmarks, rather than observing rigid deadlines.

Successive recent events demonstrate that we are likely to remain mired in a long-term struggle for peace and security. They also lead us to believe that much more must be done by the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council to ensure that the apparent risk of regional or global systemic failure ceases to exist. Peacekeeping operations are our established response to these events, and their record shows many success stories. But

whenever peacekeeping is needed, conflict prevention has been needed before and peace-building will be needed afterwards.

We might evolve in the future to the establishment of conflict-avoiding operations. While we work within the current framework of peacekeeping, however, we should be able to implement institutional change in the United Nations and to stimulate regional organizations to enhance their reach for the root causes of conflict. We should also incorporate ever more elements of peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction, in particular development and education capacities, into peacekeeping operations.

Mr. Baali (Algeria) (*spoke in French*): As the Council holds its final public meeting of the month, I wish, Mr. President, to extend to you and to the other members of your delegation the appreciation of my delegation for the manner in which you have guided our work, which has been praiseworthy in every respect. I wish also to thank you for your choice of subject for today's debate; its relevance to the work of the Council has been acknowledged by all members. Here, the contributions by Ms. Rasi and Mr. Egeland were most illuminating and provided a new dimension that will broaden our view and will help us hone our response to the challenges before us.

The subject of today's debate is of great interest because it links the United Nations — which is itself an inherently complex system — with complex crisis situations. As observed in the Millennium Declaration, the multidimensional nature of the challenges facing the Organization demands a multidisciplinary approach involving multiple actors in both assessing and addressing crises.

Let me make a key observation with regard specifically to complex crises: most of the situations of which the Council is seized in the context of its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security fall into that category. Moreover, the other principal organs and the agencies of the United Nations system are facing the same situation.

Although it is not appropriate to propose a single definition of these situations, observing them enables us to identify a number of recurrent characteristic elements. Among the causes of complex conflicts and crises are, almost invariably: poverty; corruption; ethnic or religious tensions fuelled by extremism; denial of citizenship; seizure of wealth by social groups, either alone or in association with foreign actors; and the exclusion and social inequality that those practices engender.

The factors causing the outbreak of these crises can vary, but the consequences are constant. They include massive flows of displaced persons and refugees fleeing the fighting and the lack of security, along with a concomitant deterioration of the productive sector. The breakdown of the economy then accelerates that of the State, whose powers and prerogatives are challenged by criminal systems that rise out of its ruins to grasp control of natural resources, whose illegal exploitation enables them to prolong the crisis, because a settlement would run counter to their interests.

But the complexity of a crisis does not stop there. Border-area flows of refugee populations and ethnic situations that cross borders in most conflict zones impose an additional, most often unbearable, burden on the economies of neighbouring countries; the result is to involve States in the crisis. At this point, the crisis reaches a higher level of complexity with interference by neighbouring States. These States are sometimes motivated by a legitimate desire to spare themselves the negative consequences of instability. But more frequently they are motivated by the interplay of tribal or ethnic solidarity, behind which is quickly seen the notion of compensation for harm suffered, which in turn barely conceals covetous designs on the resources of the neighbouring State which has collapsed or is in the process of doing so. The convergence of interests among the criminal armed groups, neighbours and foreign mercenaries and adventurers who never fail to appear in these situations gives rise to a conflict economy which is designed — and which functions — to prolong the crisis and to prevent the regrowth of the State.

We are all aware of those facts, but they are indispensable to understanding the nature of the United Nations response. I think it is only fair to acknowledge that the Organization has for several years fully understood this complexity and that it has begun a process of conceptual and structural adaptation. Concrete progress towards a comprehensive, integrated approach is reflected both in decisions taken by the Secretary-General in areas within his purview in the sphere of inter-agency coordination, and in the progressive, ongoing implementation of the recommendations of the Working Group on

Peacekeeping Operations. Indeed, it cannot be denied that peacekeeping and peace-building operations are increasingly multidisciplinary in nature.

Moreover, in the context of conflict prevention and settlement, recourse to the resources of Chapter VIII of the Charter is becoming more systematic, with a view to integrating the contributions of regional and subregional organizations into this approach. Here, I should highlight the important role played by Special Representatives of the Secretary-General.

However, we believe it premature to talk about genuine comprehensive and integrated strategies for dealing with complex crises at all stages of conflict prevention, conflict settlement and peace-building. In fact, the current situation of a rapidly growing number of crises is generating huge needs. Current operations now employ more than 50,000 individuals and might soon employ 60,000, with an unprecedented annual budget of $3.5 billion. That amount, approaching the amount pledged for development at the Monterrey International Conference on Financing for Development, underlines the gap in the comprehensive, integrated response sought by the international community for conflict prevention and ensuring human security.

We believe that, without question, this gap should be overcome by means of a bolder, more precise approach to detecting and preventing conflicts and by making development a dimension of complex United Nations operations, at the same integral level as the humanitarian and human rights dimensions, whose inclusion in missions is now widely accepted and is made necessary by the massive violations of human rights and other atrocities committed during armed conflicts.

We are aware that this assertion touches upon the Charter, which entrusts other organs with the responsibility for development issues. Yet, we have been inspired to make this assertion by the lucid analysis of the Economic and Social Council's Ad Hoc Advisory Group on African countries emerging from conflict, which spells out the objective limits of the post-conflict involvement of the United Nations Development Group. The debate now under way on United Nations reform provides an opportunity to consider adjusting the Charter with a view to creating the desired integrated response.

We believe that a regional approach to complex crises requires the creation of regional pillars to optimize the use of the resources made available by the pre-existing international security framework. On the African continent in particular, that means that the regional security framework that the African countries are seeking to establish, a process that culminated this week in the launch of the Peace and Security Council, should receive the same level of attention in terms of resource allocation as international operations. In that connection, my delegation welcomes the establishment by the European Union of a financing mechanism to support this process and, in particular, its support of the principle of an African standing force.

Finally, my delegation believes that thorough reform of how the interventions of the international community are carried out is necessary. That necessarily entails reforming the financing of those operations and enlarging the Security Council.

Mr. Adechi (Benin) (*spoke in French*): We thank you, Mr. President, for your initiative of inviting the Council to reflect on the United Nations response to complex crises.

The past two decades have been particularly marked by a considerable development of the United Nations role in armed conflicts. The complexity of those conflicts has led the international community more thoroughly to study their root causes and to find new ways to deal with them effectively. That is the result of a broader approach to threats to international security, responding to the urgent need henceforth to include non-military threats and to take greater account of the preventive dimension of the maintenance of international peace and security.

That led the Security Council to state at the end of its first summit meeting, held on 31 January 1992, that

> "The absence of war and military conflicts amongst States does not in itself ensure international peace and security. The non-military sources of instability in the economic, social, humanitarian and ecological fields have become threats to peace and security. The United Nations membership as a whole, working through the appropriate bodies, needs to give the highest priority to the solution of these matters." (*S/PV.3046, p. 143*)

The changes that have taken place are due, above all, to awareness of the many factors contributing to the gestation and persistence of crises and to the outbreak of armed conflict: factors which must be more precisely examined in settlement and peace-building efforts. Thus, the United Nations system has been led, on the one hand, to outline a strategy for gradually transforming a culture of reaction into one of conflict prevention and, on the other hand, to replace its practice of unsystematic, separate actions with globally coordinated interventions.

In that connection, development assistance must provide a framework for enhancing and intensifying dialogue between donors and recipients to promote the creation of inclusive structures and the greatest possible national absorption capacities. That way, development assistance can become a preferred instrument for promoting peace and preventing conflict.

Broadening the concept of peacekeeping and international security also touches upon the issue of the legitimacy of the Security Council's mandate with respect to the new challenges and the legality of its legislating initiatives in areas where international law has not yet established norms and regulations.

The changing nature of conflicts makes the commitment of significant resources necessary over a longer term. There is unanimous agreement that development is the best way to prevent conflicts. The Security Council, which has primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, has many duties and must henceforth deal with both the nature of crises and the prevention of the grave violations of humanitarian principles that are at the origin of these conflicts -- or that result from them.

The presence at this meeting of the President of the Economic and Social Council and of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator is highly significant in that regard. Increasingly, the main criterion for deciding when to intervene is the actual or foreseen human and social cost of complex crises. That requires the Council to monitor the development of crises and to take the appropriate measures within its purview to protect populations and ensure their right to life where necessary.

The Council has at its disposition a wide range of instruments that it has used over recent years to bring critical situations under control and to steer them towards a more positive outcome. More than in the past, the obligation to act flows from the Council's responsibility to protect and its exclusive right to authorize the legal use of force for that purpose. That is why the Council is more often questioned on its slowness to respond: humanitarian crises bring greater attention to the principle of protecting human dignity.

From this perspective, it is particularly important that the Secretary-General fully and effectively exercise his power to draw the attention of the Security Council to any matter that in his opinion could threaten the maintenance of international peace and security, as set out in Article 99 of the Charter.

It is true that, for a long time, the historical circumstances surrounding the creation of the United Nations and the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of States as set out in the Charter have led to priority being accorded to international crises and conflicts. The increase in intra-State conflict, however, has given rise to a new factor in terms of the exercise of the responsibilities of the Secretariat and the Security Council in the area of preventive diplomacy. In that respect, they have an important asset: the representation of the United Nations in the great majority of countries throughout the world. We must therefore accord high priority to the functions of preventive diplomacy, which, based on the Organization's global representation and on its legitimacy, must refine its ability to analyse and anticipate crises and help defuse them in the early stages of development by the use of good offices in the context of joint action by the Security Council and the competent bodies of the regional and subregional organizations concerned.

In terms of policy planning, actions aimed at eradicating the deep-rooted causes of conflict, peacekeeping operations, humanitarian assistance, post-conflict peace-building and national reconciliation efforts and long-term development cannot, therefore, be seen as separate stages or isolated issues. In this regard, we are pleased to note that a clear awareness of the need to include the response to complex crises in a strategy that is both global and regional in nature is beginning to emerge in the international community, especially the United Nations system. Thus the Security Council is required to provide strategic momentum in a multidisciplinary approach, including in its field of action all of the institutions of the United

Nations system, because of the linkage between the causes of conflict and the way in which they interact with one another — hence the need for coordinated action on the part of all those involved.

Such action on the part of the Security Council would enable it to reaffirm, in a durable manner, its leadership in the promotion of international peace and security. To that end, the way in which the Council cooperates with and consults the relevant bodies of the United Nations system should be reconsidered and improved. It goes without saying that, in this context, the question arises of a more flexible reading of the Security Council's mandate.

The Council should also take another look at its own instruments, such as general or targeted sanctions, commissions of inquiry, observation missions, preventive disarmament and the establishment of demilitarized zones — all useful tools available to the Council for the effective conduct of preventive diplomacy.

Because of the level of financial resources that are now required, the creation of special trust funds, especially for short-term initiatives, requires some thought. Recent successes have made clear the relevance of another underutilized tool: the group of friends. That concept, which has been used in a number of different ways, has had varied degrees of success, most recently in the context of the situation in Haiti.

Given the role that regional and subregional organizations could play in the prevention and management of conflict, in reconstruction and in maintaining peace, the Council should promote the strengthening of such institutions and make full use of the potential that they offer so as to enable them better to fulfil their responsibilities.

In this regard, I welcome the fact that this debate is taking place a few days after the launching of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union. That noteworthy development should be supported and encouraged. My delegation would therefore like to repeat the appeal made by the African Union to the entire international community to provide support for that significant example of progress in Africa's determination to manage its own affairs in dealing with problems that have hindered its prosperity and development.

Mr. Baja (Philippines): I would like to thank you, Mr. President, for having convened this meeting on complex crises and the United Nations response. We are also grateful to the President of the Economic and Social Council and the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs for their insightful statements on the subject.

Simple problems call for simple solutions. But complex problems do not necessarily require complex solutions. The key to solving complex crises faced by the international community today is to have a comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable response from the United Nations system. A comprehensive and integrated approach would ensure that we would have a sustained effort in addressing the complexity and multidimensionality of each crisis.

Crises confronting the United Nations have grown in complexity. They often have intertwining and overlapping dimensions. The mere mention of conflict areas — for example, Somalia, Rwanda, Haiti, Bosnia, Liberia and Sierra Leone — is enough to conjure up in our minds the complex nature of these crises, what the response from the United Nations was and what it could have been. The experience in Rwanda, for example, continues to remind us that that so-called preventable genocide should not be repeated. At this stage, we are confronted by yet another complex situation: the United Nations is called upon to engage in peace-building in Iraq. We are in the process of defining and refining the United Nations response and its strategy on that issue.

Conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building lie at the heart of the United Nations mandate for the maintenance of international peace and security. The activities of the United Nations in this regard are not new. In fact, many of the programmes and projects of this global body have a so-called preventive effect, or at least preventive potential. Unfortunately, they are often disparate and inchoate. We need to address the overlapping concerns relating to conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building, as well as the blurred distinction of when conflict prevention ends and when post-conflict peace-building begins.

United Nations activities in the area of conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building are embodied in the Secretary-General's report to the General Assembly and the Security Council entitled "Prevention of armed conflict" (S/2001/574). The

Secretary-General also submitted a framework for cooperation in peace-building in his letter of 12 February 2001 to the President of the Security Council (S/2001/138).

The Philippines believes that those documents are central to our discussion. Allow me to highlight some seminal elements which the Philippines considers important and which could form part of our future follow-up actions in the field of conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building.

On the conflict prevention strategy, the Philippines agrees with many of the Secretary-General's observations. First, conflict prevention and sustainable and equitable development are mutually reinforcing activities. Secondly, an effective preventive strategy requires a comprehensive approach that encompasses both short-term and long-term political, economic, diplomatic, humanitarian, human rights, developmental, institutional and other measures taken by the international community in cooperation with national and regional actors.

Thirdly, preventive action should address the deep-rooted socio-economic, cultural, environmental, institutional and other structural causes that often underlie the immediate political symptoms of conflicts. Fourthly, we need to address the structural and operational aspects of conflict prevention and peace-building. This means addressing the need to define the mandates of the various actors in the United Nations system and the need to ensure synergy and coordination of those mandated functions.

As regards the framework for cooperation in peace-building, the Philippines supports the guiding principles and possible cooperative activities that will help build an enabling environment for peace-building activities. These include the need to ensure a speedy operational response and the optimum mobilization of human, technical and financial resources as well as the need to direct efforts at preventing the outbreak or recurrence of conflicts. The Philippines also supports the idea of establishing an information exchange mechanism for early warning analysis and a better understanding of the root causes of conflict.

The Philippines commends the Secretary-General for his efforts to address those concerns. We note, however, that some of those efforts have been limited to certain sectors and involve only certain actors. There is no comprehensive and integrated approach that includes the participation of all stakeholders and addresses the multidimensional and complex aspects of crisis situations.

For example, the Ad Hoc Advisory Groups on Guinea-Bissau and Burundi are laudable efforts by the Economic and Social Council. But the advisory role and the ad hoc nature of these working groups are not adequate. There are concerns, for instance, about what to do after the mandate has lapsed. We therefore need continuity and an institutional mechanism that will integrate security policy, economic development and institution-building in those areas.

There is a need to integrate the various programmes undertaken by the United Nations and other multi-stakeholders on conflict prevention and peace-building and to mould them into a general strategy that will address the various concerns in a comprehensive, coordinated and sustainable manner. We need to develop a practical road map to implement the specific recommendations of the Secretary-General in his seminal reports on conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building. More important, we need to follow-up on those mechanisms that have already been identified.

We also need to develop or formulate an overall conflict prevention strategy that will ensure the integrated and comprehensive work of the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the International Court of Justice and the Secretary-General and the participation of other actors including regional organizations, funds and programmes, civil society, non-governmental organizations, the business community and the Bretton Woods institutions, among other players.

The best possible United Nations response in addressing complex crises is and has always been to root out the major causes of conflict. The big challenge for the United Nations is how to prevent the outbreak or recurrence of conflict. This is possible only if the United Nations can address the root causes of conflicts and channel scarce resources to development. Unfortunately, while global defence and military expenditures amount to $900 billion, only about $500 million goes to development. If we want to have a genuine approach to conflict prevention and post-conflict peace-building, we should address and confront this harsh irony.

Mr. President, again, I wish to thank you and your delegation for choosing this very timely and relevant topic. The need for a comprehensive United Nations response to complex crises also underlies a theme of next month's presidency: the issue of the role of civil society in post-conflict peace-building. The search for an appropriate United Nations response to complex crises should involve those who are able — and those who will be able — to contribute to an effective response to such crises.

Mr. Duclos (France) (*spoke in French*): I would like at the outset, Sir, to say how pleased we are to have worked over the past weeks under your distinguished and effective presidency. I would also like to thank you for having chosen the important subject that brings us together today.

As shown by the experience acquired over recent years and by our daily work, the United Nations is increasingly confronted by complex crises, which obviously call for a special effort towards coherence and coordination. In that connection, I welcome the statements made at the beginning of the meeting by the President of the Economic and Social Council and by Mr. Egeland, which clearly highlighted both the expectations arising from the United Nations response to such crises and the need to improve our tools. My delegation is particularly pleased to have participated in the Economic and Social Council Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Burundi, which has provided us with valuable lessons.

The non-paper you conveyed to us, Mr. President, sums up the situation clearly, and I subscribe entirely to your analysis of the various aspects of the problem. As already recommended by the Brahimi report (S/2000/809), we must devise more complete and better integrated strategies to truly build peace. We must also provide ourselves with the means to implement them and to follow up on their implementation. This must be one of the highest priorities in future years if we wish to avoid some of the errors of the past. Our States collectively made that commitment at the Millennium Summit, as you said in your non-paper. We therefore think that this question will become one of the important issues at the meeting of heads of State or Government in 2005, the principle of which has been decided by the General Assembly and which is to be devoted precisely to the Millennium Declaration goals. The High-Level Panel established by the Secretary-General to address threats to international security and necessary reforms can undoubtedly also make useful contributions.

I would like to make only a few specific comments today, based on the questions that the President suggested to us regarding strategies for responding to and following up on crises and on the inclusion of peacekeeping operations in such strategies.

First, the concept of integrated strategy has made considerable headway over recent years. I would like in particular to welcome the efforts of the specialized agencies — in particular the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) — to work with the World Bank to prepare joint need evaluations, as occurred in the cases of Iraq and Liberia, and, I believe, will soon occur in Haiti. This is an indispensable tool, of course, in designing global strategies. We can therefore only hope that the methodology for such joint assessments will be further refined and that it will set a standard.

Work on ways to guide a country from humanitarian emergency to sustainable development has also made considerable headway. It is clear that the various problems relating to transition cannot be dealt with sequentially, for example by dealing with security before humanitarian issues and humanitarian issues before development. To the contrary, responses must be devised at the outset in an integrated and coherent fashion. The inter-agency report prepared under the aegis of Ms. Carol Bellamy posits these principles clearly and proposes concrete action to adapt our traditional instruments to crisis situations and to strengthen coordination. We must support their implementation and continue the exercise, expanding it to the World Bank, for example. It is particularly important to articulate the various aspects of these strategies in areas where diverse competencies must be combined. Programmes of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, which are, as we know, crucial, provide an example. The Secretariat and the agencies, together with the international financial institutions, could, based on past experience, agree to define a framework that could then be applied according to specific situations. We must also think about financial instruments that would be best suited to these integrated strategies. This is a complex issue, and a realistic analysis of the options might be a first step.

Finally, I should like to emphasize the question of follow-up to strategies, which is probably one of the

greatest weaknesses in the systems established by the international community. The lack of stringent follow-up machinery is, from our standpoint, quite probably one of the causes of some of the failures that have occurred. Experience has shown that, once the crisis has passed, political attention and international mobilization decline sharply. However, transition requires a sustained commitment over several years; a capacity to adapt to priorities depending on how events unfold; and, if necessary, immediate responses if serious difficulties arise.

We must therefore consider political and administrative mechanisms that enable an effective follow-up of the progress made, warn of obstacles and propose remedies. Such mechanisms must involve the members of the Security Council, the countries concerned, major donors, regional and subregional organizations, and international financial agencies and institutions. They must be active in the field as well as in New York or Geneva. The small group that we established under the resolution on Haiti falls into that category. Groups established by the Economic and Social Council are also designed to devise a response. This formula, to which we are quite naturally turning, must be more clearly defined and used more widely.

Secondly, as many of us said in the course of our discussions on 17 May, peacekeeping operations, which often play a decisive role, must be part of overall peace-building strategies. This is particularly true in the case of complex crises, whose various aspects are interdependent and could each doom to failure the activities undertaken by the international community.

I will not reiterate the suggestions made by our delegation, among others, during our initial discussions under the presidency of Pakistan, but I would like to stress two points in particular.

First, planning for peacekeeping operations is crucial. Is it possible to involve, at an earlier stage of the process, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and his assistants, including the person in charge of humanitarian action and development? Could we not make better use of the experience of United Nations agencies, which often are already active in the area at the time when planning begins? Could we bring the phase of the assessment of economic and social needs — which must involve the World Bank — closer to that of the design of a peacekeeping operation? We believe that these questions should be considered by the Secretariat, which could then share its observations with us.

Secondly, the institutional structure of a peacekeeping operation and the selection of its personnel must also take into account this requirement for coherence. The appointment of an assistant special representative of the Secretary-General who would also be a resident coordinator and humanitarian coordinator would be part of that framework. The skills and experience of such an individual, whose task is indeed complex, obviously are an important factor in the success if the operation as a whole. Special representatives themselves should also be, insofar as possible, familiar with humanitarian and economic issues. If that is not the case, appropriate training could be provided in order to enable them better to discharge their duties.

Experience has shown that, perhaps in this kind of situation more than in any other, the United Nations is indispensable in the process of the design and implementation of responses to complex crises. The United Nations, however, must be able to meet such expectations through its own resources and by bringing together all of the actors involved. It seems to me that our discussion today is itself a contribution to that effort.

Mr. Maquieira (Chile) (*spoke in Spanish*): First, let me thank you, Sir, for having taken the initiative of asking the Council to reflect on this topic, which I believe to be very important. I would also like to welcome the presence of, and the statements made by, Ambassador Marjatta Rasi, President of the Economic and Social Council, and the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Mr. Jan Egeland, which provided the framework for today's debate.

Future efforts to ensure peace and security must, in our view, focus increasingly on resolving problems before they escalate and turn into actual conflicts or crises. Various international agencies, non-governmental organizations and Governments have proposed approaches that would make such coherence possible, but the truth is that the various kinds of intervention — humanitarian assistance, rehabilitation, development cooperation and post-conflict reconstruction — continue to differ in terms of logic and are sometimes contradictory in their methods.

Accordingly, the Council should focus on aspects which, while essential to conflict resolution, nonetheless appear somewhat limited in the broad context of complex crises. The organs of the United Nations focus on aspects that are important in the context of long-term solutions, but lack the capacity effectively to interact with the Security Council. That is the institutional dilemma confronting the United Nations and its Members, to which no appropriate solution has yet emerged.

One aspect that is deserving of consideration is the better use of inter-agency working groups in the context of the Secretariat, which could be one way of approaching the issue. I recall that the Brahimi report proposed coordinated work in the areas of peacekeeping operations, political affairs, development cooperation and reconstruction. In terms of complex crises, this would translate into the creation in the Secretariat of a culture conducive to the establishment of such inter-agency working groups. If an incident were to occur, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Economic and Social Affairs would come together in the framework of such groups, so as to address the conflict from multiple perspectives and inform the Council on that basis. It would not be important who presented the report, as long as it provided the Council with a comprehensive view of the situation so as to enable it to resolve it.

It seems to me that that, although this system works well in the economic and social sector of the United Nations, a major mechanism is still needed in terms of the political and security sector of the institution.

Today it is crucial to discuss new methods of association — and that is my second point — that will enable the United Nations system and its Member States, together with non-governmental organizations, to respond collectively to the challenges posed by complex crises. Our delegation believes that it has been an extraordinarily complex task for Governments, United Nations bodies, development banks and non-governmental organizations to follow joint comprehensive strategies aimed at alleviating the effects of conflicts, and to provide continuity in the growing trend towards an integrated and holistic focus that brings together a number of methods. Political consensus must be generated in the long term on the basis of political, diplomatic and economic efforts to facilitate the peace process.

However, the greatest challenge may be overcoming the lack of coordination among participating agencies, Governments and organizations in this process. The Ad Hoc Advisory Groups on Guinea-Bissau and Burundi are excellent examples of how this might be done. We also believe preventive action to be the most effective way to prevent future threats and to promote collective security.

The means of identifying preventive measures are well known. We have listened this morning to eloquent statements on what is needed to develop a genuinely preventive policy, but it would appear that our search for a way to implement such a policy is being thwarted. One way to do so would be under Article 99 of the Charter, which allows the Secretary-General to draw the Security Council's attention to situations that threaten international peace and security. With the tools currently available to the Secretary-General and the system, it would appear that the Security Council is called upon only when a crisis is imminent and that little preventive action can therefore be undertaken in advance.

In 1992, An Agenda for Peace was issued by Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali, who rightly noted that tools which could be made available to the Secretariat — and which, he felt, did not necessarily depend on Member States — would allow the elaboration of an appropriate preventive policy. Furthermore, Dag Hammarskjöld also resorted to Article 99 to initiate peacekeeping operations. It might be interesting for the Security Council and its subsidiary bodies to look into how the Secretary-General might be given better tools for pursuing preventive policies and thereby achieve the objective of involving the Security Council in situations that might evolve into conflict.

In conclusion, we are faced with circumstances that, as you, Sir, and others have noted, are extraordinary. I believe that the Security Council and other bodies in the economic, social and political arenas are gradually making progress towards finding ways and means of effectively addressing complex crises. Today's debate and the statements made here are important. The tasks entrusted to peacekeeping operations are important. We will ultimately need to find a way to devise tools that will allow us to assess

the effectiveness of decisions adopted and machinery created and how they contribute to the achievement of our goals.

Mr. Gaspar Martins (Angola): I would like to start by expressing appreciation to you, Sir, and the Pakistani presidency for the opportunity provided to us to address this important topic once again in this Chamber. This is a burning issue in contemporary international life and I thank you very much for having chosen it as a topic to end your very successful presidency.

I would like to say that we are very pleased with the statements and the presence here of Ambassador Rasi, President of the Economic and Social Council, and the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Mr. Egeland.

It is our expectation that today's discussion will be a contribution to improving the methods and to further identifying appropriate means to deal with the complex crises that, in recent years, have so negatively impacted on the lives of so many people and become the cause of great concern to the international community and a real threat to peace and security. A number of very relevant suggestions have been advanced this morning and we would like to welcome and register them for further discussion.

The complex crises we are dealing with today stem invariably from situations of total insecurity, often with a regional dimension, including ethnic conflict, genocide, uncontrolled violence, civilian deaths in overwhelming numbers, generalized suffering and massive displacement of populations within and across borders. Contemporary complex crises have led the international community, and the United Nations in particular, to an awareness of the need to address the issue from a three-fold perspective: by establishing a link between security and development, by recognizing that what happens inside a given country may impact on international peace and security, and by understanding that human security and peace-building are areas of legitimate international concern and are interlinked. Policies envisaged to address this new security threat have been developed by the United Nations, international regional organizations, non-governmental organizations, civil society and even the business community.

The Secretary-General's report on the prevention of armed conflict spelled out the basic premises of those policies and how the United Nations system can best interact in order to prevent armed conflicts and enhance States' capacity to prevent them. Three main ideas emerged from the report. First, conflict prevention is one of the primary responsibilities of Member States and preventive action should be initiated at the earliest possible stage of a conflict cycle in order to be more effective. Secondly, an effective preventive strategy requires a comprehensive approach, both short- and long-term, and conflict prevention and sustainable and equitable development are mutually reinforcing activities. Thirdly, a successful preventive strategy depends on the cooperation of many actors in the United Nations, as well as the Bretton Woods institutions, Member States, international, regional and subregional organizations, non-governmental organizations, civil society and so on.

While assigning a key role to the Security Council in the prevention of armed conflicts, the report recognized that, in reality, the focus of the Council remains almost exclusively on crises and emergencies. As the primary centre for international efforts in crisis management and peace-building, the Security Council has in the past decade established a number of peacekeeping operations with the primary aims of stopping bloodshed, enforcing peace and addressing the root causes of conflicts.

Contrary to the disengaged nature of past United Nations operations, the main operations presently deployed are multi-dimensional in character. By involving civilian and military tasks, their objective is to end wars and to promote long-term peace-building by encroaching upon domains that were once seen as the exclusive realms of sovereign States or primarily dealt with through development assistance. Some of today's operations involve the direct administration of territories and populations and the rebuilding of States against the background of the grossest violations of human rights and the total destruction of the social and economic fabric, as was the case of Kosovo and Timor-Leste.

The international community's response to the challenges of peace-building has been translated into practice by the implementation of programmes in the spheres of governance, security reform and the rule of law, aimed fundamentally at managing change peacefully and advancing constitutional and lateral processes, ensuring disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes and advancing the

fundamental structuring or restructuring of security institutions such as the police and army, and putting them under civilian control. That response also includes promoting national reconciliation through accountability for past crimes and justice for the victims, and by promoting human rights and legal and penal reform.

The Economic and Social Council has been called upon to play an ever-increasing role in the prevention of conflict, in the framework of an integrated approach recognized by the international community as valuable to achieve peace, security, respect for human rights and sustainable development. Specific cases of the involvement of the Economic and Social Council and the Security Council in Africa — in Guinea Bissau and in Burundi — are very good examples, which have been cited several times this morning.

The critical role that the Economic and Social Council plays in addressing the root causes of conflict and its contribution to a comprehensive and multidisciplinary discussion on the prevention of armed conflicts in the regional context are recognized as valuable contributions to the prevention of armed conflict and to peace-building. In addition, the ad hoc working groups and advisory groups on countries emerging from conflict have produced commendable work, and their recommendations are important contributions in conflict prevention and resolution.

After more than a decade in which large number of multidimensional United Nations peace-building missions have been established, with some drawing to a close, the international community, with the lessons learned through this cycle of peace-building, is in a better position to evaluate the outcomes of key components of the peace-building agenda with regard to inter-agency collaboration and coordination and to apply the best practices to peace-building. This morning's meeting is again a very valuable contribution to the debate.

It is our conviction that the major investments to be made by the international community — including political, diplomatic, financial, economic, cultural, analytical and moral — must be in prevention. The main and subsidiary bodies of the United Nations — the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the Secretariat — regional and subregional organizations, financial institutions and civil society, non-governmental organizations, schools, the press and all social actors should make conflict prevention the cornerstone of a universal and common endeavour to promote a more peaceful, equitable and prosperous world. That objective is an attainable one.

Mr. Konuzin (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): We are pleased to see participating in today's meeting of the Security Council, Ms. Marjatta Rasi, President of the Economic and Social Council, and Mr. Jan Egeland, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs. Their participation is further testimony to the cooperation of the major organs of the United Nations, in accordance with their prerogatives in solving tasks common to the Organization.

The nature of current global challenges and threats determines the need for a collective reaction to them, on the basis of comprehensive concern and respect for the legitimate interests of all members of the international community in strict observance of the existing international legal norms, and the comprehensive involvement of the potential of various multilateral institutions at the global and regional levels.

We note with satisfaction that, over a relatively short period of time, within the framework of the United Nations it has been possible to achieve substantial success in settling complex regional conflicts. The examples include the operations in Afghanistan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Timor-Leste, Liberia and in a number of other crisis regions. They clearly demonstrate the indissolubly linked tasks involved in ensuring that the establishment of peace and the rebirth of statehood and the full-fledged social and economic recovery of countries suffering from conflict take place.

The experience of the conduct of peacekeeping operations under the leadership of the United Nations, and with its approval, has shown, in the past decade, a radical change in the nature of the tasks facing us — a transition from traditional ceasefire monitoring to the complex settlement of problems which go as far as the full-fledged governing of territories. We believe that the United Nations Secretariat and the international community must significantly restructure their work in peacekeeping in keeping with the new tasks. So it is that the interdepartmental groups established within the framework of the United Nations Secretariat are effectively working on the preparation of complex

operations for peacekeeping and the subsequent social and economic recovery and nation-building of countries suffering from conflicts.

A good example of that type of innovation, in enhancing the effectiveness and output from United Nations peacekeeping operations, is the coordination meeting of the special representatives of the Secretary-General to harmonize joint action and solve common cross-border problems connected, inter alia, with illegal arms deliveries and supplies, uncontrolled movement of armed groups, regulating refugee flows and providing humanitarian assistance in a number of African States.

The example of the Afghan settlement gives us an effective scheme for international support for the peace process. The political timetable worked out on the basis of the Bonn Agreement was materially complemented by decisions taken at the Tokyo donors conference and has been consistently carried out by the team headed by Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi. Essential assistance in stabilizing the situation has been lent by the International Security Assistance Force. Important work is being carried out by lead countries in the areas of military and legal reforms, establishing national police and combating drug trafficking. It seems to us that the broad consensus, with regard to helping the Afghan settlement which took place under the aegis of the United Nations, is showing its effectiveness. For that reason, it is no happenstance that the Afghan model is being applied by many to Iraq.

The agreed-upon international steps taken under the aegis of the United Nations have turned out to be successful because of the unique ability of the Organization to combine its leading role in the area of security and restoring peace with the division of labour within the regional and subregional organizations in accordance with Chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. That potential should, in fact, be developed to ensure a truly legitimate collective reaction to complex emergency situations under conditions of international conflict.

The experience already accumulated by the Organization in this sphere quite obviously shows that the most effective results in the United Nations have been achieved in those cases where constructive interaction was ensured between international structures, and local institutions and national Governments. On the other hand, problems have arisen. Even now, there are difficulties in carrying out the mandates of the United Nations missions in Ethiopia and Eritrea and Côte d'Ivoire and the activities of United Nations agencies in the western regions of Sudan. Moreover, the proper level of support for the United Nations mission in Kosovo has not been received from the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of that province of Serbia and Montenegro. We are convinced that only close cooperation among all players, combined with the United Nations presence, will enable us to ensure the most effective and comprehensive treatment of crises.

There is special significance in the further development of a new kind of partnership between the United Nations and regional organizations. Positive examples of such cooperation are the conduct, under a Security Council mandate, of a European Union mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the International Security Assistance Force under the leadership of NATO in Afghanistan, the deployment of multinational forces of Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS) members in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire, the military contingents of the African Union mission in Burundi and their subsequent replacement by a United Nations peacekeeping operation and the joint peacekeeping mission of the United Nations and the Commonwealth of Independent States in the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict zone.

A great deal remains to be done to improve the peacekeeping potential of the United Nations, especially in such areas as rapid response, the effective use of material resources, financing, transport, the training of staff, et cetera. It is precisely in that manner that we must all go forward, in the light of our collective desire to make United Nations peacekeeping as effective as possible in order to settle the various international and regional conflicts.

Mr. Holliday (United States of America): Thank you, Mr. President, for convening today's meeting on complex crises and the United Nations response. It presents an opportunity to tie together a number of the Council's recent thematic debates and to step back and consider more broadly some of the interrelated issues and challenges of the United Nations role in peacekeeping and peace-building.

Most crises that the Council addresses, or would seek to prevent, are complex. They represent a failure of political, economic and sometimes social institutions

and therefore require solutions to meet both security and development needs. We believe the United Nations role in the international response to this mix of security and development needs should draw on various bodies within the United Nations system and be carefully coordinated with various other non-United-Nations sources of expertise and resources.

The Council focuses its energies and the peacekeeping budget's assessed funds primarily on meeting security needs. In that effort, the Council has authorized military observers, peacekeepers and civilian police. In conflicts around the globe, those dedicated peacekeepers have helped bring security. Stability, political solutions and economic development have followed. I note that tomorrow we shall be marking the International United Nations Day of Peacekeepers.

The Council, however, has also recognized that to ensure the sustainability of peace and security, it is important to develop national institutions and structures that will assume security functions when the United Nations departs. The Council has also acknowledged that the dimensions of crises may be so complex that non-security-related resources and personnel are also needed to address them fully to prevent the resurgence of violence. In such cases — increasingly, in most cases — the Council has authorized the inclusion of human rights staff, authorized the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to coordinate — although not administer — United Nations development activities or included a training component in the new peacekeeping operations.

In Liberia, the Council saw a country that had been ravaged by years of civil war and, accordingly, had been left with few functioning institutions. The Council responded by authorizing a robust peacekeeping operation with responsibility for a range of multidisciplinary tasks. The United Nations identified key agencies — the United Nations Development Programme, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs — to address returnee issues. Although the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) has responsibility in Liberia for the disarmament and demobilization of combatants, those activities are only the first step in assisting only one component of the war-affected community. Ex-combatants subsequently require reintegration and return assistance. In that regard, the assistance they receive is similar to the assistance for returning refugees and internally displaced persons. To meet the long-term complex needs of security, stability and reconciliation, the United Nations, UNMIL and the other agencies must focus on the process of reintegration and return for those returning — both combatants and non-combatants — and for the communities receiving them.

In Afghanistan, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) is a unique example of the ability of the United Nations to coordinate a comprehensive development and aid programme in coordination with a massive military coalition, led by the United States, and a separate security force, the International Security Assistance Force, led by NATO. For the first two years of the programme, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Lakhdar Brahimi, broke new ground by working on the political, humanitarian, economic and security fronts simultaneously and assisting the transitional Government of Hamid Karzai. After national elections are held in September, UNAMA will have overseen the entirety of the so-called Bonn Agreement process, which set out a series of benchmarks leading to Afghan independence.

My delegation recognizes that in most complex crises, the economic, political and social routes of a conflict cannot be disentangled or dealt with *ad seriatim*. However, we believe that the response should continue to come from the whole United Nations family, including the funds, programmes and agencies that have the requisite knowledge and experience, as well as from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Political Affairs.

We also believe that the specific combination of agencies, the structure and functions of a peacekeeping operation and the responsibilities of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General should vary depending on the specifics of the crisis. Unfortunately, there can be no template. Complex crises require complex and case-specific responses.

The Council has recently moved to empower Special Representatives of the Secretary-General who lead United Nations peacekeeping operations to coordinate all United Nations activities in-country. That move makes sense in order to ensure a coordinated approach to meet the needs of security and

development and to respond to the complexity of most crises. But again, that model may not be appropriate in all cases.

Our focus today is on the United Nations response to complex crises, but it is important to recall that the United Nations does not operate in a vacuum. There are also bilateral responses that should be coordinated with the United Nations. The United Nations and the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General can play a useful role in coordinating and encouraging bilateral actors and donors, rather than discouraging them by suggesting that the United Nations has it all under control.

We have seen, for example, training for civilian police on a bilateral basis in Kosovo that is coordinated with the civilian police programme of the United Nations peacekeeping operation. As well, my Government is administering reintegration for more than half the disarmed fighters in Liberia in coordination with UNMIL's disarmament, demobilization, repatriation and reintegration programme in that country.

In addition, a national response is appropriate and should be encouraged. National actors from civil society and the Government have the local knowledge and the long-term commitment necessary to resolve complex crises. Their potential contribution should not be underestimated, and their capacity for response should be strengthened.

I appreciate hearing some of the valuable ideas of my colleagues on the Security Council as well as of the representatives of the Economic and Social Council and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

Mr. Thomson (United Kingdom): We are grateful to Under-Secretary-General Egeland and Ambassador Rasi for their time and their insights today. I am grateful to you, Mr. President, for giving the Council the opportunity to discuss this daunting subject. Perhaps because it is so daunting, we have got very limited attendance here; that is disappointing because the subject is very important.

Your excellent non-paper, Sir, has helped pose many of the questions. I want to focus on just three areas: first, the need for good early-warning systems; secondly, the need to translate early warning into early action; and thirdly, the need to tackle the root causes underlying instability. Under each of those headings, I am at least in part addressing the question of conflict prevention. I would like to note how striking it is that virtually every speaker this morning has stressed the importance of the Council's addressing itself to conflict prevention.

First, long-range early warning is difficult and is something that nearly all Governments and international organizations struggle with. My own Government is working through the issues involved and trying to develop a more systematic methodology for horizon-scanning for future crises. But short-term early warning is less difficult. Over a time scale required for planning humanitarian responses of some six to 12 months, it is not too difficult to spot a crisis coming. The humanitarian community, in the form of non-governmental organizations and the United Nations, has some of the best short-term early-warning systems in the world. The United Nations, in particular, has one of the best information-gathering networks in the world — agencies and offices spread throughout the globe, experts working on issues from human rights, economic development, humanitarian issues, health, education and the environment to political analysis.

So the United Nations should be one of the best informed institutions in the world. But in fact it is not. One reason is that we, the Member States, have been reluctant to give the Secretariat the additional capacity needed to analyse and assess the vast amount of information it has access to — a real problem, in the view of my delegation. A second reason is the question of how well the United Nations system, in all its complexity, uses its existing capacities to coordinate and apply the information already available to it.

A third area to look at under early warning relates to the capacities outside the United Nations system. Perhaps enabling the United Nations to tap into these capacities in non-governmental organizations, the private sector, regional organizations and academic institutions would be one way of providing the United Nations with the tools it needs. We hope that that can be explored.

In short, the United Kingdom believes that to be truly effective and to keep its staff safe in conflict prevention and peacekeeping situations, United Nations systems need to be strengthened somehow to deal with short- and long-range early-warning factors.

I would like to turn now to translating early warning into early action, but on the way to note that if we can manage to lend greater support to a United Nations capacity for early warning, we will in the process make it easier for ourselves to address conflict avoidance, for which several delegations have called.

Translating early-warning information into early action is, however, a complex task. Political will and resources are essential. The Security Council can play a role. In resolution 1366 (2001), the Council confirmed that the prevention of armed conflict was an integral part of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security. But the Council has not kept situations of potential conflict under close review since that resolution was adopted. We rarely invite briefings on complex crises that are not already under consideration. Of course there are sensitivities about including new crisis situations on the Council's agenda. But we have to find ways to make the inclusion of new situations more welcome to all concerned — a point that the Chinese delegation made this morning.

In this context, the United Kingdom would welcome greater use of one old, one existing and one new mechanism. The old one, referred to by at least four other delegations — Brazil, Chile, Benin and Spain — is Article 99 of the Charter. The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which in his or her opinion may threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. We would like to see that mechanism used.

The existing tool, which was provided for under resolution 1366 (2001), is the ability of the Council to invite the Emergency Relief Coordinator and relevant United Nations agencies to brief its members on emergency situations which it deems represent a threat to international peace and security. This is a valuable tool for the Council to use in order to prevent complex crises from deteriorating. Recent briefings on Darfur and on northern Uganda by Under-Secretary-General Egeland have been very valuable. My Government believes that such briefings can play an important role in reminding the Council about so-called forgotten emergencies.

Thirdly, a new and potentially helpful development is — as the delegation of Spain noted — the Secretary-General's intention to appoint a special adviser on the prevention of genocide. That role could be crucial in bringing complex crises to the attention of the Council.

My third area is tackling the root causes of conflict and instability. As many delegations have pointed out, it is necessary to address not only easily understood threats, such as those from uncontrolled militia, arms proliferation and terrorism, but also harder-to-measure threats, such as human rights abuses, the spread of disease, population movements, the scarcity of resources, weak governance, lack of democracy, poverty, social injustice, environmental degradation and an almost endless list of other important issues. Clearly, as most delegations have said this morning, sustainable security is intimately bound up with development. The United Nations family, including the Bretton Woods institutions, have an indispensable role to play in mitigating these threats. That does not in any sense contradict the point just made by the United States delegation that there has to be space for bilateral efforts alongside those of the United Nations.

I have three suggestions about how the United Nations system and its Member States can address the full spread of threats more effectively. The first relates to strengthening partnerships between the Council, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council on peace and security matters — several delegations have made this point. It is useful to remind ourselves of Article 65 of the Charter, which says that the Economic and Social Council may furnish information to the Security Council and shall assist the Security Council upon its request. Do we use that enough? We are pleased that Ambassador Rasi is here today. The ad hoc groups of the Economic and Social Council on Burundi and Guinea-Bissau are interesting developments to build on. Perhaps those groups signal an emerging role for the Economic and Social Council to work with countries to build their conflict prevention and peace-building capacities and to raise awareness of potential needs among the wider United Nations membership.

Secondly, we need to make sure that Council mandates for peacekeeping operations take sufficient account of the less tangible threats. I believe that we are doing better on this. It does not mean that the Department of Peacekeeping Operations need carry out all the activities or that all of these activities be funded by the assessed budget, but simply that the Council

should recognize the full range of issues needed to bring a given situation to stability and peace.

Thirdly, the United Nations system needs to strengthen the coordination of conflict-prevention and peace-building activities. Many speakers this morning have mentioned this. However, speaking as a donor country, it is worth noting that donors too need to improve their coordination. Within the United Nations system, we welcome recent work by the United Nations Development Group/Executive Committee on Humanitarian Affairs working group on transition issues to try to define better tools for working in countries moving from conflict to reconstruction. We also fully support efforts amongst United Nations agencies working on the peacekeeping surge to strengthen their coordination, a subject we covered at length on 17 May (see S/PV.4970).

In conclusion, I would note that many of the issues raised in today's debate are being examined by the Secretary-General's High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change. These are difficult issues; we do not envy the Panel its task. But we hope that it will provide strong direction to the United Nations and its Member States on the key issues that we must get right and that it will point us to vital areas for further work, with a view to taking decisions in the course of the sixtieth session of the General Assembly. The United Kingdom looks forward to engaging fully in that process.

Mr. Trautwein (Germany): I would like to thank the Pakistani presidency for this opportunity for the Security Council to address this important topic: important for the United Nations, but also important for every single State Member of the Organization. The participation of the President of the Economic and Social Council and of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator underline that importance.

Over the last few months, the Council has looked at the various and complex facets of conflict resolution, peacemaking, peacekeeping and peace-building. The Council has discussed the issues of conflict prevention, of justice and the rule of law, of national reconciliation, of the role of the private sector in conflict and post-conflict situations and, most recently, of peacekeeping. The Council has also considered the role of women, both as potential victims of conflict and as indispensable actors in peace-building, and it has taken action to address the plight of children associated with armed conflict.

The Council's attention to those questions, which are all essential to securing the sustainability of the Council's peace-building efforts, is a welcome development; it can, of course, be attributed to the fact that a number of complex crisis situations have been, and still are, on the Council's agenda. Currently, the outstanding item on everybody's mind is the highly complex situation in Iraq, where serious security problems, the transition from occupation to sovereignty, efforts to address the humanitarian situation and to rebuild the economy and issues of justice and reconciliation pose a formidable mix of intertwined challenges. But other very difficult situations, such as those in Darfur, Côte d'Ivoire and Haiti, require no less attention.

Most crises share the fate of being complex. However, the reasons for their complexity almost always vary. Therefore, rather than discussing any one-size-fits-all solution, I will attempt to lay out three common denominators that can, in our view, be extracted from the Council's previous debates and that may deserve to be retained, particularly at a time when the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change has embarked on a broad-scale effort to suggest fundamental reforms that will, one hopes, enable the United Nations to respond in the most adequate manner to today's threats and challenges and to those of tomorrow.

The first point in this regard is that our actions must be guided by a close look at the underlying causes of conflict. These may include a mix of poverty, socio-economic inequalities, weak governance institutions and practices, and deficits in — if not a total lack of justice and the rule of law. Addressing root causes is not only the key to conflict prevention, it is also the key to securing the sustainability of peacekeeping and peace-building efforts.

Germany, like many other Governments and the United Nations, has moved to apply a broad concept of peace and security which includes the political, socio-economic, rule of law and ecological dimensions. We are aware, as others are — and here, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) is a vivid expression of that awareness — that peace and security, to be sustainable, must be rooted in societies endowed with institutions that are inclusive and

participatory. Those institutions must guarantee everybody's dignity, well-being and chance to live up to his or her human potential. They must provide and guarantee social justice, equal rights and procedures that allow for a fair and inclusive resolution of conflicts.

The European Security Strategy, adopted in December 2003, seeks to promote a rules-based international order, and we fully endorse that objective. Our adherence to, and compliance with, international treaties in the fields of human rights, disarmament, trade and environmental protection, as well as our support for the International Criminal Court translate this philosophy into practical commitments.

The second point is that, while the United Nations needs to apply a broad concept of security, the Council should not be overburdened with tasks for which it is ill-equipped. A far better way to address the multidimensional aspects of conflict is to find meaningful arrangements for the division of labour among those who, in one way or another, have comparative advantages in dealing with a given complex situation.

The Secretariat has gone a long way to facilitate cross-sectoral communication and cooperation within the United Nations. In that context, I recall the establishment of the Executive Committees, notably the Executive Committee on Peace and Security. Progress towards a coherent and coordinated United Nations system response in transition situations has been made under the leadership of the Executive Director of the United Nations Children's Fund, through the joint work of the United Nations Development Group (UNDG) and the Executive Committee on Humanitarian Assistance (ECHA). Important lessons can also be learned from the Integrated Mission Task Force established in the context of Afghanistan, following up on a recommendation in the landmark Brahimi report on peacekeeping (S/2000/809).

In the specific case of justice and the rule of law, we realize that the United Nations, including various parts of the Secretariat and specialized agencies, funds and programmes, have by now accumulated considerable know-how. We await with great anticipation the Secretary-General's report on justice and the rule of law and any suggestions as to how this know-how can be translated into more coherent action.

Building on experiences with the Security Council's Ad Hoc Working Group on Conflict Prevention and Resolution in Africa, and the Economic and Social Council's Ad Hoc Advisory Groups on African countries emerging from conflict, possible arrangements for more intensive cooperation between the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council could be explored.

Last but not least, meaningful cooperation between the United Nations and regional arrangements has proven, in very recent experiences gained in West Africa, the Caribbean and the Balkans among others, to be an effective way to respond to complex crises. In that context, we welcome the fact that the Peace and Security Council of the African Union had its inaugural meeting only three days ago, and we encourage that body to live up to the words of its Chair, Nigeria's President Obasanjo: "Africa is poised for action". The international community should stand ready to assist regional arrangements in their needs for capacity-building, when necessary and appropriate.

The third point is that the United Nations is increasingly called upon to look beyond its intergovernmental horizons. The emergence of non-State actors is not only a debit on the challenges side of the equation, it is also — and perhaps much more so — an asset on the side of expertise, public communication and action. While decision-making in the United Nations will remain the business of Governments, the integration of non-State stakeholders and non-State expertise in the deliberative process is in everybody's best interest: in the interest of informed decision-making and in the interest of popular acceptance. That point has been given considerable emphasis in the context of our deliberations on justice, the rule of law and national reconciliation. Our debate on the role that the private sector can play in addressing conflict and post-conflict situations has been yet another opportunity to demonstrate the complementarity between State and non-State efforts.

The Council already has some experience in bringing together State and non-State stakeholders, be it through the convening of Arria-type Council meetings or the very effective collaboration of interested Member States, United Nations system stakeholders and non-governmental organizations, such as on the issue of children and armed conflict. We encourage not only the Council, but indeed the United Nations as a whole, to further explore such approaches.

I would like to conclude on a point that is easily overlooked. Giving thought to better crisis management, as we are doing today, implies the recognition that, all too often, conflict prevention is failing. Crisis prevention — based on early warning, the vigilance and determination of effective and well-legitimized United Nations bodies, credible deterrence whenever feasible, and universally accepted norms — must remain at the core of our endeavours.

Mr. Dumitru (Romania): Mr. President, let me begin by congratulating you for having arranged this important discussion on a topical theme. I would also like to welcome the presence in this meeting of Ambassador Marjatta Rasi, President of the Economic and Social Council, and of Mr. Jan Egeland, Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator.

My presentation will focus first on the definition of complex crises; secondly, on the progress made by the United Nations family in formulating a comprehensive and integrated response to complex crises; and, thirdly, on recommendations aimed at overcoming existing theoretical and practical challenges confronting the development of a sustainable approach.

From the definitional point of view, complex crises are raging in numerous parts of the world, with the situations in Somalia, Haiti and Côte d'Ivoire — to mention but a few of them — serving as compelling examples. They encompass an array of issues ranging from failed economic policies, social services incapable of responding to population growth or pandemics such as HIV/AIDS, poor and corrupt governance, religious tension, ethnic discrimination, natural resource scarcity or competition, widespread poverty and absence of hope. Appearing at a critical juncture of the conflict cycle, complex crises require specific and immediate attention. Left unattended, the persistence of underdevelopment, political repression, social injustice and deep-rooted grievances results in a complete disruption of authority, as violence erupts and the State implodes, threatening regional stability.

A comprehensive and integrated strategy aimed at responding to complex crises must support structures aimed at strengthening peace, thus transforming the conditions that allow crises to grow. The symptoms and root causes of complex crises are intertwined in a mutually reinforcing relationship. For that reason, a sustainable approach to complex crises must include complementary and systematic security and development components in order to resolve crises and address their structural derivations. As pointed out in the non-paper for today's meeting, the intrinsic link between peace and development must remain at the core of the United Nations response.

Romania welcomes the advances made by the United Nations family in formulating a comprehensive and integrated response to complex crises. Here we can point to the fact that the development agencies are revisiting traditional conceptions of economic aid.

In full appreciation of the fact that good domestic policies and institutions are necessary for aid to have a positive impact, United Nations agencies have established tools and mechanisms to bridge the gap between relief and development, linking their approaches to that of the security community. In addition, approaches to development focus on long-term and locally driven capacity-building development programmes, contributing to the establishment of a positive environment for sustainable stability.

Similarly, the United Nations security community has expanded its conflict-management activities. The Security Council has broadened its conception of peace and security, acknowledging the human dimension as a security threat. In addition to mandating a number of multidimensional peacekeeping operations, the Council has chosen as the subject of its monthly debates issues such as peace-building, HIV/AIDS and the protection of civilians in armed conflict.

Central coordination mechanisms now exist, allowing for cross-sectoral cooperation on thematic and country-specific task forces in the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the Department for Political Affairs (DPA) and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

While those developments demonstrate the emerging trend within the United Nations of the convergence of the development and security sides of the House, challenges remain at the political, institutional and operational levels. I would like to suggest a few recommendations aimed at improving the United Nations response to complex crises as well as the effectiveness of peace-building programmes and activities.

First, in cases of complex crises with prolonged violence, development programmes should not focus on short-term humanitarian assistance to the exclusion of support for long-term needs, as this makes the civilian population dependent on external aid and less capable of recovering from war.

Second, the United Nations family should increasingly rely on regional and subregional organizations, given the success achieved by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the African Union in preventing and resolving crises in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Burundi and, most recently, in the Sudan. In recognition of the importance of regional organizations in the prevention, resolution and management of conflicts, Romania will host a debate on cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations during its presidency of the Security Council in the month of July.

Third, further to its presidential statement on its role in the pacific settlement of disputes of 13 May 2003, the Security Council should make greater use of Chapter VI procedures to promote conflict prevention. Mechanisms such as commissions, fact-finding missions and direct dialogue with the parties to a dispute offer opportunities to identify and address the root causes of complex crises in the early stages of their development.

Fourth, the practice of forming groups of friends and of appointing special representatives and envoys of the Secretary-General should be continued as a means of enhancing cooperation and harnessing collaboration with the Secretary-General, building on the successes achieved in Afghanistan and in Haiti.

Fifth, the Security Council should further support United Nations organs and mechanisms in their security and development efforts. It should convene a meeting to review the relationship between the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council, drawing from the experience in Guinea-Bissau, and explore the possibility of greater interaction with the General Assembly.

Sixth, mechanisms for cooperation and collaboration among security and development communities should be enhanced, as development agencies are often the only international presence in a pre-crisis country and thus have the ability to foresee and perhaps avert violence.

Seventh, the evaluation of lessons learned and best practices should be initiated. It should, for instance, determine whether appointing the resident coordinator as deputy to the special representative, as applied in United Nations missions in Sierra Leone, Tajikistan and Haiti, is indeed the most effective method of improving coordination between conflict management and development practitioners. It should also assess the possibility of creating future integrated mission task forces, as used in Afghanistan. Generally, consideration should be given to using UNAMA as a model for a new integrated approach to complex crises.

Eighth, Member States should provide increased support and clear mandates to United Nations efforts in integrated and comprehensive activities. Programmes should be better planned and delivered and mandates should be flexible enough to allow the fulfilment of tasks.

Finally, to enhance the capacity of the United Nations in the implementation of a response to complex crises, the participation of non-governmental organizations, civil society, the business sector and international financial institutions should include devising methods for generating resources from a peace-building perspective.

The President: I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of Pakistan.

At the outset, I would like to express our thanks to Under-Secretary-General Jan Egeland, as well as to the President of the Economic and Social Council, Ambassador Marjatta Rasi, for their participation in today's debate. We are grateful for their insightful statements.

Jan Egeland mentioned 20 current crises affecting millions of people. Most of these are complex crises and most are within the purview of the Security Council.

Evolving a comprehensive, integrated and coherent response to these crises remains a formidable challenge for the international community. In the United Nations, we have an institution best suited to generating responses in a timely, effective and coherent manner.

At the policy level, the first priority must always be preventive diplomatic action. A credible early warning capacity based on impartial and accurate analysis of situations remains an essential requirement,

and I am glad that our colleague from the United Kingdom spoke on this point. If this analysis points in the direction of a potential conflict, then the United Nations system must act promptly and with cohesion to prevent it. As somebody has quipped, prevention is better than a Security Council resolution. There are several means at our disposal, ranging from the Secretary-General's good offices and the initiative that can be taken by the General Assembly to the mechanisms prescribed in Article 34 of Chapter VI of the Charter. All these can be usefully employed to address situations the continuance of which could endanger the maintenance of international peace and security.

There is, however, greater need for a calibrated policy response, with the Secretary-General, the Security Council, the General Assembly and the United Nations system at large working in synergy, within their respective roles and mandates. We think that Brazil's idea of a conflict-avoidance action deserves further consideration.

In the event of the outbreak of a conflict, the Security Council's role becomes clear and pre-eminent. The Council has evolved many instruments for conflict management. Its standard operating procedures are clear: first, to halt the fighting and, secondly, to disengage the conflicting parties, if necessary through the interposition of a peacekeeping force. Peacekeeping missions help contain conflict, save lives and create space for peacemaking. It is no accident that eight of our 15 peacekeeping operations are complex in nature. Speedy action to adopt resolutions establishing peacekeeping operations and to appoint special representatives of the Secretary-General is critical to the success of these efforts in the initial phase.

The quality of the Council's engagement — whether direct or indirect — is of crucial significance. Of late, the Council's missions to regions of crisis have become an important tool for gaining a better understanding of ground realities and for finding ways of containing conflict and promoting peace processes. The Council's interaction with regional and subregional organizations, consistent with the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter, is also increasing. Cooperation with the Economic Community of West African States has shown that this partnership is and can always be mutually beneficial. It was instrumental in helping to stabilize conflict situations before the deployment of United Nations peacekeeping operations in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire. Cooperation with the newly-established Peace and Security Council of the African Union should also develop along similar lines.

But the Council must go beyond conflict management in addressing complex crises. While peacekeeping missions working within their mandates can help in different ways, they are not a panacea for the whole range of complex issues and underlying causes. Sierra Leone is a relevant example.

Therefore, the Council must pay greater attention to resolving conflicts. Chapter VI of the Charter contains a whole inventory of measures that the Council could employ in the pursuit of this objective. There has to be a clear recognition that durable peace can be established only when the underlying causes of conflict are effectively addressed.

The root causes of conflicts are many and diverse. They are political, social, economic, historical and cultural in nature. In the long list of root causes, however, poverty and underdevelopment seem to be omnipresent. A look at the issues on the agenda of the Security Council reveals that the theatre of nearly all the conflict situations we are dealing with is the developing world — a striking observation indeed, but not a startling one. The inter-linkage between peace and development is now well recognized. This was also at the heart of the Millennium Summit, which took a number of far-reaching and important decisions concerning the dual objectives of peace and development.

The international community's approach to complex crises must take into account this vital inter-linkage between peace and development. Again, at the policy level, strategic coherence is a prerequisite. This entails enhanced coordination within the United Nations system. Apart from being within the purview of the Security Council, complex crises, because of their multidimensional character, also involve, in varying degrees, the areas of responsibility of other principal organs of the United Nations: the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council. It is therefore crucial for the United Nations to bring synergy to its work through cooperation, coordination and complementarity in the work of its principal organs.

Peace-building is now seen as a crucial component of any strategy for sustainable peace and

development. In post-conflict situations — such as in Guinea Bissau and Burundi — peace-building has elicited cooperation and coordination between the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. We have heard about this from Ambassador Rasi. Peace-building in most complex crises is also not possible without the active involvement and support of the Bretton Woods institutions.

Intra-organ coordination must be accompanied by closer coordination between the Secretariat and the agencies, funds and programmes. By deepening system-wide coordination, we would ensure timely, effective and coherent responses to the crises that often test the will and the capacity of our Organization.

Several proposals have been advanced to promote coherence in response to multifarious challenges. Recently, the President of Mozambique and the Prime Minister of Portugal proposed the creation of a new commission to promote peace and development, mandated by and in conjunction with the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council. Pakistan itself has proposed the establishment of ad hoc composite committees of the three principal organs of the United Nations — the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council — to effectively address complex crises and emergencies, including in Africa. The Pakistan delegation is informally circulating today a non-paper outlining our proposal for the creation of ad hoc composite committees.

We hope that this proposal and similar initiatives will be considered by the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly and will be taken into account in the context of the proposals for institutional reform of the United Nations system.

One thing which was underlined by Under-Secretary-General Egeland in his remarks is relevant throughout the system: the requirement for adequate and full funding of the actions required to prevent, manage and ameliorate conflicts and to restore peace and stability. Peacekeeping does, indeed, cost $3.5 billion today, and it may increase further. But we must not lose perspective. Not only are the United Nations and its family of organizations the only available instrument for dealing with complex crises: they are also the most cost-effective. Much more needs to be done to project and propagate that simple truth. We agree with those who said that all the issues which we have considered will come together and should be considered on the auspicious occasion of the sixtieth anniversary of the United Nations.

I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

I wish to mention in concluding our discussion that this debate has more than lived up to the expectations held by the Pakistan presidency when it proposed consideration of the item.

In accordance with the understanding previously reached, the Pakistan presidency will prepare and circulate a summary of the many useful and important ideas and suggestions which have been made by almost every delegation in this debate.

Since this is — I hope — our last public meeting for this month, I wish to take this opportunity to thank all Council members and the general membership of the United Nations for their unfailing support and cooperation to the Pakistan presidency during the month. It has been a real pleasure serving the Council in the capacity of President.

I also wish to thank the Secretariat and all the support staff, including the conference officers, interpreters, security officers and all other personnel for their dedicated work. I express our best wishes to Ambassador Baja and the team of the Philippines delegation for a very successful presidency next month.

There are no further speakers inscribed on my list. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.4981

Security Council

Fifty-ninth year

Provisional

4981st meeting

Thursday, 3 June 2004, 10 a.m.
New York

President:	Mr. Baja	(Philippines)
Members:	Algeria	Mr. Baali
	Angola	Mr. Gaspar Martins
	Benin	Mr. Adechi
	Brazil	Mr. Valle
	Chile	Mr. Muñoz
	China	Mr. Wang Guangya
	France	Mr. de La Sablière
	Germany	Mr. Pleuger
	Pakistan	Mr. Akram
	Romania	Mr. Motoc
	Russian Federation	Mr. Smirnov
	Spain	Mr. De Palacio España
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir Emyr Jones Parry
	United States of America	Mr. Holliday

Agenda

The situation in Liberia

Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1521 (2003) regarding Liberia (S/2004/428)

Third progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia (S/2004/430 and Corr.1)

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-154A.

04-37373 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 10.10 a.m.

Expression of thanks to the retiring President

The President: As this is the first meeting of the Security Council for the month of June, I should like to take this opportunity to pay tribute, on behalf of the Council, to Mr. Munir Akram, Permanent Representative of Pakistan to the United Nations, for his service as President for the month of May 2004. I am sure I speak for all members of the Council in expressing deep appreciation to Mr. Akram for the great diplomatic skill with which he conducted the Council's business last month.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation in Liberia

Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1521 (2003) regarding Liberia (S/2004/428)

Third progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia (S/2004/430 and Corr.1)

The President: In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 37 of its provisional rules of procedure to invite Mr. Charles Gyude Bryant, Chairman of the National Transitional Government of Liberia.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

Mr. Charles Gyude Bryant, Chairman of the National Transitional Government of Liberia, was escorted to a seat at the Council table.

The President: On behalf of the Council, I extend a warm welcome to the Chairman of the National Transitional Government of Liberia, Mr. Charles Gyude Bryant.

In accordance with the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure to Mr. Jacques Paul Klein, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Liberia.

It is so decided.

I invite Mr. Klein to take a seat at the Council table.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

Members have before them the report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1521 (2003) regarding Liberia, document S/2004/428, and the third progress report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia, document S/2004/430.

At this meeting, the Security Council will first hear a briefing by Mr. Jacques Paul Klein, Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Liberia, and then by Mr. Charles Gyude Bryant, Chairman of the National Transitional Government of Liberia.

At the end of those briefings, I will give the floor to those Council members who wish to make comments or ask questions.

As there is no list of speakers for this meeting, I invite Council members who wish to take the floor to so indicate to the Secretariat as from now.

I give the floor to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Liberia, Mr. Jacques Paul Klein.

Mr. Klein (*spoke in French*): I have the pleasure today of reporting to the Council on the progress achieved since the start of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). In so doing, I would like to introduce the two reports of the Secretary-General before the Council: the third progress report on the United Nations Mission in Liberia and the report prepared pursuant to Security Council resolution 1521 (2003).

(*spoke in English*)

I am grateful to you, Mr. President, and to all members of the Council for having graciously agreed to receive Chairman Gyude Bryant, who is a valued supporter of UNMIL and whom I would like to commend, in great privacy, for the positive steps which he has led the Transitional Government to take in difficult early stages of his great mission. His presence here today will give the Council the opportunity to hear

from the Chairman himself the steps taken by the National Transitional Government of Liberia in implementing the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, and the Chairman's vision for taking Liberia through this period of transition to the October 2005 elections.

Given the state of chaos, insecurity and collapsed governmental structure at the time we arrived in Liberia seven months ago, our immediate priority was to stabilize the country by progressively deploying troops throughout its entirety, disarming the armed groups through the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and rehabilitation (DDRR) programme, and simultaneously commencing the restructuring of the law and order institutions in order to create the necessary security environment, space for the implementation of other aspects of our mandate and to facilitate the delivery of sorely needed humanitarian assistance. I am pleased to report that the progress we have made on these most pressing priorities has far exceeded our expectations.

The deployment throughout Liberia has greatly improved security along its long and porous borders. UNMIL now has a strong presence along the Guinean-Liberian and Sierra Leonean-Liberian borders and the northern part of the Liberian border with Côte d'Ivoire. We will have full presence on the border contiguous with Côte d'Ivoire when the inbound Ethiopian and Senegalese battalions deploy to the south-east in mid-June.

Similarly, UNMIL's civilian police component is gaining ground. It has expanded considerably to the areas beyond Monrovia, including Roberts International Airport and the main UNMIL sector headquarters in Buchanan, Gbanga, Tubmanburg and Zwedru. The civilian component of UNMIL, although authorized at 607 international staff positions, has only 400 in place. This leaves me with a shortfall of 33 per cent. However, what they lack in quantity, they make up in quality.

The relaunched DDRR programme is progressing without major obstacles. As of 31 May, a total of 38,673 combatants had been disarmed, of those, 13 per cent are children and 18 per cent women. As I indicated earlier, together with those disarmed in December, that represents more than 70 per cent of the estimated 53,000 combatants. A total of 16,065 weapons have also been collected, and 12,858 rounds of heavy ammunition and 3,900,000 rounds of small ammunition have been collected and destroyed.

There are worrying signs, however, that some of the heavy weapons are not as yet being turned in for disarmament. We are determined to ensure that, in the end, all such weapons are surrendered. Another concern is that few non-Liberian combatants are voluntarily disclosing their foreign identities. So far, only 82 have declared themselves. We expect more to gain confidence in the process and identify themselves once the arrangements for their repatriation and remuneration become clear. We are devising those arrangements in consultation with the concerned United Nations agencies in the surrounding countries, preparing reintegration programmes should those individuals choose to return to their countries of origin.

With the aspects of disarmament and demobilization progressing smoothly, the main focus is now on preparations for the reintegration of disarmed combatants. In collaboration with the Transitional Government, United Nations agencies, non-governmental agencies and other parties such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the European Union, short-term bridging projects have been devised to absorb demobilized combatants pending the availability of a long-term reintegration programme. The United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and its partners are currently developing long-term capacity-building programmes for 7,000 child ex-combatants, most of which will focus on education, skills development, apprenticeship and community-based support.

Since we last briefed the Council, there has been considerable progress in the area of security sector reform and the rule of law. UNMIL has assisted in the restoration of the judicial system. Seventeen courts have been reconstituted in Monrovia and its environs. Furthermore, in collaboration with the International Committee of the Red Cross, we have assisted in improving the facilities and the conditions of the Monrovia Central Prison and to date have trained 50 correctional officers.

Additionally, the United Nations civilian police component has made considerable progress in the restructuring and the retraining of the Liberian National Police. A Rule of Law Implementation Committee has been established to coordinate the reform of the police, judiciary and correctional

institutions, as indicated in the report. The Committee is finalizing the strategy for the reform and the restructuring of Liberian National Police. It has already finalized the eligibility criteria for recruitment into the new police service, and the Transitional Government and UNMIL jointly launched the recruitment process on 5 May. The training of new cadets is to begin on 1 July.

With regard to the restructuring of the army, we are pleased that the Government of the United States has offered to take the lead in assisting and advising the National Transitional Government of Liberia on the implementation of that important task. A few weeks ago, I met with a visiting assessment team from the United States Department of Defence, and we discussed proposals for coordinating our efforts in that regard. UNMIL prepared a draft restructuring scheme and a draft defence policy that are now being reviewed, and follow-up meetings will ensue to ensure a proper, realistic and coordinated approach among all parties concerned.

Since April, UNMIL civil affairs officers have been deployed in various parts of the country, and UNMIL has currently deployed staff to the four sector headquarters, in Tubmanburg, Buchanan, Zwedru and Monrovia. It has also deployed in 10 of the 16 counties. In collaboration with the Ministry of Internal Affairs, a project proposal has been finalized for the return of government officials to their counties and districts immediately after the disarmament exercise has been completed. The United Nations Development Programme, USAID and the European Union are also involved in sourcing funds for this process.

Preparations for the October 2005 elections have commenced. The seven members of National Elections Commission (NEC) were sworn in on 29 April. UNMIL maintains that Liberia must take ownership of the electoral process. However, the Mission expects to play a key role so that the NEC can avail itself of the substantial material, human and technical resources that we have. In providing support for the electoral process in Liberia, UNMIL will be guided by two key objectives: to assist in the conduct of credible elections with all the necessary expertise and to leave behind a Liberian election management body that has the requisite capacity to continue independently, with minimal international assistance.

Currently, the Mission and other partners are assisting the National Elections Commission to establish its infrastructure in Monrovia and the counties. In accordance with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the NEC, assisted by UNMIL, the Economic Community Of West African States, the European Union and the International Foundation for Election Systems, will have to select the electoral system to be used, finalize the demarcation of constituencies and prepare a draft electoral law for consideration by the National Transitional Government of Liberia and the National Transitional Legislative Assembly. UNMIL is developing a training seminar for NEC commissioners and senior staff on electoral administration and electoral systems.

We also ask the Council to take note of the fact that there are indications that certain individuals in the Government are becoming enamoured of and comfortable in their positions and are becoming somewhat less enthusiastic about the timing of the October 2005 elections. The Council needs to reiterate its strong support for the October 2005 election date and its insistence that the elections will be held as scheduled.

The three mechanisms for monitoring the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement — namely the Joint Monitoring Committee, the Implementation Monitoring Committee and the International Contact Group on Liberia (ICGL) — have played a significant role in complementing the role of UNMIL. On 11 May, the ICGL met in London and expressed satisfaction at the progress made, especially the successful relaunching of the DDRR programme.

Developments in the surrounding countries are of concern to us as they can impact negatively on the peace process in Liberia. Thus, we are much encouraged by the efforts of the Chairman, who is working with the leaders of the neighbouring States — Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone — to improve their multilateral relationships. In that context as well, we have adopted a regional approach for addressing several of the cross-border issues between those countries. Hence, in cooperation with our colleagues in the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire and the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA), we are taking concrete measures to enhance inter-mission cooperation, in particular the sharing of assets and military information. My Force Commander,

Lieutenant-General Daniel Opande, has met three times with his counterparts in UNAMSIL and the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI). There have also been three meetings of regional Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, hosted by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa. A working group on inter-mission cooperation has been established to effect close cooperation on cross-border issues, and the Mission and the French army in Côte d'Ivoire have exchanged military liaison officers. As per the direction of the Secretary-General, a detailed study on enhancing all aspects of pursuing a regional approach in implementing our mandate will be prepared for submission to the Council later this year.

The improved security situation in recent months and the resumption of the disarmament process have enabled humanitarian agencies and human rights groups to extend their activities to areas that were formerly inaccessible. Also due to the improved security situation, displaced people and refugees are returning to their former homes.

Some refugees have returned from the surrounding countries, especially Sierra Leone, and almost 80,000 internally displaced persons have returned spontaneously, out of a possible caseload of 316,000. Others too have returned on their own and have been assisted by UNMIL and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees when they become stranded on their way home. That was the case with some 300 refugees stranded in Mali, who had to be airlifted to Liberia, and, more recently, the 350 refugees who were rescued from a foundering vessel off the coast of Côte d'Ivoire. We are discouraging these piecemeal, self-initiated approaches and are working in collaboration with the UNHCR in support of a broad and organized process of return. The main challenge now for the humanitarian agencies is a lack of resources for quickly moving relief assistance to newly accessible areas. That said, I must commend the World Food Programme, which feeds 600,000 people in Liberia every day, including 284,000 individuals belonging to vulnerable groups — the rest being internally displaced persons.

UNICEF continues to support the Ministry of Education in its back-to-school campaign, which aims to return an estimated 1 million children to their classrooms by the end of 2004. As of this May, the campaign has provided basic equipment and supplies, including more than 8,000 school-in-a-box kits to 3,700 schools for 622,000 children and 20,000 teachers. As well, since June 2003, more than 1.24 million children under the age of 15 have been immunized against measles.

Significant efforts are still required to restore public concerns and to revive the economy. However, the commercial and informal sectors have increased substantially. We are encouraged by the progress made since the donors conference of 5 and 6 February. Chairman Bryant will elaborate on the work of his Ministers to implement the Results-based Transitional Framework. However, the level of pledges redeemed by donors remains disappointingly low. As of 24 May, up to $60 million had been received of the $520 million pledged in New York last February for the two-year transitional period.

Before I conclude, let me make a few remarks related to the report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Security Council resolution 1521 (2003) regarding Liberia (S/2004/428).

As part of its mandate, UNMIL has continued to monitor progress made by the Transitional Government to put in place mechanisms to ensure the proper management of two key natural resource industries, namely diamonds and timber, which are both under United Nations sanctions. In this context, an important message I would like to leave with the Security Council is that the National Transitional Government of Liberia badly needs reliable sources of revenue in order to function effectively. Liberia's long-term security and stability will come only with an economy that is robust enough to create steady employment for young adult males, supported by a responsible credible, democratic and accountable Government. It is therefore necessary for the international community to provide all necessary support to enable the National Transitional Government of Liberia to meet the requirements of Council resolution 1521 (2003).

Let me conclude by stressing that the Liberia of today is totally different from the Liberia before the arrival of the troops of the Economic Community of West African States Mission in Liberia and, subsequently, of the United Nations. The peace process is now firmly on track and irreversible. UNMIL troops are deployed throughout the country and have significantly stabilized the country, and the disarmament of combatants is making steady progress.

However, there are still numerous challenges ahead. The progress made so far is still fragile. Ensuring complete weapons handover remains a priority. Until the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation programme and troop deployment process are completed, inter- and intra-factional conflicts may persist in remote parts of the country. The capacity of the Transitional Government to deliver services and to extend its authority throughout the country also remains, at the moment, very limited.

(*spoke in French*)

Despite these challenges, however, I can say that I anticipate no major setbacks in our effort to bring lasting peace and stability to Liberia, especially if resources to facilitate the reintegration of former combatants and national recovery are made available in a timely fashion.

The President: I thank Mr. Klein for his briefing.

I now give the floor to the Chairman of the National Transitional Government of Liberia, Mr. Charles Gyude Bryant.

Mr. Bryant (Liberia): I was here in February to present to the international community the Results-Focused Transitional Framework — a composite of the efforts that the Transitional Government of Liberia had exerted in an attempt to resurrect a totally collapsed State. We were encouraged by the overwhelming response of the United Nations, the United States, the European Union, the World Bank and a number of bilateral partners, as measured by the pledges for $522 million. Those pledges are being transformed into action on the ground to produce tangible results for the people of Liberia.

I am here today for one primary reason: to plead with the Council to lift the sanctions on my country.

As we disarm and demobilize our conflict's combatants, there are two critical needs associated with the process.

First, there is the need to rehabilitate ex-combatants, many of whom are lacking in economic survival skills. Following various processes of medical care and counselling, they will be helped to acquire new skills through training.

Secondly, there is a need to reintegrate them into local communities. An entry point in this regard is the creation of jobs to provide work for them. Here, Liberia remembers the lessons of history: ex-combatants who are not meaningfully rehabilitated and reintegrated into society run the risk of being re-recruited into violent crime and conflict. Our evolving fragile democracy simply cannot afford that. Accordingly, there is an urgent need to revive our economy and create jobs in support of the reintegration of ex-combatants and the internally displaced.

This brings me to the issue of the lifting of sanctions. Liberia makes a passionate appeal to the Council today to lift the sanctions on timber and diamonds. We make this appeal while appreciating the motivation for the imposition of the sanctions and in a spirit of full cooperation with the international community in order to address the concerns of the Security Council.

We also make this appeal because the sanctions contribute to the perception that Liberia is very unsafe and dangerous. There is a surcharge on everything imported into Liberia, thus raising the cost of living for my people. That has adverse implications for an orderly transition from conflict to peace.

The forestry sector holds the greatest short-term promise for job creation and the fostering of economic recovery. That sector used to provide over 7,000 jobs, contribute 20 per cent of Government revenues and account for approximately 50 per cent of our foreign exchange earnings. The sanctions on timber continue to hurt us. Sanctions were imposed on Liberian timber for five direct and indirect reasons. The primary reason was that timber resources were being used by the erstwhile Government to purchase arms for the purposes of fuelling conflict within the subregion and of suppressing its own people.

On this issue, we are pleased to report that the war is over and Liberia is now at peace with its neighbours. Rather than purchasing arms, the Transitional Government is currently disarming combatants. Our mission in this respect is to make our society gun-free and to live in harmony with our sister countries of the subregion.

United Nations forces are being deployed throughout the country — they have a visible presence at all sea ports and airports and they are patrolling our borders to ensure that weapons do not re-enter our country.

The Transitional Government is committed to the rule of law, human rights and social justice. This Government is not in the business of suppressing its own people. Despite provocation from detractors, we have remained focused on the major issues of disarmament and reconstruction. We have no political prisoners and no prisoners of conscience. The media is enjoying unprecedented freedom. Ours is indeed a Government of peace, reconstruction and national renewal.

The second concern of the Security Council was the lack of transparency in the awarding of concession agreements. It was the opinion of some members of the international community that concession rights may, in fact, have been granted to fly-by-night investors doing business not in the interests of Liberia but in the interests of the ruling elite and international criminal elements.

On this critical issue, 30 concession agreements have been examined. The first review was undertaken by the Forestry Development Authority, mainly to catalogue the legal and operating status of the 30 companies involved in the sector in 2003.

The second review involved more stakeholders, including environmentalists and conservationists as well as journalists and other international organizations. Five recommendations from that review have been made to the Board and have been endorsed. They are the following. All concessions whose acreage was increased within the period 1997 to 2003 should be reduced to their original size, as contracted with the Forestry Development Authority prior to 1997. Concession areas illegally taken away from others between 1997 and 2003 should be given back to their rightful owners. New concession areas illegally occupied between 1997 and 2003 without satisfaction of then-existing requirements should be withdrawn. All concessionaires indebted to the Government and the Authority should be made to settle their obligations. All concessions should be given a definite time frame in which they can come into conformity with new guidelines and regulations; those who fail to do so will have their concessions revoked through legal process.

Specifically, 24 of the 30 concessionaires have been cleared and will be recertified to recommence operations following their settlement of financial obligations to the Authority and the Government. Additionally, six of the concessionaires have not been cleared due to past gross irregularities and are slated for further investigation and/or legal revocation.

The third concern of the international community was that timber revenues were not being used for the benefit of the Liberian people. That relates to the issue of accountability. Since our incumbency, we have taken measures to ensure that our resources are utilized for the benefit of all our people. We currently have in place Executive Order No. 2. It centralizes the collection of all Government revenues under the authority of the Ministry of Finance and the deposit of all such revenues into the Government's account at the Central Bank of Liberia. Executive Order No. 2 has substantially increased Government revenues and control over those revenues.

Further, we have opened a Government timber revenue account at the Central Bank for stumpage fees and land rental. We have opened another forestry account, also at the Central Bank, for reforestation, conservation and research fees collected within the sector. Accounts at other financial institutions have been closed. The Central Bank accounts will assist us in tracking and monitoring revenues from the sector.

Additionally, the terms of reference of a European-Union-funded audit of the Authority has been commissioned by the Government to recommend new systems that will enhance financial transparency and accountability. It is expected that a more transparent budgetary process will also evolve from that undertaking. The Board of Directors has resolved to hire the services of a certified public accounting firm to develop, install and train Authority staff in the new systems to be recommended by the audit.

Because Liberians are so dependent upon and interact so closely with their local forest resources, my Government is fostering a forest sector reform programme that restores the connection between forest and community. In that direction, we are considering the following: establishing county-level advisory committees intended to provide a channel of communication for communities; developing village wood lots to secure fuel wood supplies for urban communities; and establishing a unit in the Forestry Development Authority responsible for developing and enhancing the flow of forest resources and benefits to the community.

These efforts are an integral part of a community-friendly logging policy that we are currently

developing. That policy will ensure that a percentage of the timber revenues generated goes back to meet the development needs of the local communities where the logs were felled. Those funds will serve as matching resources for the corporate social responsibility funds provided by logging concessions to assist local communities. The primary development needs targeted for those funds are education and training, health and sanitation, and infrastructure. An oversight committee, drawn from relevant sectoral ministries and agencies, will be established to monitor utilization of those funds.

The law requires concessionaires to build community infrastructures such as health facilities and schools. The Government is now considering, at the policy level, the degree of responsibility for community development on the part of concession holders, the national Government and local governments.

The fourth area of concern of the international community has been the low capacity of the Forestry Development Authority to regulate the sector. On that issue, we have put in place a programme to enhance the capacity of the Authority as follows. The Board of Directors has been reconstituted, as recommended by the Timber Sanctions Review Committee. The Board now includes the Minister of Finance, thus linking the Authority with the macroeconomic management of the Government. The Board has approved the creation of two Deputy Managing Director positions, one for protective forestry — conservation — and another for commercial forestry. They will focus, highlight and balance conservation and commercial issues.

The Government has made available to the Authority an initial amount of $350,000 to commence the rehabilitation of its infrastructure. With additional assistance from the United States Office of Transition Initiatives, all five regional offices are being renovated, refurbished and equipped with short wave communication and mobile equipment. Refresher training courses have commenced. One has been undertaken for managers and sectional heads. A second phase now under way includes refresher training for more than 200 forest rangers, scalers, protection forest guides and park wardens. Train-the-trainer courses are also being organized.

We have encouraged the establishment of oversight committees and institutions for monitoring effective sustainable forest management practices, community involvement and environmental impact assessments. In this connection, we are pleased to inform the Council that the Environmental Protection Agency has been established and set up as one of the oversight and monitoring institutions.

While the aforementioned measures are critical for improved governance of the sector, we are also committed to enhancing the regulatory capacity by progressively working towards achieving the following, in partnership with the international initiatives: the evolution of a stronger management team by engaging external experts either through request for secondment or through direct hire as technical assistance experts; the review and revision of forestry commercial levies, as well as strengthening the revenue collection system; the establishment of a web site and creation of a CD-ROM; and beginning the building of a geographic information system/remote-sensing capacity. The fifth area of concern of the international community has been the lack of appreciation for the environment, conservation and biodiversity in forestry operations.

To address these fundamental concerns, our reform programmes now accentuate the environment in the operations of FDA. Primarily, we have adopted a "triple-C" policy — conservation, community and commercial — to henceforth guide us in the exploitation of our forests. This policy seeks to strike a balance between the competing interests of community development, conservation and commercialization. In this context, FDA has endorsed the initiatives of Conservation International, along with 13 non-governmental organizations, and has given these organizations unequivocal access to FDA and its operations.

The Government and Conservation International are now working together to restore Liberia's forest conservation programme. A sequenced landscaping strategy to secure and expand the network of protective areas and national parks has begun. Two national parks — Sapo and Nimba — have been proclaimed and six new target areas have since been identified and protected. A conservation trust fund will be established for these and related purposes. A primary objective of this fund shall be to facilitate biodiversity research.

Finally, we recognize that there are appropriate laws on the books for good governance of the forestry

sector. However, these laws have not been rigidly applied in recent times, thereby creating chaos and leading to the abuse and misuse of our forest resources. Our Government shall henceforth vigorously enforce forestry laws and regulations. Additionally, in concert with our international partners, Liberia will continue to review and implement a strategy of long-term sustainable forest management.

I have laid out for the Council's consideration a series of actions which we have taken and propose to take in order to meet its requirements for lifting sanctions on the export of our timber products. We would like the Council to have its experts visit Liberia within the next 90 days to validate this performance.

Diamond sales are a foreign exchange earner for Liberia. Diamond production, alongside the exploitation of gold, is an economic mainstay for a substantial number of our people. Additionally, on account of Liberia's dual currency regime, in which the United States dollar serves as legal tender alongside the Liberian dollar, diamond dealers and traders from neighbouring countries prefer to do business in our markets. As such, Liberia receives collateral benefits from these transactions.

We have made tremendous progress in satisfying the demands of the Security Council. We have submitted ourselves wholeheartedly to the internationally recognized Kimberly Certification Process. The Process requires participating countries to enact legislation that clearly defines procedures aimed at promoting transparency in the production, sale, importation, transit and exportation of rough diamonds. Our cooperation in this area is known to the Council's own Panel of Experts, which, in paragraph 93 (b) of its most recent report, states that this collaboration between the Diamond High Council and the Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy was closely monitored by the Panel.

In compliance with this requirement, an act entitled "An Act Amending the New Minerals and Mining Law, Part I, Title 23, LCLR, By Adding Thereto a New Chapter 40, Providing for Controls on the export, import and transit of Rough Diamonds" has been submitted to the National Transitional Legislative Assembly for enactment into law.

As further assurance to the Council of our total compliance with the Kimberly Process, we have agreed with the Sanctions Review Committee that immediately, upon the lifting of sanctions on diamonds, Liberia will temporarily impose a voluntary embargo on the sale, importation and exportation of rough diamonds until it is Kimberly-certified. Further, in an effort to establish a viable monitoring mechanism for rough diamonds produced in Liberia, the Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy is setting up a cooperative mining system within the alluvial mining subsector.

The cooperatives will provide small-scale miners with financial and material support. The cooperatives will, in turn, purchase rough diamonds produced by the miners. As with timber, a percentage of revenue intake from diamond extraction will revert to these communities for development. Under this system, all production will be monitored and regulated. This will enable the Government to trace diamonds produced from the fields to the Diamond Certification Centre at the Ministry of Lands, Mines and Energy and through to their destination on the international market. A database will be established at the Diamond Certification Centre for effective monitoring, research and planning purposes, as well as to disabuse the international community of the notion that Liberia does not have diamonds. The Government has embarked on extensive training of its mineral inspectors and mining agents, who are expected to play a vital role in monitoring the cooperative scheme.

While we await the decision of the Council with regard to lifting sanctions on diamonds, we take cognizance of the decision of the United States Government to unilaterally lift sanctions on the importation of diamonds from Liberia, and to express our appreciation for that decision. And for the record, I want to make clear that, even though the United States has been generous in doing that, to date there have been no exports of diamonds to the United States in violation of the Council's sanctions.

As I conclude this appeal for the lifting of sanctions, permit me to say a few words of gratitude to this body. The United Nations has been kind to Liberia in many and varying ways. It supported the Accra peace talks and developed the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. That accord is currently guiding us in our transition from continuous conflict to sustainable peace and human development. The United Nations continues to provide humanitarian assistance to war-weary Liberians through its specialized agencies. Those agencies are working in collaboration with the Government and with non-governmental organizations.

The United Nations has authorized and now has in place one of the largest peacekeeping forces in its history to disarm combatants as well as to keep and enforce the peace in Liberia. The United Nations co-sponsored the highly successful International Reconstruction Conference for Liberia, held on 5 and 6 February 2004. For all of that, Liberians thank the United Nations from the deepest recesses of their hearts.

May I also take this opportunity to pay a special tribute to Secretary-General Kofi Annan for his personal involvement in resolving the Liberian conflict. Despite other global crises such as those in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Middle East, he has raised the Liberian crisis to the highest level of international concern and has provided diplomatic leadership in rescuing the situation. We are immensely grateful to the Secretary-General for his support and assistance. Leadership is about inspiration, and he continues to inspire us to reject conflict and to build a better society for our people.

Finally, let me assure all members of the Council that, through their support and assistance, Liberia is breaking through. A failed State is being transformed into an emerging democracy. A lawless State is being transformed into a nation that respects human values and is committed to the rule of law. A pariah State is being accepted into the comity of decent nations. And a conflict-prone State is being transformed into a nation of peace — at peace with itself, at peace with its neighbours, at peace with the international community. Liberia is counting on the Council for its continuous understanding and support.

The President: I thank Mr. Bryant for his briefing.

I shall now give the floor to those members who have indicated their wish to speak.

Mr. Holliday (United States of America): On the occasion of the first public meeting since you assumed the Council presidency, Sir, I would like to congratulate you and to express our appreciation for the work of the outgoing President, Ambassador Akram.

My delegation would also like to thank Chairman Bryant and Special Representative of the Secretary-General Klein for their presentations to the Council. We appreciate their presence here today, but, most important, we appreciate the work that they have undertaken on behalf of the Liberian people. They faced enormous challenges when they assumed their respective offices, and although many challenges remain, much has been accomplished since the Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed in Accra last August.

The most significant of those accomplishments is unquestionably the near-full deployment of United Nations peacekeepers and the relative calm that they have brought to Monrovia and environs. The calm and stability remain fragile, but we commend the peacekeepers and encourage their sustained deployment outside Monrovia. We very much appreciate the efforts of troop-contributing countries, and we urge current and potential troop contributors to support the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).

We welcome indications that peacekeepers of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) will work closely with peacekeepers in neighbouring countries such as Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone. Close cooperation and collaboration among UNMIL, the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) will serve the interests of all three peacekeeping operations and of peace and security in the region.

We take note of the meetings between the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General and the exchange of liaison officers highlighted in the Secretary-General's report (S/2004/430). We hope that continuing exchanges of ideas will result in the development of concrete plans for cross-border activities and the sharing of resources, and we look forward to further developments on this issue.

While military deployment has speeded up and has nearly reached authorized levels, civilian staffing for UNMIL lags behind. We are very concerned that the Special Representative should have all the means necessary to carry out his work. We encourage all parts of the United Nations — in Monrovia and in New York — to do whatever is necessary to ensure that UNMIL has the right staff in a timely manner.

A key task for UNMIL has been the disarmament and demobilization of combatants. Successful completion of those activities has often been identified as the key to Liberia's lasting stability and security. We

need to disarm and demobilize the fighters in order for the political process to go ahead, and we need to support reintegration efforts in order to minimize future threats. We also need to be sensitive to the simultaneous returns of internally displaced persons and of refugees, as well as to the needs of the communities to which those groups are returning. Illiteracy, unemployment and a lack of prospects afflict all those groups equally. We recognize the particular significance of ex-combatants and the risk they pose to the political process, but we must also keep in mind their civilian victims, and we must not be seen as rewarding ex-combatants. We can best reach that balance not by slowing or ceasing disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR), but by devoting similar energy and resources to assist all the other war-afflicted groups.

We would urge that all parts of the United Nations system involved in the DDRR process begin the RR phase immediately. We are concerned about the gap between the DD and the RR. We understand that disarmament and demobilization — which got off to a bit of a rocky start — have been well under way since being restarted in mid-April. We encourage serious collaboration with non-governmental organizations in Liberia and with others with relevant experience to ensure continued success in the DD phase. And we urge rapid commencement of rehabilitation and reintegration. Only serious and sustained assistance programmes will discourage former combatants from returning to political violence or from embarking on criminal activity.

We also urge the Liberian factions to do their part for DDRR. The ultimate responsibility for DDRR belongs to Liberians themselves, albeit with strong support from the international community. The Secretary-General's report (S/2004/428) notes that just over 30,000 combatants have been disarmed but that fewer than 15,000 weapons have been collected. We are concerned that more weapons have not been brought in, but we recognize that not all combatants had their own weapons and that most combatants are still reluctant to give up their weapons. Their faith in the peace process is understandably fragile, and they continue to feel a need to rely on their guns as the sole source of security and livelihood. We propose that the current emphasis on demobilizing combatants and dismantling the militias be followed by consideration of how to ensure that the weapons are permanently out of circulation.

In conjunction with DDRR, as Jacques Klein mentioned, my Government is taking the lead on security-sector reform. We have sent a 30-person assessment team to Liberia to consider security-sector issues. Its members are now drafting its recommendations for a reform plan. We will direct a significant part of our bilateral funding for Liberia to that effort in recognition of Liberia's need for professional defence forces and of the need to replace Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and ex-Government forces with a serious, professional and trained force loyal to the new Government of Liberia.

Security-sector reform is a large task. Although we expect to play a significant role, we encourage other donors to step in and work with us. I would add that, as many members know, one of our security assessment team members was tragically murdered in Monrovia last week. We are saddened by that loss, but it does not diminish our commitment to completing and pursuing this important task in Liberia.

Liberia needs both short-term humanitarian and long-term development assistance. We must support immediately the establishment of an effective police force and a functioning judiciary, and must ensure that there are adequate resources for elections next year. February's donor conference was a huge success. It represented a unique collaboration of key assistance actors on a results-based framework, and donors responded enthusiastically, pledging roughly $500 million. However, four months later, less than 20 per cent of those pledges have been met. We urge donors to stand by their commitments and not to let the fact that the spotlight has perhaps moved away from Liberia's immediate crisis to be an excuse for those needs not being met. We would urge donors and stakeholders to coordinate. Cooperation has generally been good, but it would be useful to have a more disciplined sharing of plans to ensure maximum coverage of needs. We encourage donors to pay particular attention to returns of refugees and internally displaced persons. We anticipate the return of 850,000 to Liberia, including half a million internally displaced persons and 350,000 refugees.

We also encourage the National Transitional Government of Liberia to work with United Nations agencies, donor Governments and non-governmental organizations to ensure that programmes are in place to receive all the returnees and to ensure that their return is sustainable. Again, the responsibility belongs to Liberians, with support from the international community.

My Government notes the initial steps that Chairman Bryant and other members of his Government are taking to institute control over Government revenue to ensure that funds are spent appropriately to benefit the people of Liberia. These are welcome developments, and we applaud the ongoing efforts.

However, there will be no lasting change in Liberia absent the establishment of values that reflect honesty, trust, service, transparency and accountability. It has been suggested that we should ease current restrictions imposed by the Security Council on Liberia under resolution 1521 (2003), particularly in the areas of diamonds and timber. We too look forward to that day. However, my delegation respectfully has a different view of the current situation and believes that a history of corrupt practices in Liberia has fostered an environment in which abuses of power were permitted to flourish. The time has come, as resolution 1521 (2003) states, for the National Transitional Government to establish transparent accounting and auditing mechanisms to ensure that all Government revenues are not used to fuel conflict but instead are employed to improve the lives of all Liberians. We note the Chairman's description of some of the positive steps that have been taken in that direction.

Finally, despite the best efforts of committed Liberians, United Nations staff and members of the international community, Charles Taylor continues to remain a threat to Liberia. We continue to believe that Taylor should be held accountable for his actions in Sierra Leone and should appear before the Special Court.

Before closing, Mr. President, I would like to thank you for chairing this timely and critical meeting, and for allowing us to have such a robust and comprehensive statement. I must also re-emphasize the intention of the United States to work closely with our colleagues in Monrovia, with Chairman Bryant and with our Security Council colleagues here in New York to ensure a brighter future for the people of Liberia, who deserve no less than our continued engagement as they rebuild their nation.

The President: I thank the representative of the United States for the kind words he addressed to the presidency.

Mr. Valle (Brazil): I take this opportunity, Sir, to congratulate you heartily on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council and to wish you much success in your term as President. I extend compliments to Ambassador Munir Akram for his very successful conduct of our work during the month of May, which was characterized by a highly demanding agenda.

My delegation welcomes both the presence and the important and encouraging statement of the Chairman of the National Transitional Government of Liberia, His Excellency Mr. Charles Gyude Bryant. In addition, I express appreciation to Special Representative Jacques Klein for introducing the report of the Secretary-General and for the work he has been carrying out as Head of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).

My delegation welcomes the progress achieved so far in the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed at Accra in August 2003. The present report (S/2004/430) lists a number of positive developments that have taken place within the period under review: improved conditions for the delivery of humanitarian assistance and for the beginning of national recovery; establishment of an interim national police force; progress in judicial reform and in the promotion of the rule of law throughout the country; empowerment of the Cabinet of the National Transitional Government; the appointment of a new National Elections Commission; and the development of legislation relating to the establishment of an Independent National Human Rights Commission and a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

UNMIL has been central in providing adequate security conditions for the implementation of the Accra Agreement. We are very pleased to learn that UNMIL has successfully relaunched its programme of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and rehabilitation (DDRR) and that, since December 2003, 58 per cent of the anticipated number of combatants have been disarmed. It is particularly gratifying to know that an intensive public information programme

has decisively contributed to that result. My delegation has always insisted on the relevance of public communication in complex operations, in particular that of radio broadcasting.

Nonetheless, the Secretary-General's report also takes due note of the low number of weapons being surrendered in the disarmament process. We are concerned by information received from the Panel of Experts on Liberia that arms trafficking has not been dismantled and that factions could easily rearm. We believe that the complete deployment of UNMIL and cooperation among peacekeeping operations in the region can contribute to addressing this threat. Furthermore, renewed efforts should be made to support the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the implementation of its moratorium on small arms. As a matter of fact, in the light of the discussion held by the Council last week on complex crises (see S/PV.4980), cooperation with ECOWAS in developing programmes that could have an immediate social impact in Liberia should also be envisaged by the international community.

At present, greater attention should be devoted to job-generation activities through supporting both labour-intensive enterprises and individual economic initiatives. Failure in providing economic alternatives may damage current DDRR efforts. In that context, the Economic and Social Council could have an important role to play in assisting in the management of economic recovery; the experience gained in Burundi and Guinea-Bissau could be instrumental to that effect, as pointed out by the President of the Economic and Social Council, Ambassador Marjatta Rasi, at last Friday's meeting.

Our delegation welcomes the positive developments taking place as a result of the adoption of a regional approach by UNMIL, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire and the United Nations Peace-building Support Office in Guinea-Bissau in the implementation of their mandates. It is also heartening to learn that the human rights situation in Liberia and access to humanitarian assistance have improved since March. The continuous training of law enforcement agents will contribute even further to that end.

Before closing, I would like to congratulate UNMIL and the National Transitional Government on the progress now being achieved in Liberia and to appeal to donor countries to help the National Elections Commission in mobilizing the material and human resources needed for the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections in October next year as stipulated in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The risks involved in postponing democratic elections would be too high to be ignored.

The President: I thank the representative of Brazil for the kind words he addressed to the presidency.

Mr. Wang Guangya (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): I should like at the outset, Sir, to congratulate you on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. I am confident that, with your experience and diplomatic skill, you will successfully guide the work of the Council this month. I should like also to take this opportunity to congratulate my good friend Ambassador Akram on his successful leadership of the work of the Council last month.

I should like first warmly to welcome Mr. Bryant, Chairman of the National Transitional Government of Liberia, who has travelled so far to be with us. His statement was very helpful to the Council's understanding of the current situation in Liberia. I should like also to thank Mr. Klein, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, for his briefing in connection with the report of the Secretary-General.

The past year has been very eventful for Liberia. With the resolute assistance of the international community, the long period of war and turmoil in Liberia has come to an end and the long-hoped-for peace has arrived. Since the establishment of the National Transitional Government of Liberia, headed by Chairman Bryant, serious efforts have been made to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, promote the peace process, bring about national reconciliation and undertake the process of national recovery and economic reconstruction. Liberia is embarking on a new and historic phase of development. We are sincerely gratified to see the positive change in the situation in Liberia, and we offer our heartfelt congratulations to the National Transitional Government of Liberia for the tangible achievements made since it took office.

We sincerely hope that all sides in Liberia, on the basis of the achievements already registered, will seize this opportunity to strengthen cooperation and work

together to promote the stability and development of the nation.

In our view, there are three priority tasks. The first is to endeavour to extend the Government's authority throughout the territory of Liberia. The second is to expedite the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process, and the third is to ensure effective control over national resources.

Chairman Bryant has expressed the wish that the sanctions on Liberia be lifted as soon as possible. We fully understand that wish. We endorse the idea that the Security Council should make a decision on that question as soon as possible.

Since its deployment under the leadership of Mr. Klein, the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) has overcome many difficulties and has worked to nurture and safeguard peace and stability in Liberia. We commend the work done by the Mission and hope that, in the light of the development of the situation, it will further strengthen its coordination and cooperation with the National Transitional Government of Liberia and help it to promote capacity-building.

We call on the international community expeditiously to fulfil its pledged commitments and to help Liberia to consolidate peace and realize development. Liberia is an important West African country whose peace and stability are important to the region as a whole. We hope that the National Transitional Government of Liberia will further strengthen good-neighbourly relations with the countries of the region and support UNMIL in the framework of continued and strengthened communication and cooperation with United Nations missions in other West African countries, in the common effort to achieve peace and development in the region as a whole.

We look forward to the forthcoming recommendations of the Council mission that will soon leave for West Africa with respect to a comprehensive strategy and solutions to cross-border issues.

China has actively supported the peace process and post-war reconstruction in Liberia. Chinese peacekeepers are participating in UNMIL, including in engineering, transportation and medical units. China has also provided, to the extent of its capabilities, economic and financial assistance to the Liberian Government. We are prepared to work with other members of the international community in continuing tirelessly efforts to achieve comprehensive and lasting peace and stability in Liberia.

The President: I thank the representative of China for the kind words he addressed to the presidency.

Mr. Baali (Algeria): I would like first of all to associate myself with those who have expressed their appreciation and admiration to Ambassador Munir Akram and his able team for the remarkable manner in which Pakistan conducted our work last month. I would like also to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council and to assure you of the full support and cooperation of the Algerian delegation.

It is a great honour for the Council to receive today Chairman Bryant, Chairman of the National Transitional Government of Liberia, and to hear his views and expectations regarding the role of the Security Council and of the international community at large in support of the remarkable efforts of the Liberian people and Government aimed at rebuilding a peaceful, safe and prosperous Liberia.

I would like also to express our thanks to Mr. Klein for his comprehensive briefing and to commend him, as well the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), on the encouraging developments achieved so far in the peace process in Liberia.

Chairman Bryant has clearly outlined the challenges that the Liberian people are still confronted with. For Liberia, the process of healing from the wounds inflicted by the war will certainly be a long and arduous one. The problems are numerous and difficult to solve, and the transition from emergency recovery to reconstruction and rehabilitation will require tremendous efforts and huge resources. The impatience of the Liberians, especially ex-combatants, will rise as peace and stability are restored throughout the country.

Yet the news is encouraging, and success is well within reach. We are in that regard very impressed by the improvement of the security situation, by the fact that the transitional institutions are functioning smoothly, and by the significant progress achieved in the peace process, in particular regarding disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and the progressive restoration of State authority throughout the country.

Furthermore, the international community has been quite supportive, as demonstrated during the international conference that took place last February here in New York. The international community is indeed fully aware that there is no alternative but to succeed in Liberia. As a matter of fact, failure would have dramatic consequences, not only for the Liberian people, but also for the security and stability of the entire West African region.

In that regard, there is a broad consensus, which we welcome, within the international community and within the Council, on the necessity of adopting a global and regional approach when dealing with the issue of instability in West Africa and when addressing the factors that have been fuelling insecurity in that subregion for more than a decade.

In that context, I would like to commend the personal commitment of Chairman Bryant and his tireless efforts to promote good relations with Liberia's neighbours, at both the bilateral and multilateral levels. The holding of the summit of the Mano River Union, which took place on 20 May, is a very welcome step towards the activation of dialogue and cooperation among the States of the region. In that connection, I would respectfully ask Chairman Bryant if he could offer us some comments with regard to the outcome of that very important event.

Finally, we are fully aware of the importance that Liberia attaches to the lifting of sanctions, and we entirely agree with its argument on the moral, social, economic and humanitarian impact of sanctions. The sanctions were imposed for the sake of peace in Liberia. Last December, the Security Council revised the legal basis of the sanctions regime in order to bring sanctions into line with the new political realities in Liberia. The Government is a partner for peace of the Security Council. It is therefore our view that the issue of sanctions should no longer be a source of controversy between Liberia and the Council.

In conclusion, I once again thank Chairman Bryant and wish him every success in his very demanding duties.

The President: I thank the representative of Algeria for his kind words addressed to the presidency.

Mr. de La Sablière (France) (*spoke in French*): As this is the first time my delegation is taking the floor in a public meeting this month, at the outset I wish you, Sir, all the best during your presidency for the month of June. I also thank Ambassador Akram for the manner in which he conducted the Council's work last month, which we greatly appreciated.

First, I welcome the presence among us of Chairman Bryant. On behalf of France, I take this occasion to commend him on the remarkable effort he is making for his country's recovery. We all know that his task is great. I simply wish to tell him that today he can count on my country's support, and on that of the Council, I am sure.

I also thank Mr. Klein for his briefing on the situation in Liberia, which we listened to with great attention.

I must say that the information we have heard is very encouraging. It is encouraging for three reasons. First, it is encouraging because the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), now at a staffing level of just over 14,000 persons, is today able to deploy over the entire territory. Secondly, it is encouraging because — and this is essential — as Mr. Klein has told the Council, the disarmament process has been resumed. The fact that 34,000 ex-combatants — if I remember the figure correctly — have been disarmed gives hope for new stability in Liberia. Finally, it is encouraging because security sector reform is under way.

Chairman Bryant mentioned the issue of lifting the sanctions imposed on his country pursuant to resolution 1521 (2003). In that connection, we note with great interest the action taken by the Liberian Government and UNMIL to restore State control over natural resources. We encourage the Liberian authorities to continue their efforts in that direction. The Council will continue closely to follow the progress made on that issue with respect to the criteria set out in resolution 1521 (2003).

Significant progress has therefore been made. However, to achieve lasting stability, Liberia must still face three major challenges.

The first challenge is the lasting demobilization of combatants, which comes up against two hurdles. The first hurdle is to reduce the number of weapons in circulation, and we are concerned by the difficulties that seem to be encountered in recovering weapons. The second hurdle is to reintegrate ex-combatants into civilian life. That task is certainly the most difficult

one and will require a lasting effort by the entire international community. France will participate alongside its partners in the European Union.

The second challenge is the rebuilding of the State and basic public services. That is essential for the people of Liberia to benefit from the newly recovered peace.

The third challenge is to hold free and transparent elections in October 2005. In Liberia, as elsewhere, credible elections are the sole guarantee of a successful end to a crisis. The success of those elections and the commitment of all parties to the democratic process are the measure by which one will be able to judge the solidity of the peace process in Liberia. As has often been said in the Council, a lasting and solid peace process in Liberia is a guarantee for peace and security throughout the region.

In conclusion, I express our satisfaction at the efforts for coordination among the United Nations operations in West Africa. My country has always urged such coordination. We have always believed that the sharing of information and logistic resources, joint efforts at the borders and coordination on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programmes are indispensable for strengthening the effectiveness of each operation. We hope that the United Nations operations will continue on that path.

The President: I thank the Ambassador of France for his kind words addressed to the presidency.

Mr. De Palacio España (Spain) (*spoke in Spanish*): In this first public meeting of the Security Council under the Philippine presidency, we express our best wishes for the success and the positive outcome of the Council's work. We pledge our delegation's support. As well, we express our esteem and gratitude for the work done by Ambassador Munir Akram during the Pakistani presidency of the Council in May.

We are especially grateful for the presence of Chairman Bryant and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Klein, at this public meeting, which is particularly timely because it is taking place days after the publication of the latest report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Liberia (S/2004/430) and a few short weeks before a Security Council mission is to visit West Africa, including Liberia. We express our satisfaction at the words of praise of the Special Representative for Chairman Bryant. We congratulate the Chairman on that.

For our part, we wish to make some comments with respect to the situation in Liberia. First, we appreciate the efforts made to date by the National Transitional Government to implement the necessary political, economic and social reforms, to which Chairman Bryant referred in his extensive briefing. We encourage him to continue working actively along those lines, with the support of the international community. It is gratifying that the Cabinet of the National Transitional Government meets regularly and that most government posts have been filled.

We believe that the fundamental priority at the moment is to make progress in the overall security situation, which, in our view, is comprised of three main elements. First is the full deployment of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in the entire country. The second element is the satisfactory continuation and conclusion of the process of demobilization, disarmament, reintegration and rehabilitation of ex-combatants. We have been reminded of some of the consequences if that crucial process were to fail. Third is reform of State security institutions.

With respect to the full deployment of UNMIL in terms of both the overall staffing level and the Mission's presence throughout the national territory, we note and welcome the fact that the deployment process is scheduled to be completed at the end of this month.

With respect to the process of demobilization, disarmament, reintegration and rehabilitation, we welcome the progress made since its resumption in mid-April. Nevertheless, it is worrisome that, as has been highlighted, the number of heavy weapons surrendered so far is still below what was expected and that, therefore, there continue to be large quantities of those weapons hidden, which could be used in the future to destabilize the fragile security situation of the country.

With respect to the reform of the State security institutions, we note with satisfaction the start, in early May, of the process to recruit new members of the police force. We also take note of the efforts to restructure the armed forces, which are becoming ever more urgent as the process of disarmament,

demobilization, reintegration and rehabilitation moves forward.

With respect to the regional approach, we are pleased to note that, on 29 April, another meeting took place in Dakar between the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the United Nations Mission in Côte d'Ivoire and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone, organized by the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa, Mr. Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah. The future formulation by the three missions of joint plans and modalities aimed at ensuring more effective control of the common borders is an important initiative, which we welcome.

Lastly, despite the evident achievements that have been made thus far, major challenges to the peace process in Liberia remain, as has been noted. These include ensuring the success of the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and rehabilitation programme, to which I referred earlier; stabilizing the security situation; extending State authority throughout the entire country; and, above all, preparing for the elections that are scheduled to take place in October 2005 and that should go ahead as planned, with no delay. In this context, we take note of the appeal made by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to the Council and to the international community. We would also like to refer to transparent management of economic resources and to improvement in the humanitarian and human rights situation — areas where progress has occurred.

All of these issues constitute complex challenges that require the resolute commitment of the Transitional Government, supported by the international community. We encourage the Transitional Government and UNMIL to continue their efforts in those fields and assure them of Spain's support as they traverse the path ahead of them.

The President: I thank the representative of Spain for his kind words addressed to the presidency.

Mr. Smirnov (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): First of all, I would like to say how pleased we are to see you, Sir, presiding over the Security Council for this month. We are ready to cooperate closely with your delegation. We greatly appreciate the work done by the representative of Pakistan during the month of May, and express our gratitude to him.

We thank Chairman Bryant and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Klein, for their very comprehensive briefings on the situation in Liberia. We support the main conclusions of the most recent report of the Secretary-General (S/2004/430). We note that some progress has been made in stabilizing the situation in Liberia. At the same time, a number of important tasks remain on the agenda for a Liberian settlement.

Chairman Bryant dealt in detail with the tasks that need to be undertaken to ensure the effective and transparent management of the national resources of his country. We support the efforts of the National Transitional Government in that regard. At the same time, we believe that questions pertaining to the security situation in the context of the disarmament and reintegration process, as well as problems relating to the extension of the authority of the Transitional Government throughout the territory of the country, remain priority tasks on the political agenda, in the framework of the efforts of the Transitional Government, including preparations for the elections which are planned for 2005.

In that context, we would like to ask a number of specific questions. We would like in particular to know how the establishment of a new national army is being dealt with. What elements are going to be included? What will its approximate size be?

The report of the Secretary-General refers to the illegal transportation of heavy weapons through the territory of Liberia. How serious is that problem? We would be grateful for more detailed information in that regard.

The President: I thank the representative of the Russian Federation for his kind words addressed to the presidency.

Mr. Gaspar Martins (Angola): I would like to start by congratulating you, Sir, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council for this month. I assure you of our full support and cooperation with a view to ensuring that this month, too, will be a very successful and productive one for the Council. We have no doubt that that will be the case, given your great skill and the able manner in which you are conducting our business.

I would also like to reiterate our gratitude for the commendable conduct of the Council's work by

Ambassador Munir Akram and his team during the month that has just ended.

I wish to welcome the presence in the Council Chamber and the participation in this meeting of Chairman Bryant and his delegation. Their presence provides a very good — indeed, historic — opportunity for a productive dialogue between the Security Council on the one hand and the Liberian authorities and the Liberian people on the other.

That dialogue will certainly enhance the preparations for the forthcoming Security Council mission to West Africa, including Liberia, which we hope will take place later this month. Chairman Bryant's presence is also a mark of the qualitative change in the situation prevailing in Liberia compared with that of six months ago. That is proof of the personal qualities and commitment of the members of the Government of Liberia to the cause of the people.

I would also like to thank Mr. Klein for the clarity of his briefing, and to commend the personnel of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) for the successful way in which they have been implementing the mandate of the Mission. The results achieved so far have exceeded our expectations. That demonstrates that the leadership and the political and material support of the Council and the international community are among the determining factors in dealing with complex crises.

The situation in Liberia continues to be a central question for the Security Council and for the continent. During the solemn launching of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union just over a week ago, heads of State or Government, while welcoming the progress being made in the peace process in Liberia, noted, however, that there is still much to be done to ensure that peace is truly consolidated in the country. It is therefore timely that the Security Council is meeting to review the situation in Liberia and to welcome the progress that has been achieved.

In his most recent report (S/2004/430), the Secretary-General described the ceasefire as largely holding, while recognizing that the security situation remains fragile, owing to the fact that the disarmament process has yet to be completed. That is also a fact, judging from what we have been told this morning.

The consolidation of peace in the country will depend mostly on the achievements of the Government of Liberia during this critical, but key, transitional period of the country, from war to peace and from relief to first steps of recovery.

As has been repeatedly said, the Government of Liberia will be able to handle this transitional period only if its efforts, the political will of the Liberian people and political forces involved in the process are duly and promptly complemented by adequate assistance from the international community. This meeting could be a good opportunity for the Council to reiterate the support of the international community.

The challenges faced by Liberia are indeed enormous. Evidence of extensive destruction to infrastructure and the social fabric is overwhelming. According to the Secretariat's Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, non-governmental organizations and United Nations agencies, of Liberia's population of 3.3 million, 1.7 million people are in need of assistance, 80 per cent live below the poverty line, 35 per cent are undernourished and 75 per cent do not have access to clean water, while unemployment has reached 85 per cent. The Government has also to face the burden of refugees and displaced persons and the difficult task of restoring State authority.

Faced with that economic and social environment, the Government has spared no effort to build peace in Liberia, and that is very commendable. The main question remains how to make the peace process irreversible in such a fragile situation.

It is our view that to make this positive trend irreversible, the key role will have to be played not only through the efforts of Liberians, but also through the international community's implementation of the commitment made at the International Reconstruction Conference for Liberia, held in New York just a few months ago, in February. In that connection, it is a real concern that of the $522 million pledged, only $66 million have been received so far.

By presenting the Results-Focused Transitional Framework, the Government of Liberia and the partners have clearly pointed out not only the needs to be met, but also the right way to ensure a successful transition and sustainable peace. Chairman Bryant has shown his personal commitment to the successful execution of this Framework by heading the Implementation and Monitoring Committee itself.

As was established during the Security Council meeting on complex crises and the United Nations, held last month under the Pakistani presidency, Liberia is one of those complex crises in which the link between peace and development must remain at the core of the international community's response.

God endowed Liberia with natural resources that can contribute significantly to the prosperity of its people. Assistance from the international community should therefore focus on helping Liberia to exploit those natural resources for the benefit of its population. We commend the Government of Liberia, and Chairman Bryant in particular, for the administrative, political and economic reform measures, which have been presented in a very detailed form to the Council this morning.

We welcome the role of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) in assisting the National Transitional Government to restore proper management of the country's natural resources and in devising mechanisms for ensuring accountability and transparency in the collection and disbursement of revenues, as well as in restoring institutional capacities and a legal framework to end impunity.

UNMIL is putting in place adequate tools for Liberia for a lasting solution to the problems affecting the country, as that will enable full control of the situation by the Liberian Government. The establishment by the Transitional Government of a task force to deal with Security Council sanctions is further proof of its political will and commitment. Those efforts also call for adequate Council attention. We are of the opinion that the Council needs to respond effectively to help and to respond to the plea made by Chairman Bryant here this morning concerning the ending of sanctions.

Liberia has been described in the recent past as the epicenter of subregional instability. Progress made towards peace is evident. The restoration of confidence between the countries of the region is under way, and useful lessons have been learned from the conflict in Liberia and neighbouring countries that have enabled the United Nations to develop a regional approach. That will also prevent new conflicts in the region.

The commendable work being performed by UNMIL, the Economic Community of West African States, United Nations agencies, the Bretton Woods institutions and non-governmental organizations, as well as other partners, constitutes steady steps towards the stabilization of Liberia. It is our conviction that the political will and the unity of the Liberians is a key factor. With the assistance of the international community, Liberia will regain its rightful place in the world and will play its role as a pioneer of the United Nations and African unity, a key player for the political independence and economic integration of Africa, as well as a symbol of freedom for the entire continent.

To paraphrase what Chairman Bryant said just a little while ago, leadership is about inspiration. Chairman Bryant inspires us to continue to work with him and his Government toward building peace in Liberia and reconstructing that great country.

The President: I thank the representative of Angola for his kind words addressed to the presidency.

Mr. Pleuger (Germany): First of all, I would like to join other delegations in congratulating you, Mr. President, on your assumption of the presidency of the Council. I would also like to express my appreciation for the able and efficient way Ambassador Munir Akram conducted our business last month. Next, I would like to thank Special Representative Klein and Chairman Bryant for their briefings. Those briefings have given us confidence that recent developments both on the political side and with regard to the overall security situation are encouraging.

Let me make three short remarks. First, we of course welcome that the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) has now been able to deploy throughout the country, and that has contributed, in our view, to a significant improvement in the still-fragile security situation. With the progress that has been made, it seems to us that UNMIL could become a model for the new type of multidimensional peacekeeping missions the Council has been aiming at. In that respect, UNMIL's increased use of quick-impact projects is of particular interest to us. Quick-impact projects appear to be a useful tool. We would like to see that option further explored, not only by UNMIL, but also for its potential for other United Nations peacekeeping missions.

Secondly, the successful first phase of DDR, with the disarmament of militias, was a crucial step towards further stabilization in Liberia. The next step must now be the swift integration of the former combatants. In this respect, I would like to draw attention to the situation of former female combatants, of whom more

than 2,600 have already been disarmed, according to the Secretary-General's report. We hope that a situation similar to what we have witnessed in the DDR programme in Sierra Leone can be avoided. Council members will recall that, in Sierra Leone, a significant number of female ex-combatants ended up being completely excluded from the reintegration programmes of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). That is to say that we acknowledge efforts made with regard to gender aspects of United Nations peacekeeping missions, including UNAMSIL and the United Nations Mission in Liberia, but we would like to see those efforts given more attention in the future, as well as being clearly reflected in the reports.

My third and last remark is on cooperation between United Nations missions in West Africa. We welcome their joint operations in the border regions and we would like to encourage them to consider further steps in that direction. It is our hope that progress can also be made in the efficient pooling of resources so that the heavy financial burden on Member States can be eased.

As far as the sanctions are concerned, we thank Chairman Bryant for his very substantive comments on the issues related to the measures under resolution 1521 (2003). We will take them into due consideration during the upcoming mid-term review.

The President: I thank the representative of Germany for his kind words addressed to the presidency.

Mr. Zinsou (Benin) (*spoke in French*): As the Security Council is gathered this morning for its first public meeting in June, I should like to convey to you, Sir, the congratulations of my country's delegation on your assumption of the presidency and to assure you of our full cooperation in guaranteeing the success of your mandate.

I should also like to express here our deep admiration of Ambassador Akram of Pakistan for his skilful guidance of the Council's work last month.

We are grateful that you, Sir, have organized this briefing of the Security Council, allowing us to hear the important statements on the situation in Liberia made by the Chairman of the National Transitional Government and by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Liberia. We welcome them to New York and pay tribute to them for their commendable work in the service of peace.

The progress made in the deployment of troops throughout the country has allowed the successful relaunching of the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation or resettlement (DDRR) programme, the impact of which, it must be said, will be felt beyond the borders of Liberia. We would therefore congratulate and thank all the troop-contributing countries that have made this beneficial step possible.

All of the Liberian parties must now mobilize to consolidate the yet fragile security situation in the country, which is unfortunately still prey to internal struggles among factions and numerous criminal activities. In this respect, we urge the factions to cooperate honestly and diligently with the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) so as, in particular, to accelerate the disarmament and demobilization of combatants.

We reiterate the priority we attach to the reintegration and repatriation aspects of the programme and welcome the efforts made to that end by certain donors, including the United States Agency for International Development, the United Nations Development Programme and the European Union. The success of the DDRR programme is essential to the country's recovery and to the fulfilment of the promise of regional stability to which we wholeheartedly aspire.

We note the efforts made by the National Transitional Government and the National Transitional Legislative Assembly to fulfil their responsibilities in the peace process. These efforts, along with those of UNMIL, are establishing a genuine momentum that should be supported more intensively by the international community. In that regard, the assessment provided in the Secretary-General's report points to the urgent need for the establishment of certain essential services within the country, such as the provision of electricity, water and public health care, through the development and implementation of quick-impact projects and the creation of literacy centres for the people and especially for ex-combatants.

The precarious security situation within the country lends particular urgency to the need to launch the training programme for the Liberian National Police and to strengthen the judicial sector. This will help to improve the living conditions of the population

and thereby ensure its support and ever-increasing cooperation with the peace process. The extremely limited financial means of the National Transitional Government in facing this challenge require the rapid mobilization of resources anticipated from the international community on the basis of promises made in February at the International Reconstruction Conference for Liberia.

With respect to elections, there is no doubt that the future of Liberia is largely dependent on the establishment of conditions conducive to their organization and holding. The efforts of the National Transitional Government and UNMIL in this area lead us to believe that they have taken the full measure of what is at stake in October 2005. In this regard, we welcome the positive developments represented by the establishment of the National Elections Commission and of legal frameworks for the creation of the Independent National Human Rights Commission and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

We remain concerned, however, by the delay in reviewing, ratifying and issuing certain important legal texts, especially those on human rights. We stress the need to ensure that truly national political parties are created, free of all regionalist, ethnic or tribal tendencies and answering solely to the precise criteria established in advance by a charter of parties. We believe that substantial assistance, including financial, could be considered within the framework of activities to promote good governance in that country. That would, moreover, be a good way to promote national reconciliation.

With respect to sanctions, we are sensitive to Chairman Bryant's excellent arguments in favour of lifting them soon. We believe that the Council will address this issue in the near future. However, with respect to sanctions imposed against individuals, we feel that an evaluation of their impact is required in order to ensure their effectiveness. Available information would seem to indicate that resolution 1532 (2004) has had only limited effect on the targeted individuals.

At the regional level, my delegation welcomes the nascent cooperation among the United Nations missions in the subregion. We welcome the activities and joint measures being undertaken by the missions. We await with interest the report of the Secretary-General and his recommendations on the regional approach to implementing the mandates of those missions. Benin is determined to continue to work closely with all those who are striving to maintain this new hope for a lasting peace for Liberia, for the Liberian people and for the West African subregion so that they can return to the path of peace, stability and sustainable development.

In conclusion, I should like to ask the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to tell us what kind of difficulties have caused the recent insurrections by ex-combatants in Monrovia and what measures are being planned so that such insurrections will not take place again.

The President: I thank the representative of Benin for the kind words he addressed to the presidency.

Sir Emyr Jones Parry (United Kingdom): Let me join colleagues, Sir, in wishing you every success in your stewardship of the Council and in thanking Ambassador Akram and his colleagues for what they did in the month of May.

I should like to begin by thanking Special Representative Klein for his report and Chairman Bryant for the way in which he set out the positive developments which have taken place in Liberia. I think we owe the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL), the Special Representative and the Transitional Government a particular debt for the way in which they have taken a very grave situation through to the progress that can be recorded today.

As the Security Council, we can take pride in what the United Nations has been able to contribute to the developments in Liberia. I look forward personally to being in Liberia within three weeks' time to see first-hand — with the Security Council mission — how those developments have taken place and to explore with the Special Representative how the United Nations is acting coherently to tackle the problems, how to give him the support he deserves, how we position the United Nations effort in Liberia against the effort in the region as a whole and how the effect of developments in one country impinge on those efforts, but also how, in aggregate, we can be quite confident that we are doing everything we ought to do to support him in his courageous efforts and that we can report back to the Council that the United Nations is playing, with maximum effect, the part it ought to play.

Against that background, I should like to quickly make three points. First, we welcome the progress made on security sector reform despite a fragile situation in Liberia. The security situation is holding. The United Kingdom very much welcomes the establishment of a Rule of Law Implementation Committee to coordinate the reform of the police, the judiciary and the correctional system. The progress made so far demonstrates that the rule of law and how it applies in practice are actually basic to taking a State in the condition in which Liberia found itself towards the destination we would all like to see. To support that, of course, there needs to be rapid agreement with regard to the restructuring of the armed forces and to the establishment of reforms outside Monrovia, in other regions of the country.

Secondly, we welcome UNMIL's efforts with regard to disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation or resettlement (DDRRR), which are crucial to the development of Liberia. Mr. Klein's efforts to relaunch that programme and to get it firmly on track are very much to be encouraged. What we need is a concerted effort to ensure that the necessary financing and the necessary programmes are in place — as he has argued — for long-term, sustainable rehabilitation and reintegration.

My last point is to address the question of sanctions. We have heard an impressive case from Chairman Bryant as to why sanctions should be lifted. That has been endorsed by the Special Representative, and we must be mindful of that. We are also aware of the history and of why we came to be in a position to need sanctions. I welcome the Chairman's suggestion that experts might visit soon in order to validate the progress which has been made and, as I understand it, to assess that progress against the conditions which were attached in the first place: the reasons why we needed sanctions. I think it is absolutely right that we should do that and that the review — which is intended in any event — should be a positive sign of encouragement of what has been achieved. Then we shall see where that leaves us on the sanctions. Clearly, we need to recognize progress and to provide every encouragement. But, on the other hand, we need to ensure that there is no abuse. I think the objectives are shared. The question is how we do that in a way that will tap the economic benefits that we want to see, which are crucial, as we have heard.

There is an apparent contradiction, however, in seeking to lift sanctions on exports of diamonds and then saying, "By the way, we will not export, because we need a voluntary restraint arrangement until we have Kimberley certification". I think the case would be stronger if we could demonstrate that the Kimberley Process was being fully implemented, and that therefore the logical thing to do was to put in place the lifting of sanctions. But that is a detail. I think that the principle that we should look at it rigorously, both against the conditions and against the case the Chairman has made and the progress he has achieved, is absolutely right. The United Kingdom will take part constructively in that discussion.

I end where I started: we very much look forward to the Security Council demonstrating its commitment to Liberia and the region, especially by starting the voyage in Accra. We will work with the Economic Community of West African States to demonstrate, too, our support for regional organizations carrying on the good work.

The President: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom for the kind words he addressed to the presidency.

Mr. Akram (Pakistan): Let me start by expressing to you, Sir, the warm felicitations of the Pakistan delegation on your assumption of the presidency of the Security Council for this month. This is a month that will undoubtedly tax your considerable skills, but we have no doubt that it will be a most successful, even if eventful, presidency. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank all of my colleagues who have made such kind and generous comments about last month's Pakistan presidency.

It is a signal honour for us to welcome Chairman Bryant to the Council and to thank him for his comprehensive statement outlining the achievements of the Transitional Government. I would also like to thank the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Jacques Paul Klein, for his report on the activities of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). I think both of the statements we heard today are important statements requiring reflection by the Council and its members.

First, our discussions in the Council on Liberia — like those on other conflict situations in Africa — have, I believe, led us to understand that some of the fundamental requirements for achieving the objective

of sustainable peace are the following: the provision of credible security; a viable political and peace process; and, thirdly, economic recovery, reconstruction and development. In the case of Liberia, it would seem that we are on pretty sound footing as far as the first two prerequisites are concerned. We think that UNMIL has done a remarkable job in difficult circumstances.

We commend Mr. Klein and his team, and indeed the entire United Nations family that has worked in Liberia. They have, we think, transformed a very difficult situation into a manageable one.

As Mr. Klein remarked the other day, UNMIL is going to be a successful Mission. We welcome the fact that it will soon be fully deployed. Pakistan's participation in that Mission is a matter of pride and a reflection of our strong commitment to the cause of peace in Africa. We particularly welcome the cooperation between the peacekeeping missions in Liberia and in neighbouring countries.

The change in circumstances in Liberia has also been helped by the improved political climate in the subregion. That has also had an immediate positive impact on the way sanctions are implemented. For example, the current report of the Panel of Experts on Liberia states that no violation of the arms embargo has been reported since August 2003. On that issue, we note the comment made by Chairman Bryant that war was over in Liberia, that Liberia was at peace with its neighbours, and that the purchase of arms was not a priority for the Transitional Government.

Having said that, I must turn to the third major requirement, which is post-conflict peace-building and reconstruction. It is clear that Liberia requires resources and institutional capacity, and there is also the imperative of bringing the peace dividend to all sectors of its population, especially the young adult males, to which both Mr. Klein and Chairman Bryant referred.

Resources, of course, are the key. To a large extent, all of this is dependent on adequate and sustained international assistance. Again, Mr. Klein has said that there is a future for Liberia if the money comes in. Worryingly, though, this is not happening so far. We have been informed that 75 per cent of the pledges made at the reconstruction conference in February are yet to be redeemed. The principal option, therefore, for the Liberian Transitional Government must be to generate resources, especially through the use of its own natural wealth. Chairman Bryant has made an impassioned and credible plea for the lifting of the sanctions regime against Liberia.

Pakistan, together with several other members of the Council, has emphasized the clear distinction between the arms and travel bans, on the one hand, and the economic sanctions — that is, the sanctions on diamonds and timber — on the other. There is a need to approach the two sets of sanctions separately, in our view. We have heard from Chairman Bryant that the sanctions have a punitive impact on the efforts of the Transitional Government to bring peace and stability to the country, and the Council needs to reflect on that.

Resolution 1521 (2003) implicitly recognizes that such an impact could happen, and it provides for regular review of the diamond and timber sanctions, with a view to terminating them as soon as possible once the conditions are met, in order to create revenue for the reconstruction and development of Liberia.

Given the progress made by the Liberian authorities in the case of diamonds, we can, hopefully, look forward to utilizing that provision in the resolution as soon as possible, with a view to the lifting of the diamond sanctions. We note Chairman Bryant's assurance that Liberia would not export diamonds until it joins the Kimberley process, and we construe this as a positive confidence-building measure.

Chairman Bryant has also outlined the measures taken to respond to the international community's concerns regarding the timber sector, and this, too, we believe, is a positive indication.

In conclusion, let me say that Pakistan looks forward, in the months ahead, to the completion of the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and rehabilitation (DDRR) programme; and to a comprehensive review of sanctions, with a view to lifting them as soon as possible, paired with the full commitment of the resources which have been pledged by the international community for the reconstruction of Liberia. The forthcoming Security Council mission to West Africa, which will be led by our colleague Ambassador Jones Parry, will, we hope, strengthen the commitment of the international community to Liberia's re-emergence as a stable and prosperous country and to the realization of the objectives of peace and stability in the entire region.

The President: I thank the representative of Pakistan for the kind words he addressed to the Philippine presidency.

Mr. Motoc (Romania): Sir, I hope you will accept the last, but no less true and sincere, expression of delight at your assumption of the presidency and of confidence in the able discharge of your responsibilities during what looks to be a particularly eventful period in the life of the Security Council.

I wish also to commend Ambassador Akram and the Pakistani presidency for an outstanding performance in guiding the work of the Security Council during the month of May.

We are also grateful and appreciate very much both the presence and the insightful and comprehensive presentations made by Chairman Bryant and by Special Representative Klein. I should like also to say a special word of appreciation for the nice gift - the nice plate that Ambassador Klein gave to each member. It reminds me of a previous encounter I was pleased to have with Ambassador Klein, when, in a previous incarnation of his, he gave me a plate with an inscription related to the mission he successfully completed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I wish him continued success.

Romania is also very pleased to acknowledge the progress made towards sustained peace and reconstruction in Liberia, as well as the steps taken in this regard by Chairman Bryant and his National Transitional Government. We fully commend the efforts of the Liberian authorities and encourage them to carry out, in a most determined manner, the measures and plans needed to lay the foundations of good governance and socio-economic development.

At the same time, we take this opportunity to convey our appreciation to Special Representative of the Secretary-General Klein and the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) for their important contribution to the stabilization and national recovery of Liberia. We are encouraged by the results of their work. Indeed, 17,500 combatants disarmed in one month is but one impressive indicator of the successful discharge of their duties.

I would like to limit myself to just a few observations and questions directed to the kind attention of our invitees.

First, now that the disarmament and demobilization process is firmly on track, the focus will be reoriented towards the reintegration aspects of the disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation (DDRR) programme, as an essential condition for attaining the overall objectives of securing peace and social reconstruction. Since any major gap between these phases could have serious destabilizing consequences on the ground, we would like to ask, especially Mr. Klein, whether reintegration capabilities match the very high caseload of demobilized combatants.

Secondly, the security situation in the timber-producing areas of Liberia still seems to be highly precarious, impeding the proper functioning of the Forestry Development Authority throughout the territory of the country. We would be very interested to hear from Mr. Klein about prospects for improving this situation after the full deployment of UNMIL, in parallel with the plans for the gradual establishment of civil authority throughout Liberia. We would also appreciate any further comments by Chairman Bryant on this issue, taking into consideration the general efforts to restore State authority throughout the country.

And thirdly, one month ago, the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General for Liberia and Sierra Leone met in Monrovia, along with the Force Commanders and civilian police commissioners of UNMIL and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), to discuss efforts to improve cross-border security and review progress in the DDRR exercise in Liberia. I would appreciate Mr. Klein's assessment of the outcome of that meeting one month later.

The President: I thank the representative of Romania for his kind words addressed to the presidency.

Mr. Muñoz (Chile) (*spoke in Spanish*): First, I join in the congratulations to the Philippines on its assumption of the presidency. The Council will face great challenges this month, and I am certain, Sir, that you will be equal to those challenges.

I also thank the Mission of Pakistan and Ambassador Akram for their excellent work last month.

I welcome the presence of Chairman Bryant at this meeting of the Council. I also thank Mr. Klein for his introduction of the report of the Secretary-General (S/2004/430) and for the complementary information he provided.

We are pleased to note that deployment of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) is almost completed, as scheduled. The Mission will thus reach its authorized strength at the end of this month. The ceasefire agreement is being observed on the ground, although we judge that the security situation will continue to be fragile until the disarmament process is complete. Of course, disputes among factions and criminal activities continue to pose a threat to security, but, fortunately, they have not put the peace process in jeopardy.

An important step has been taken with resumption of the process of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and repatriation (DDRR) on 15 April. As we have noted, disarmament and demobilization are essential components of the peace agreement and are a prerequisite for tackling the reintegration of ex-combatants.

The report of the Secretary-General underlines the conditions that must be met in order for elections to be held in October 2005. It is a complex process, and it is advisable that preparations begin immediately, as the report indicates.

The adoption of a regional focus in West Africa is already under way with the strengthening of cooperation among the United Nations missions in Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone, as prescribed in the Council's presidential statement of 25 March 2004 (S/PRST/2004/7).

In that connection, we welcome the fact that on 20 May, at Conakry, Guinea, the leaders of the Mano River Union countries met to reactivate the Union. We hope that the Council's mission to West Africa at the end of June will produce concrete recommendations, in compliance with the regional dimension of its mandate.

In conclusion, I wish to express my country's satisfaction at the progress made by UNMIL in carrying out the various aspects of its mandate.

Finally, we have duly noted Chairman Bryant's statement on the important measures the Transitional Government is taking. We wish him — and Liberia, of course — all the best in the near future.

The President: I thank the representative of Chile for his kind words addressed to the presidency.

I should now like to make some very brief comments in my capacity as the representative of the Philippines.

First, I thank Chairman Bryant and Special Representative Jacques Paul Klein for coming all the way from Liberia to brief the Council on the latest developments there. The important and comprehensive information and views they provided are significant inputs for the Council discussions on Liberia to be held next week. We are also pleased to note that the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) continues to make steady progress in stabilizing Liberia and creating the necessary security conditions for implementation of the Accra Agreement.

The deployment of UNMIL troops throughout the country augurs well for the implementation of the programme of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and rehabilitation — a crucial element for Liberia in what Chairman Bryant has called breaking through. I hope that the support given by UNMIL will assist the National Transitional Government of Liberia in performing its functions even as the various government institutions are being rebuilt and strengthened.

The Philippines has consistently maintained that a regional approach is crucial to achieving peace and security in Africa, and more so in the subregion of West Africa. Generally, local actors are more sensitive to the context and the content of the various problems there. They are usually better placed to understand local dynamics and have a greater stake in a return to peace. Thus, we welcome the efforts undertaken in that regard, such as the participation of Chairman Bryant in the Mano River Union summit held in Conakry, Guinea, on 20 May 2004 and the meetings of the various United Nations peacekeeping and political missions in West Africa over the past few months. It is expected that the Council's mission to West Africa the last week of June will dwell further on the regional approach and come up with more ideas for the application of that approach.

In that connection, and having in mind the situation of West Africa, where the three largest peacekeeping operations in the world are deployed, I would like to ask how inter-operable UNMIL, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)

and the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (ONOCI) are in cases where cross-border operations have to be mounted in the present or near future.

I resume my function as President of the Council.

I now give the floor to Mr. Jacques Paul Klein to respond to questions and comments.

Mr. Klein: First, let me thank the Council collectively. Each member has received a folder containing the basic mission briefing, other background material and a small gift for their continued support. At present, in my mission, I have 89 nationalities — from Australia to Zimbabwe. We have 13 of the 15 members of the Council represented in our mission. It is truly a United Nations mission, and the Council can be extremely proud of what the men and women in the mission are doing.

With regard to the issue of the ratio of weapons to disarmed personnel, the Council should recall that a good number of those personnel were women, who did not necessarily have a weapons but who serviced mortars, did the cooking and provided other basic support to the fighters. We made the decision early on that they were indeed part of the combatant force and that we could not leave them out. The same goes for the children. That is why one often sees a discrepancy between the number of combatants and weapons and the actual total numbers. I think that has to be factored in.

With regard to reintegration, that is our major concern now, obviously. In a country with an 85 per cent unemployment rate, how do you integrate another 45,000 to 50,000 people into society? Fortunately, members of the Council — specifically members of the European Union, the United States and others, bilaterally — have come through, and we have some major programmes. We have a programme for about 35,200 in the context of our own DDR trust fund. The United States Agency for International Development has come up with a programme whereby it will take an initial 10,000 — 2,000 a month — to give them basic skills and then put them out repairing roads, repairing bridges, et cetera.

We have also engaged the Liberian business community. I personally wrote letters to the whole entrepreneurial infrastructure, including, for example, Firestone. I said, "You now need to take 300, 400 or 500 young people into an apprentice programme. You need to teach them how to do business". We are doing the same thing with the merchants within Liberia itself. All of those things are in process.

Our relationships with our contiguous neighbours are excellent. I can tell you candidly — I want to put this on record — that we owe a great debt to the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) for its strong support during our start-up phase. Many of our personnel came from UNAMSIL. Much of the equipment I have — the Bailey bridges, generators and logistics support — came from that Mission. We have had regular meetings.

You need to know that we have exchange programmes — military and civilian — with other missions, both in Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire, and with the liaison officer in Guinea. I have French officers on my staff from Côte d'Ivoire. My people are in Côte d'Ivoire, as well. We have the same relationship with our colleagues in UNAMSIL. I can tell you — I hope that I am correct — that as far as I know, as of today we have seen no major movement of weapons. That is, we patrol by air. Members of the sanctions Committee were out there themselves. They also monitored timber cutting; they monitored gold and diamond mining. We have found no abuses to date in that respect. We are watching the situation very carefully, because the rumours are obviously ongoing.

Besides the numbers that you have in your folder on weapons taken in, there is a whole separate category that we are also collecting. Through informants, with a bag or two of rice and a little money, sizeable weapons caches are coming in. In Lofa county three weeks ago, 80 millimetre mortars and several hundred rounds of ammunition were brought in by an informant. We do not tally that, because it does not relate to a specific combatant — it is a cache coming in.

Once the majority of the weapons are in our hands we will have — and we have already started on this — a very intensive programme to find out where the other weapons might be. As you know, in the DDR programme we have basically hired — they are on our payroll — 48 of the generals from Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), the Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) and the former Taylor faction. They actually work with us. So when we say to General Cobra, "Please bring 250 personnel to this road junction tomorrow morning", they show up. The reason for doing that is that we want to

maintain command and control for as long as we can over the belligerents out there. What we do not want is for the system to break down, with nobody any longer in charge.

So that implies what all of you have said: quick disarmament and quick demobilization, working with the local commanders who still maintain discipline.

As for the question about the future Liberian defence structure, that is something that, ultimately, the Liberian Government and its own people will have to decide. My own view is simple: Liberia does need a defence structure. What should it be — an expanded State Border Service, a national army? The first question to ask — speaking from 35 years as a general officer — is, "What is the mission of this army?" That is the first question. That then defines the budget, which defines how many personnel you have and what kind of weapons you can buy. Ideally, Liberia does need something on the border to control illegal migration, smuggling, et cetera. Also, when you are working in three eight-hour shifts doing something constructive you are not out plotting coups somewhere.

Secondly, if the military is structured properly, it can also be an instrument for nation-building, where for the first six months you do reading and writing and people are brought together. The second six months you learn a basic skill — whether driving, refrigeration repair, fork-lift operating, it does not matter. The you do some military service, and then you return to wherever you came from. And two or three years from now, when you meet somewhere, what do you have in common? The commonality is your military experience together, which binds and heals nations and breaks down ethnicity.

So those are the things that we are looking at. Again I would like to thank the Government of the United States in this case, which is taking the lead and hopefully will eventually provide funding for a future Liberian defence structure. But ultimately it is up to the Government of Liberia to decide what it needs and what it wants.

Lastly, on the issue of sanctions, to me — and perhaps because I am a former military person I see things rather simply — sanctions were put in place to penalize the previous Government for egregious wrongs. That Government has gone, a new Government is in place. If that new Government can demonstrate the transparency and the accountability that you desire, then ultimately we have to say "Yes, sanctions should be lifted". If you do not, you deprive it of the very revenue source that it needs to build a State. Then we, collectively, wind up paying the bill, which ultimately Liberia could sustain if it had the revenue resources, from at least timber and some of the other things that are needed.

So I would ask you to look at that. I understand your concerns. It is a question of transparency and control. Does the money flow into a central bank account? Is there accountability? All of that. But if that can be demonstrated, then I do not think that we have any other recourse but to give the Government of Liberia the tools that it needs to meet the future.

I hope that answers most of the questions.

The President: I thank Mr. Klein for the comments and clarifications he has provided to the Council.

I shall now give the floor to Mr. Charles Gyude Bryant to respond to the comments and questions.

Mr. Bryant (Liberia): Somebody asked a question about our relations with our neighbours. I think they are good — I think they are very good. I have been to Conakry, Guinea, four times, I think, at the last count. I have been to Côte d'Ivoire three times. I have been to Freetown twice. Since I have been here in the United States I have received a personal phone call from President Tejan Kabbah. This is thousands of miles from where we were eight months ago. The leaders of Guinea, Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire were simply not talking to us. The fact that I can go into Conakry, Freetown or Abidjan and sleep at peace tells you we have come miles in our relationship. The good thing also is that we are all resolved that we want to live at peace now. We are all resolved that we will initiate common security measures to ensure that there will be no more cross-border armed incursions and no more trading in light weapons or heavy weapons across our borders bringing hardship to our people.

I have lived in Liberia since birth. I have lived there through all of our crises. I supported the Security Council decision to impose sanctions on us because of the profanity of what our Government was doing at the time — mutilating little children, mutilating old people and pregnant women. How could anybody in his or her right mind condone such acts? It was shameful for us. Some of us were so ashamed that we found solitude in

our bedrooms — we were too ashamed to even show our faces outside as Liberians.

But I assure you that today it has changed. Eighty-five per cent of the kids we are disarming say, "We want to go to school". They are 22 years old today, but they want to go to school. And that is why we need resources: to build schools, to build clinics, to build infrastructure, so that the partners who come in and want to sincerely work with Liberians do not also have to invest in access roads, power generators or clean water to live and work. That is why we have come to make this case. I thank Council members for giving me an audience and for all their kind and warm comments about us.

The President: I thank Mr. Bryant for his additional comments and clarifications.

There are no further speakers inscribed on my list. May I take this opportunity to express, on behalf of the Council, our appreciation to the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Klein, and to Chairman Bryant for taking the time to come to brief the Council.

The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 17.50 p.m.

United Nations S/PV.4982

Security Council

Fifty-ninth year

Provisional

4982nd meeting

Thursday, 3 June 2004, 4 p.m.

New York

President:	Mr. Baja	(Philippines)
Members:	Algeria	Mr. Baali
	Angola	Mr. Gaspar Martins
	Benin	Mr. Adechi
	Brazil	Mr. Sardenberg
	Chile	Mr. Muñoz
	China	Mr. Wang Guangya
	France	Mr. de La Sablière
	Germany	Mr. Pleuger
	Pakistan	Mr. Akram
	Romania	Mr. Motoc
	Russian Federation	Mr. Konuzin
	Spain	Mr. Yáñez-Barnuevo
	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Sir Emyr Jones Parry
	United States of America	Mr. Negroponte

Agenda

The situation between Iraq and Kuwait

This record contains the text of speeches delivered in English and of the interpretation of speeches delivered in the other languages. The final text will be printed in the *Official Records of the Security Council*. Corrections should be submitted to the original languages only. They should be incorporated in a copy of the record and sent under the signature of a member of the delegation concerned to the Chief of the Verbatim Reporting Service, room C-154A.

04-37379 (E)

The meeting was called to order at 4.20 p.m.

Adoption of the agenda

The agenda was adopted.

The situation between Iraq and Kuwait

The President: Pursuant to the understanding reached in the Council's prior consultations, and with the consent of the Council, I shall take it that the Security Council agrees to extend an invitation to His Excellency Mr. Hoshyar Zebari, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, to participate in the meeting, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

There being no objection, it is so decided.

At the invitation of the President, Mr. Zebari (Iraq) took a seat at the Council table.

The President: I welcome the presence at this meeting of the Secretary-General, His Excellency Mr. Kofi Annan.

The Security Council will now begin its consideration of the item on its agenda. The Security Council is meeting in accordance with the understanding reached in its prior consultations.

At this meeting, the Security Council will hear a briefing by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, His Excellency Mr. Hoshyar Zebari. At the end of the briefing, I will give the floor to Council members who wish to make comments or ask questions. As there is no list of speakers for this meeting, I would invite Council members who wish to take the floor to so indicate to the Secretariat as from now.

I now give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, His Excellency Mr. Hoshyar Zebari.

Mr. Zebari (Iraq): On Tuesday, 1 June, the people of Iraq took the first step towards regaining their full sovereignty and independence. United Nations special envoy Lakhdar Brahimi supervised the introduction of a new interim Iraqi Government to assume authority on 30 June, which marks a major success in Iraq's transition towards democracy and towards ending the legal occupation of our country.

The formation of the interim Government was the result of an extensive consultation process promoted by Mr. Brahimi, who, despite the security constraints, travelled throughout Iraq to solicit the views of all sectors of Iraqi society. Over the past months, the Secretary-General's special envoy, the Iraqi Governing Council and the Coalition Provisional Authority were engaged in an exercise of broad national consultation that included public meetings and that reached out to tribal, religious and community leaders, political parties from inside and outside the Governing Council, prominent individuals and women's groups, among others. The selection of the interim Government was based on merit and qualifications, with an element of political and social balancing. While it represents the vast majority of the people of Iraqi society, it would have been impossible to include the more than 400 political parties and associations that have mushroomed to date in the new and free Iraq.

I would like to thank the United Nations, Member States and Secretary-General Kofi Annan for their support and assistance in the formation of the interim Government. I am grateful in particular for the ongoing efforts of Mr. Brahimi, who has been an excellent facilitator in achieving this successful outcome.

This process, in our view, was reasonably legitimate and decent. We cannot say that it was totally perfect, but I think the outcome will prove in the days ahead to have been the best there could be under the current circumstances.

Today I would urge the continued support of the international community through the adoption of a new draft Security Council resolution to endorse the establishment of the sovereign interim Government. I urge the Council to adopt such a draft resolution as soon as possible, to support the ongoing political process, reaffirm the need for Iraq to control its own resources and recognize Iraq's need for the continued presence of a multinational force in partnership with the Iraqi authorities.

We strongly welcome and encourage adoption of the positive text of the draft resolution, now under consideration, and hereby present our views and proposed amendments so that the draft resolution may correspond more fully to the wishes and aspirations of the Iraqi people. Iraq's views must be represented and heard by all, as this draft resolution will be an endorsement of the democratic process that the Iraqi people have chosen to pursue, and as it is their interests that lie at the heart of it.

We seek a new and unambiguous draft resolution that underlines the transfer of full sovereignty to the people of Iraq and their representatives. The draft resolution must mark a clear departure from Security Council resolutions 1483 (2003) and 1511 (2003), which legitimized the occupation of our country. By removing the label of occupation we will deprive the terrorists and anti-democratic forces of a rallying point to foment violence in our country.

We expect that the draft resolution will endorse a genuine and comprehensive transfer of power on 30 June. This means investing full authority in the interim Government to run Iraq's affairs, make its own decisions and have authority over Iraq's security matters. This transfer of sovereignty must also authorize the interim Government to control, administer and manage Iraq's resources and assets. Iraq must have a leading role in mechanisms agreed upon by the Security Council to monitor disbursement of its resources.

We recognize that the formation of the interim Government is a milestone in the broader political process as defined in the 15 November agreement, which I presented to the Council in December 2003. In that respect, the Transitional Administrative Law, which defines the interim law during this transitional period, is fundamental to the political process. From now until the end of 2005, the Transitional Administrative Law will be the only legal framework and the interim arrangement that reflects the wishes of the majority of the Iraqi people for a free, united and democratic Iraq.

Principles enshrined in the Transitional Administrative Law reflect Iraq's path of reform and democratization; the Law regulates the working of the interim and transitional Governments. Our brothers in the League of Arab States welcomed the passing of the Transitional Administrative Law, and we urge the Security Council to endorse and acknowledge this important and historic document.

The continued support of the United Nations for the political process is critical to help us meet the challenges ahead. Here, I would like to outline further steps taken to ensure a more inclusive process.

In order to further broaden participation, there are plans to hold a national conference — hopefully in July 2004 — to allow all those parties and individuals who wish to be represented to have their say in the democratic process. A preparatory committee has already been identified for the conference. An electoral commission has also been established to supervise elections, with the help and support of experts from the United Nations. Part of the mandate of the caretaker Government is to work closely with the United Nations and its agencies to prepare for general elections to be held in 2005. To achieve this, we seek the continued advice and support of the United Nations and call upon the Member States to assist Iraq in ensuring security conditions conducive to holding elections.

In this respect, we Iraqis are grateful to the coalition that helped liberate us from the persecution of Saddam Hussein's regime. We thank President Bush and Prime Minister Blair for their dedication and commitment to this mission and we recognize the sacrifices of all coalition forces in helping the people of Iraq realize a stable, free and democratic Iraq. We must also recognize the sacrifices made by our people in this noble cause. The overthrow of the former regime led to the total collapse of the State and its institutions and since April last year we have been working very hard to re-establish Iraq's security, military and police forces.

However, we have yet to reach the stage of being able to maintain our own security and therefore the people of Iraq need and request the assistance of the multinational forces to work closely with Iraqi forces to stabilize the situation. I stress that any premature departure of international troops would lead to chaos and the real possibility of a civil war in Iraq. This would cause a humanitarian crisis and provide a foothold for terrorists to launch their evil campaign in our country and beyond our borders. The continued presence of the multinational force will help preserve Iraq's unity, prevent regional intervention in our affairs and protect our borders at this critical stage of our reconstruction.

It is an objective reality in Iraq today that we require the continued assistance and partnership of these troops, but we also need this presence to be regulated under arrangements that compromise neither the sovereignty of the interim Government nor the right of the multinational force to defend itself. Iraqi forces must be under Iraqi command, but operate in liaison and partnership with the multinational force to achieve this objective. The transitional Iraqi Government and the new Iraqi interim Government must have a say in

the future presence of these forces and we urge that this be reflected in the new draft resolution.

I would like to end by reminding the Security Council of the spirit of cooperation in the process of forming Iraq's new interim Government and the significance of its establishment. Of the 32 ministers, six are women, and the Government is the most representative of the Iraqi people in the history of our country. It is significant that the handover of power to the new Government was peaceful and entailed none of the bloodshed that has historically characterized the transfer of power in our region.

During the complex process of deliberation that preceded its formation, national reconciliation conferences were held in Arbil and Baghdad that were addressed by Special Adviser Brahimi. We are proud of the willingness of all parties involved to compromise and make neutral concessions for the greater good of a better future for all Iraqis. The endorsement of Grand Ayatollah Sistani also represents a very positive and important signal from the highly respected religious leader.

Political development in Iraq is progressive and increasingly inclusive and we remain steadfastly committed to the clear steps we must take towards elections in 2005. Only by following this course will we preserve Iraq's territorial integrity and unity and realize a peaceful and prosperous country for our people.

Mr. Baali (Algeria) (spoke in Arabic): Allow me at the outset to welcome Minister Zebari to this important meeting of the Security Council. I thank him for responding to the Council's invitation to engage in a dialogue with us today and to share his views and vision regarding the future of Iraq and what, on the eve of the restoration of its sovereignty and independence, that sisterly country expects from the international community and, more specifically, from this Council in terms of assistance in building its national institutions and reconstructing its national economy.

Of course, we are very eager to see Iraq regain its full sovereignty and for its Government to exercise all its competencies and responsibilities and to manage all the country's internal and external affairs, including its security aspects, resources and wealth, especially in relation to the management of the Iraqi Development Fund. The statement made by Minister Zebari was on the right track in that respect and I thank him for the ideas, views and visions he outlined for us. We will spare no effort in addressing them constructively because, in the final analysis, the heart of the issue is Iraq's future. Iraq itself must be comfortable with and accept the draft resolution that our deliberations will lead to.

Thus, I should like to put several questions to Minister Zebari, which I hope will not prove too awkward for him.

First, does Minister Zebari feel that the present wording of paragraph 1 of the draft resolution guarantees the Government of Iraq all the authority necessary to exercising its sovereignty and functions and to conducting the internal and external affairs of the country, including security?

Secondly, does Minister Zebari believe that the wording of paragraph 6 of the draft resolution, relative to the exercise by the Iraqi Government of its authority over the Iraqi national security forces, is sufficiently strong? Does it really guarantee the full authority of Iraq over its forces? Is there a need to be more explicit in the wording of that paragraph?

Thirdly, how does the Minister view the relationship between the Iraqi Government and the multinational force? Does he believe that a letter to the Council is enough, or is there a need to refer to some of the general principles and specifically to note that the final say regarding the military operations of the multinational force falls to the Iraqi Government?

Fourthly and lastly, as the Minister has just come from Iraq and is more aware of conditions there, does the text of the draft resolution provide for the role that Iraq wants for the United Nations, or does Iraq have a different vision of that role?

Mr. Negroponte (United States of America): It is a pleasure to welcome Mr. Zebari back to the Council, this time in his capacity as the Foreign Minister of the Iraqi interim Government.

Iraq is poised to take a momentous step in its modern history. The new Government named earlier this week will assume full sovereignty this month, and in coming months it will have the responsibility and the authority for leading the people of Iraq to national elections by early next year. The work that lies ahead for Minister Zebari's Government is exhilarating in its promise for the future, but we are sure that that work will not be easy. He and his colleagues will be called

on to demonstrate their commitment to the people of Iraq at a difficult and dangerous time. Those who deploy terror in an attempt to snatch hopes for the future from the Iraqi people will continue, and perhaps even redouble, their insidious and vicious attacks. We are sadly but acutely aware that Mr. Zebari and his colleagues face personal risks by serving their country.

The United States warmly welcomes the formation of a Cabinet of distinguished Iraqi men and women who represent the breadth, talent and diversity of Iraqi society. As President Bush said on Tuesday, "The Government has the talent, the commitment and the resolve to guide Iraq through the challenges that lie ahead". The United States stands ready to assist the Government of Iraq in achieving the goal of a secure, democratic Iraq at peace with its neighbours. We look to Member States of the United Nations to join us in helping the people of Iraq to realize that vision.

We pay tribute to Ambassador Lakhdar Brahimi, Special Adviser to the Secretary-General, for his tireless work in setting the stage for a new Prime Minister's leadership of the Iraqi people. Ambassador Brahimi engaged in a vibrant consultation with hundreds, and even thousands, of Iraqis representing the diversity of Iraq. We expect to see that process continue through the formation of a national council next month to advise and assist the interim Government.

Today, as Minister Zebari joins us, the Security Council is considering a draft text circulated by my delegation and that of the United Kingdom. The draft salutes the new moment that we are facing in Iraq's history: the occupation of Iraq will end, and the Iraqi people will assume full responsibility and authority for governing a proud and rich nation. The Council's timely adoption of that draft resolution will bear witness to a fundamental change in the relationship between the Security Council and Iraq after nearly 14 years since Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait.

We welcome Minister Zebari's presence here in New York, and we welcome Iraq's contribution to the exchange of views on the draft resolution under discussion. In the days ahead, my Government and our Multinational Force partners will engage the incoming Iraqi Government on a broad range of issues, and in particular on the nature of the security partnership between the Multinational Force and the Iraqi people. The United States is committed to supporting the new Iraqi Government in its work to bring lasting stability to Iraq and to allow for free national elections by the end of January 2005. This will be a true partnership founded on shared goals and tangible cooperation at all levels, from the soldiers on foot patrols to the highest levels of two sovereign Governments.

Our work in the Security Council to support the Iraqi people will not end with the adoption of this draft resolution or with the end of the occupation. We must confront with resolve and determination those who seek to deny the Iraqi people the opportunity for democratic self-government and those who seek to sow instability, fear and terror in Iraq. The United States will not flinch in this task. This is work that demands a shared effort from the international community, standing shoulder to shoulder with the Iraqi people and with the interim Iraqi Government as they move along the path to elections and to the development of capable institutions for governance and as they work to create a stable, peaceful and democratic future for their country.

Mr. Wang Guangya (China) (*spoke in Chinese*): The Chinese delegation thanks Mr. Zebari for his briefing. This is the first time that the Security Council has heard from the representative of the interim Iraqi Government on the current situation in that country and on the new Council draft resolution. We hope to have more such opportunities.

As stated by Secretary-General Kofi Annan, the formation of the interim Iraqi Government symbolizes a new beginning. China welcomes the formation of the interim Iraqi Government, and we hope that that will soon lead to the restoration of full Iraqi sovereignty and to the stabilization of the situation in Iraq. We hope and trust that, with the broad support of the Iraqi people and the strong support of the international community, the interim Government will accomplish its mission smoothly.

The Security Council's timely adoption of the new draft resolution will be significant for Iraq's future development. To that end, all the parties have adopted constructive attitudes and have conducted in-depth consultations on the draft resolution concerning the Iraqi issue, as proposed by the United States and the United Kingdom.

We believe that the new draft resolution should send two clear signals. The first is the termination of the military occupation of Iraq to return full sovereignty to the Iraqi people. After 30 June, the

interim Iraqi Government will exercise full sovereignty in the political, economic, security, judicial and diplomatic areas. Secondly, the deployment and the mandate of the multinational force should effectively respect Iraqi opinion. Prior consultation and consent should be sought from the interim Iraqi Government on major military operations, to express the fact that the interim Government has full authority. In addition, the duration of the multinational force should be in keeping with the political process in Iraq.

We believe that, in our consultations on the draft resolution, we should listen to Iraq's opinions and to those of its neighbours. Only when we produce a good draft resolution that enjoys broader support will we be able to actually produce something that will be conducive to the stabilization of Iraq's security situation and to the smooth implementation of Iraq's reconstruction.

I would also like to take this opportunity to ask a number of questions of Foreign Minister Zebari. First, what are the expectations of the new interim Government of Iraq with regard to a new draft resolution? Does he have any suggestions in that regard? Secondly, what are the hopes of the interim Government regarding the specific role of the United Nations? And thirdly, what progress has been made with respect to the security agreement as negotiated by Iraq and the multinational force?

Mr. Pleuger (Germany): I would like to express our appreciation for the presence of our Secretary-General, at least at the beginning of this meeting, and, of course, we very much welcome the opportunity for an exchange of views on the content of the new draft resolution on Iraq with the old and new Foreign Minister, Mr. Zebari. We have been advocating this dialogue all along, because we firmly believe that the new Iraqi interim Government must have a say with regard to the framework that this draft resolution is going to provide for the months to come.

Germany, in the negotiations so far, has always been in favour of an overriding principle — that is, that the political process and the security architecture for this interim period should not be imposed on Iraq by the Security Council or by anyone else, even if it is done with the best of intentions. I think that it is fair to say that it is very important for the credibility of that interim framework that it is the result of direct consultations between the designated interim Government and the Security Council and is not just the result of bilateral arrangements or agreements.

We therefore support the idea expressed by other Council members in former meetings not to limit this dialogue with the representatives of the interim Government to a one-time event. Of course, we would also appreciate it very much if the new political leadership were willing to continue these discussions with the Council early next week.

The key issues with respect to the future draft resolution will, from our perspective, be twofold: first, it has to send a clear signal which marks a genuine break with occupation and thus generates the necessary acceptance among the Iraqi people; and secondly, it will have to define the respective roles and responsibilities of the interim Government, the multinational force and the former occupying Powers, and the United Nations, in their triangular relationship, in a manner that is consistent with the desired signal of a transfer of full sovereignty and authority.

We are fully aware that the presence of some 140,000 foreign troops and of several thousand foreign civilians has to be harmonized with the concept of a real and credible restoration of full sovereignty. While we acknowledge that the revised version of the American-British draft resolution is an honest attempt to achieve that reconciliation, we believe that there is still room for improvement towards a more credible restoration of Iraqi ownership and full sovereignty, in particular in three key areas of the text as it stands now.

My first point pertains to the transfer of sovereignty. In our view, it has be clear that full authority is transferred, and I think that I heard from the Foreign Minister as well as from the representatives of the Coalition that that is the intention. We feel that any restrictions that might arise in some areas should only be self-imposed restrictions that arise out of the character of the interim Government as a caretaker — as an interim Government.

My second point pertains to the duration of the mandate of the multinational force. We agree with what was said by the Foreign Minister and by Ambassador Negroponte that a premature withdrawal of troops would not be desirable, but we think that a deadline — that is, a specific date for the expiration of the force's mandate — is an important signal that should be included in the text, notwithstanding the possibility of renewing the mandate or of basing the presence of

foreign troops in Iraq subsequently on a different legal basis, such as a status-of-forces agreement.

Furthermore, the clear-cut right of the transitional Government to terminate the mandate earlier if it so wishes should be clarified in order to make clear the fact that it is a fully sovereign Government.

My third remarks pertain to the security architecture — the description of the general principles that will govern the sharing of security responsibilities between the interim Government and the multinational force — the partnership, as it was called by Ambassador Negroponte. That does not mean going into micromanagement, which should be left to the parties on the ground.

But I would like to pose two questions to the Foreign Minister in that respect. Which general principles does he think should be the determining factors in the relationship between the multinational force and his Government, especially if it comes to conflicting views on some issues? In that context, my second question is, the draft resolution refers to a request of his Government with regard to a further presence of the multinational force and to a multinational-force-related letter to the President of the Security Council. Could he inform us of its content or elaborate on the current state of affairs?

We would very much appreciate the views of his Government on those issues as well as on other aspects of the draft text. Of course, we understand that the interim Government has been designated only a few days ago and that it may not yet have had a chance to discuss all the aspects of the draft resolution in detail, but this, we feel, is an important draft resolution, and its message may well influence the acceptability of the political transition in Iraq. We are therefore deeply interested in his preliminary views today and look forward to an ongoing dialogue with those responsible in his country.

Mr. de La Sablière (France) (*spoke in French*): I am pleased to welcome Mr. Zebari and to congratulate him on his confirmation as Minister for Foreign Affairs. We have taken note of the formation of the Iraqi interim Government that will begin to function on 30 June. We hope that that Government will be fully successful in the very difficult task that will be facing it until the elections. France, for its part, is prepared to work with the Government of Iraq and to contribute to the economic and political reconstruction of the country.

I should also like to tell Mr. Zebari how useful his presence here today is. The Security Council has for several weeks been discussing a draft resolution that is crucial to the future of Iraq, and it must, of course, be fully aware of the views and expectations of the Iraqi authorities.

The discussions that we have been having in the Security Council for several weeks now have demonstrated, in my view, that all of its members share the same objective: the full and entire restoration of Iraqi sovereignty on 30 June; indeed, that is what Mr. Zebari told us earlier in his statement.

The Iraqi Government that has been formed should, as of 30 June, have full and complete authority in all areas.

Aside from the issue of its composition, we believe that the Government's credibility in the eyes of Iraqis will depend on its ability to govern fully and in complete independence. At the same time, we all know that — as Mr. Zebari has just said — maintaining a multinational force in Iraq will remain necessary for some time in order to help stabilize the country and assist Iraqis in assuming full responsibility for their security as soon as possible.

We do not think that those two demands are contradictory — not necessarily, at least. It is possible to reconcile the restoration of sovereignty with the maintenance of a significant foreign military presence. A sovereign Government and the multinational force can coexist, while respecting both the full authority of the Government and the operational effectiveness of the force.

However, from our point of view, it is not enough to decree that there be cooperation or a partnership between the Government of Iraq and the multinational force. Without getting into details and modalities, the general principles and parameters of that cooperation and partnership must be specified in the resolution. The Iraqi interim Government must have complete authority over its security forces and its armed forces. It is the Government's decision whether to make those forces available to the multinational force, if they deem it necessary or desirable to do so. The Iraqi forces should therefore not be engaged in the operations of

the multinational force without the consent of the Government of Iraq.

We also believe that the multinational force should carry out its mandate in close coordination with the Iraqi Government. The Iraqi Government's prior consent must be obtained for certain large-scale operations that could have significant political implications. Can we take the risk of repeating the Fallujah scenario, when one of the major challenges the new Government will face is the effort for national dialogue and reconciliation in the run-up to the elections.

We believe it is critical that the Iraqi Government — in any case, the Government resulting from the elections — be able to decide freely to terminate the mandate of the multinational force. That decision is up to it alone.

I note that the principles I have just mentioned have all been the subject of agreeing public statements by high-level leaders of the Coalition and of countries not belonging to the Coalition, including mine. It therefore seems that there is broad consensus on those principles. Given that situation, it should be possible to include those principles in the resolution under discussion if we deem it necessary to send a clear and credible signal to the people of Iraq that their Government will be fully responsible and that the temporary presence of the multinational force does not mean their sovereignty is being challenged.

Finally, it is the opinion and the expectations of the Iraqi people that should guide the Council's work. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq has already mentioned several of the points to which I have referred. We would be very grateful to him if he could provide us with further information on those points. We also hope that we will have the opportunity to continue our discussions with him. We were very happy about the exchange that we had this morning and about the exchanges that we will have with other Iraqi officials in coming days.

Mr. Muñoz (Chile) (*spoke in Spanish*): First, I welcome the presence of Foreign Minister Zebari, who is with us in the Council again, but this time in a different capacity. It seems to us that his suggestions and recommendations are absolutely fundamental to adopting a good resolution on the future of Iraq in this very important period.

As he said, the first step in the political process has been taken with the appointment of the sovereign interim Government. As he said, it is the best possible result in the present circumstances. It is a compromise. Like all compromises, it is perhaps not the optimal situation, but it is based on reality. We agree with him that the key idea of the resolution that the Council adopts should be the full transfer of sovereignty to the Iraqis beginning on 30 June. We believe that the appointment of the interim Government is an important step in that direction, as well as in the timetable of the political transition towards full democracy.

This Government deserves a chance to carry out its specific tasks for a limited period. Now, the challenge falls upon us in the Security Council to prepare a good resolution that truly contributes to the full transfer of sovereignty to the interim Government, without ambiguity, with the greatest possible clarity and, if possible, with additional inputs from the Iraqi Government itself over the coming days.

We have already made considerable progress, but the text still needs to shed more light on the relationship between the sovereign interim Government and the multinational force. It must reaffirm the principles of international law and international humanitarian law. It must specify more clearly the end of the mandate of the multinational force, with the understanding that the force will be required for a significant length of time, as Minister Zebari himself indicated.

In that context, I would like to take this opportunity to ask three questions that might help the Council in its work of preparing the draft resolution.

First, in the stage prior to the selection of the interim Government, some criteria were set out with respect to the future interim Government of Iraq. In that connection, I would like to know whether the new Government adopted or considered the condition that individuals appointed as members of the interim Government could not be candidates in the elections scheduled for January of next year.

Secondly, I would like to know what, in the opinion of the Foreign Minister, are fundamental elements that would enable the interim Government to exercise its full authority in accordance with the sovereignty it will have as of 30 June. In other words, what are the indispensable components that comprise

full and complete sovereignty and that Mr. Zebari and others would like to see reflected in the resolution?

Finally, we have read in the press some statements attributed to members of the interim Government on the subject of security. For that reason, and picking up on Minister Zebari's own words referring to full control of the Iraqi forces, we would like to know whether the new Iraqi authorities hope to have such full and effective control of the country's armed forces and security forces. How do they hope to ensure coordination with the multinational force?

I would like to pose one more question, to which Minister Zebari should not feel obliged to respond. What policy will be adopted towards the militias that currently exist on the ground? That could be a problem for the political process that lies ahead.

Mr. Akram (Pakistan): Since the inception of the crisis in Iraq last year, Pakistan has been guided by the interests and welfare of the Iraqi people — before the war, during the war and after the war. Following the war in Iraq, Pakistan pleaded for full respect for certain basic principles: Iraqi sovereignty and the interests of the Iraqi people; the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq; and Iraq's control over its own natural resources. We were glad that those principles were reflected in resolution 1483 (2003) and subsequent resolutions adopted by the Council.

As we all acknowledge today, Iraq is entering a new phase in its political existence. An interim Government has been formed, and it has claimed all the attributes of full sovereignty. As we have been advised, the formation of the interim Government, through a consultative process led by the Secretary-General and his special envoy, Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, is a first step in the transition to a fully representative Government. The role of the United Nations and of Mr. Brahimi is, in our view, a vital one in fostering acceptance of the Iraqi interim Government within and outside the country.

The Government of Pakistan has welcomed the appointment of the interim Iraqi administration as a step towards restoration of a fully representative Government in the country. Pakistan hopes that Iraq, under the interim administration, will exercise full sovereignty, which will lend it credibility, protect Iraq's unity and territorial integrity and help restore security and stability in the country. Pakistan also hopes that the United Nations will play a central role in assisting the Iraqi people to exercise full sovereignty and to bring about the earliest possible restoration of security and stability and the reconstruction of their country.

We look forward to hearing a detailed report from Mr. Brahimi in the near future and to obtaining his evaluation of the situation and of future prospects. We listened with interest and attention to the statement made by Foreign Minister Zebari in the Security Council today. My delegation will be responsive to the views of the Iraqi interim Government in its consideration of the draft resolution which the Security Council is currently considering. In that context, I would like to offer some comments and pose a few questions to the Foreign Minister.

Foreign Minister Zebari mentioned that more than 400 political groups have mushroomed in Iraq; obviously not all of them are represented in the interim arrangements. We would like to know whether the interim Government intends to continue efforts to ensure the broadest possible inclusiveness of various political groups and to evoke the widest possible support from the Iraqi people.

Secondly, we have noted that the Iraqi interim Government wishes to have full authority; in that context we would like to inquire whether it would envisage any limitations on this authority through a self-imposed restraint. The people of Iraq, Foreign Minister Zebari has told us, need — and have requested the multinational force — to help stabilize the security situation. We would be grateful to learn his evaluation of the principal sources of the security threat faced by Iraq today. Secondly, does the interim Government have in mind any time frame with regard to the presence of the multinational force?

Foreign Minister Zebari also mentioned that the multinational force will have to be regulated and that a partnership will be established between the Iraqi authorities and the multinational force. We would like to know whether consideration has already been given to the nature of this partnership in the security sphere and whether the establishment of any mechanisms has been envisaged for the purposes of regulating that partnership.

Finally, I would like to leave a few questions for the Foreign Minister's consideration. Perhaps the Iraqi delegation could respond later if it cannot do so at the moment. These relate to the provisions in the draft resolution concerning the arms embargo and to the

international monitoring body over the Iraqi development fund. Does the interim Government feel that these provisions are consistent with the provision of full sovereignty and full authority to the Iraqi Government?

Finally, we expect that the interim Government will also soon establish contacts and consultations with its neighbours. We would be happy to learn of any plans for such contacts and cooperation, which we believe will enhance security and stability, both in Iraq and elsewhere in the region.

Mr. Konuzin (Russian Federation) (*spoke in Russian*): We are grateful to Mr. Zebari for his statement.

On 1 June, the Iraqi interim Government was formed and the temporary Governing Council dissolved. Earlier, the Secretary-General briefed us on the results of the mission to Iraq of his special envoy, Mr. Brahimi. We look forward to the report of Mr. Brahimi himself.

Russia has always advocated the prompt restoration of the full sovereignty of Iraq. To do that, it is very important that the Iraqi people recognize the interim Government as the country's main political force. In that regard, my delegation welcomes what the Secretary-General has said in the Council's consultations, that the Iraqis themselves will need to judge their Government on the basis not of statements but of the Government's specific actions. My delegation also found another comment of the Secretary-General to be of value, that security in the country cannot be ensured by military means alone and that we must try to ensure that the most vocal Government critics are included in the upcoming national dialogue.

We hope that the interim Government will be able to make a significant contribution to establishing national institutions and a system of government and to meet challenges such as establishing internal stability, restoring the economy and the social infrastructure and establishing law and order. It is our view that the international community, led by the United Nations, must give as much assistance as possible to the people of Iraq to achieve those goals.

The Security Council is working on a draft resolution on Iraq. It is our job to ensure that the people of Iraq are united and sovereign once again and that there will be stability, democracy and economic prosperity in the country. We must be sure that we are acting in accordance with the views of the Iraqis and that we are not imposing our will on them. In that regard, we wish to hear from the interim Government specific ideas with respect to international assistance for Iraq, particularly in the political, economic, military and humanitarian areas. We will take those considerations into account in our future work on the Council's draft resolution on Iraq.

We also recommend that the head of the interim Government, with a number of ministers, come to New York to meet with the members of the Security Council. An alternative could be to hold a meeting in the region, which would give Iraq's neighbours an opportunity to participate actively in the dialogue with the Iraqi leadership.

Now I wish to ask several questions. First, what are the priority areas? According to which priorities does the interim Government wish to receive international assistance from the international community? What role could the United Nations play in that regard?

My second question concerns the situation regarding the file on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, as no weapons of mass destruction have been found. We believe that the draft resolution being prepared by the Security Council on Iraq must clearly answer the question of who will be responsible for searching for traces of weapons of mass destruction and for maintaining the safety of the sites and all materials found under the monitoring of the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Mission (UNMOVIC) and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). What does the Minister think about the work of the IAEA and UNMOVIC being resumed simultaneous to the transfer of power to the interim Government in order to deploy in Iraq a long-term disarmament monitoring system based on Security Council resolutions?

My third question, which others delegations have already asked about, has to do with the interaction between the interim Government and the multinational force. And the last question: does the Minister believe it important to consider convening an international conference, possibly in several stages, as an instrument to provide a tool for the Iraqi settlement process? How does the Minister feel about that idea?

Mr. Motoc (Romania): I also heartily welcome the presence today in the Security Council of the Iraqi Minister for Foreign Affairs, His Excellency Mr. Hoshyar Zebari. It is indeed the first opportunity, after the formation of the interim Government of Iraq, for the members of the Council to hear the views and the expectations of that Government about how the Council can best assist Iraqis transform their aspirations into realities.

I wish to take this opportunity to recognize the presence earlier of the Secretary-General.

The United Nations is also to be credited for having come as far as it has, listening today to such a forward-looking, self-confident vision statement by a proud representative of the new Iraq.

The Brahimi and Perelli missions have already produced a valuable outcome. My Government welcomed the formation of the interim Government on 1 June as an important step toward the transfer of full sovereignty to Iraq on 30 June. It was also the view that, with the interim Government in place, the political process in Iraq has entered a new and important stage. It is our sincere hope that the interim Government will be able to solidify thinking, keep the aspirations of the Iraqi people united and have a bold start in managing the most complex task ahead — the proper implementation of the political calendar in organizing free and fair elections in Iraq.

As far as we in the Security Council are concerned, I would like to restate once more Romania's resolve to promote the adoption of a new resolution on Iraq that best assists the daunting transformation processes in that country. Minister Zebari's comments earlier seem to indicate that we are on the right track. I wish to reassure Foreign Minister Zebari of Romania's firm commitment to continue to support the transitional processes under way in Iraq, in particular the stabilization efforts carried out by the multinational force and the institutional and economic reconstruction of the country.

The President: While waiting for the representative of the United Kingdom to speak, allow me to make a brief statement in my capacity as the representative of the Philippines.

We attach great importance to the reconstruction of Iraq. We are also convinced that the United Nations is playing a role in the political process leading to the establishment of a permanent Government in Iraq. It is critically important that the political process for restoring sovereignty to Iraq is fully accepted and supported by the people of Iraq.

As many have stressed within and outside the United Nations, Iraqi ownership of the process must be a guiding principle in this exercise. The legitimacy of the process in the eyes of the Iraqi people will be a key element in ensuring that democracy and stability take deep root in the country. We have an important role to play in achieving this goal.

Our approaches to this objective might diverge, but one thing is clear: Iraq requires the participation and cooperation of the international community, the United Nations plans and programmes, and other stakeholders to place Iraq on track to peace and stability. The leading role of the United Nations in this effort will be the critical foundation of a diplomatic consensus among all major players to extend help in the Iraqi reconstruction. Our efforts will be futile without the input of those who will be directly affected by our actions: the Iraqi people themselves. The Security Council thus benefits immensely from the presence here today of Minister Zebari, who has provided us with a clear presentation on the desires and aspirations of the Iraqi people to the establishment of a new Iraq.

Whatever action the Council may take, it should consider the various elements that Minister Zebari explained, especially on allowing the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political future. There are many issues that demand our attention. Many of them will have to be discussed and debated in later days, either in this forum or in other forums that we will have on Iraq, but the Council will certainly be guided by what the Iraqis themselves need, as Minister Zebari told us. The points he raised and his responses to questions by Council members are elements that we should ponder as the Council deliberates on a draft resolution that spells out the framework of action for Iraq.

I now resume my functions as President of the Council.

Sir Emyr Jones Parry (United Kingdom): I am sorry about the unorthodox order of my presentation.

May I join those colleagues who have welcomed Minister Zebari's presence with us and, in particular, the words he addressed to us today, which were very powerful and moving. I think this is an occasion for all of us to see, rightfully in this Chamber, a representative of Iraq deliver that sort of message.

We are also particularly grateful to Lakhdar Brahimi for what he has done and the key role he played in actually facilitating the production of what has been described as the best possible outcome achievable. What we now need is the maximum support of the international community and for all of us to support Iraq, its Government and its people.

I particularly welcome Minister Zebari's very strong endorsement of the draft text on the table. I read very carefully the comments he made on it and I was struck that the points he emphasized are points which the Council has addressed and which, I believe, are in the process of being fully reflected in the text that is before us. It is right that the text should emphasize that full sovereignty, without any qualification in the security dimension or elsewhere, will pass to the people of Iraq and to the Government which is now coming into being. It is right that the United Nations should take on the leading role in the political process. The Minister put forward very clearly the view of the incoming Government that the multinational force is necessary, that it is needed and that it is wanted.

It is on that basis — the prior condition for the presence of the force to continue — that this Council should give a fresh mandate for that operation to continue. But it should do so in a way that demonstrates that the force will operate in partnership with the Government, that there will be a process set in train and that both the draft resolution before us and the letter which we expect very soon from the Prime Minister of Iraq will set out precisely how the Government wants the force to operate. This partnership should be based on an understanding that a national security council should tackle the big issues and should work to get agreement on precisely how the force should carry out certain operations and the broad strategic direction for the operation of the multinational force.

Minister Zebari laid stress on sovereignty, but none of that process is inconsistent either with Iraq's having full sovereignty or, at that same time — as the Minister recognized, and I hope colleagues heard this very clearly — with the troops having the right of self-defence and the detailed implementation of operations resting under the military command of the multinational force. That is my understanding of the partnership. I am pleased that the Minister seems to have exactly the same perception of that and that it should come through very clearly in the draft resolution which we will adopt quite soon and in the letter which actually sets out, as I said before, the Government's wishes — that is to say, Iraqi security forces answering to the Minister's Government.

In the view of the British Government, however, if consent for the multinational force is withdrawn, then the pillar on which the force is based also falls. It would be clear that the force could not continue, but that is not the emphasis that any of us wants to put on it. The Minister has rightly put it in the positive — the positive that Iraq needs and wants this force and that that is why we have a partnership.

The partnership has to go much wider. It is what the international community must now do: to rally behind Iraq and to support Minister Zebari and the courage that he and is colleagues are displaying to take Iraq through this interim stage, through elections and to end of a political process. I think the United Nations can do more, give him every support in that endeavour and wish him every success with it.

The President: I now give the floor to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, Mr. Hoshyar Zebari, to respond to questions from Council members.

Mr. Zebari (Iraq): I will start answering the questions in order.

First, to my good friend the Ambassador of Algeria, I will speak in Arabic.

(*spoke in Arabic*)

I thank him for his kind words. The draft resolution is extremely important to us in Iraq, to the region and to other Arab countries. With regard to the questions that he raised, I should like to state that the current wording of the draft resolution on the nature of the sovereignty, the terms of reference of the Government and so on is quite adequate. Our understanding of sovereignty is that it would be for and

enjoyed by the Iraqi people and that the Government should run its own affairs, be free to make its own decisions and have control over Iraqi security affairs. It should also control the country's financial resources and represent the Iraqi people in international forums.

As for its terms of reference, as I mentioned in my statement earlier, we understand that the ongoing presence of the multinational force is needed more by Iraq than by the United States, the United Kingdom or Poland. We need that force and I have so stated very clearly to Arab leaders and Ministers for Foreign Affairs, the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the League of Arab States.

The dangers are great and will be exacerbated if a security vacuum should be created. We are not yet prepared; we have not completed our security or military preparations sufficiently to be able to say good-bye to the multinational force. At this point — we say this very clearly, without any hesitation or feeling of shame — we are more concerned about the fate of many thousands of Iraqis, about the country's future and about the situation in the country. It is important to us that Iraqi forces be under Iraqi leadership. We should use our imagination to achieve a kind of coordination among Iraqi forces and their leadership and the leaders of the multinational force so that they can work together as partners in meeting the security threats confronting us.

There will definitely be correspondence between the Iraqi interim Government and the Security Council, and the continued presence of the multinational force will definitely depend upon Iraqi approval — as opposed to the situation under resolution 1483 (2003) or 1511 (2003), in which the multinational force was there as an occupying force, against the wishes of the Iraqi people. This time, the force will be there by approval of the representatives of the Iraqi people. This is all I can say about that.

(*spoke in English*)

The representative of China asked two questions concerning what we need to see in this draft resolution. In my statement, I believe I enumerated the points that are important for us. But, to repeat them briefly, I think we need the draft resolution to be clear and unambiguous and to reflect full sovereignty very clearly. In particular, the people of Iraq need to see that this is a genuine transfer of sovereignty and authority to them, not a cosmetic attempt in that process. It is very important that the people feel and see that. So any language to consolidate and help us get to that point would be very welcomed by us.

The following is a point that I highlighted in my statement. Yes, we need the multinational force to help us, we need the Council's efforts, we need assistance from Member States and from the rest of the international community. Iraq is no longer a local issue; it has become a regional and international issue. In fact, when we speak of the main front in the war against international terrorism, that is real to us; we feel it, we sense it. We are in the trenches every day. Iraq is not like other countries such as Afghanistan or Somalia. In fact, the collapse of the Iraqi State would have a huge impact on the entire region and on the Council's interests as well. We have constantly told those of our neighbours who believe that continued instability in Iraq will be in their interests that they are making a fatal mistake. We have all seen the recent spate of terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria and Istanbul, and that is just the beginning if we lose this battle, this confrontation. This is really a struggle between two wills regarding what kind of country we want to establish.

Of course, we really want clear references to the status of the multinational force, to their operations and to their relations of cooperation with the Iraqi interim Government in a spirit of partnership. At this stage — here, I will be very honest, one can ask any member of the Iraqi Government or any Iraqi politician about this — a call for immediate withdrawal or a fixed deadline or timetable would be very, very unhelpful. It would be used by enemies to complicate the problems even further. If we are ready to assume responsibility, it can be done as soon as possible. But, as we can see, these attacks have a pattern: they are all politically motivated. As we pass through each stage, we see that the forces that want to derail this process are coming back and playing politics with bombs and suicide missions.

We also really need the sovereign Iraqi Government to have control national resources and the country's finances. It would be difficult to justify the operation of a sovereign Government if that Government were not able to manage its own finances. So I believe Iraq needs to be represented fully in whatever mechanisms or supervisory boards are envisaged in that area so that it can have an important or leading role in that regard.

In addition, because we really cannot operate in a legal vacuum, we want a reference or an acknowledgement to the effect that the Transitional Administrative Law is very important for us, because every step that we take now or in the future will be implemented under that Law.

These are our main points. We welcome a very important and central role for the United Nations in this process. In fact, in the political, electoral and reconstruction processes, we will need the United Nations in many ways. I think there is now a greater realization that the United Nations has an important role to play than when we experienced difficulties in December or January. Yes, that role is dangerous and challenging, but when has the United Nations not carried out its work in difficult circumstances? We welcome that role. I believe that Mr. Brahimi and the recent United Nations mission did a remarkable job. It was risky and very dangerous for the members of the team, but they rose to the challenge, and we are very proud of their positive and constructive re-engagement.

Our friend the representative of Germany raised a number of questions, and I will address them. But I would also like to make a number of comments, because we think it is important to clarify several things.

We are here as the representative of the Iraqi interim Government, and we can speak on behalf of the Prime Minister and the new arrangements. We did not read the text only a couple of days ago; we read it weeks ago, when it was first distributed, and we are completely familiar with it. We could take an examination on it, explaining, item by item, what the draft resolution entails and what it contains, because this is not an academic exercise for us; this is our future. So we definitely know what we are talking about and what is at risk.

Secondly, I would say that we in the new Iraqi Government are open to any consultation, at whatever level the Council deems necessary, as it is very important for us to reach out to as many people, as many members as possible.

I answered some of the questions posed by the representative of Germany, but let me say this with respect to his two main questions on the principal two elements that we need to see in any arrangement or agreement to regulate relations between the Iraqi interim Government and the multinational force. I think that for us the first element is very important — that Iraqi forces, the military, the police, security forces, intelligence and whatever other arrangements exist should come under Iraqi control and Iraqi command, and that they not be part and parcel of the multinational force or under foreign command. We are talking about full sovereignty. I think that we should say that very clearly and loudly.

There is also an understanding from our friends and allies. They are helping us to build these forces. They are investing money, giving assistance and making sacrifices to train our police, our army and so on. But leading up to that we need our own command, let us say, to be there and to liaise or coordinate through certain structures. I think that this is the first condition.

The second principle is that we think that the Iraqi interim Government and the Iraqi transitional Government really should have a say about the final status of these forces. We need them. The question is a hypothetical one. I think that we are going to need these forces for quite some time, but, as a sovereign Government, we must definitely have a say in that respect; it will not be open-ended forever. But we must have a say in the duration of the mandate of these forces. I think these are the two elements that we have tried to explain.

I think that the Prime Minister, Mr. Ayad Allawi, and the Cabinet held their official meeting today and addressed this issue frankly today. We have been in constant consultation and contact with them and are considering preparing those letters on behalf of the Iraqi interim Government.

I appreciate very much the comments of the Ambassador of France, and I also enjoyed very much our discussion this morning and the exchange of views. I appreciate his support for the draft resolution's being adopted by consensus, to show the people of Iraq and of the world that the Security Council is united in its desire to see a truly sovereign Iraqi Government assuming real authority and power and overcoming current difficulties. I think that is a shared objective that we in Iraq highly appreciate and for which we express our thanks.

The Ambassador of Chile raised a number of questions. I will start with the last one, about the fate of the militias. We have been working for some time with the Combined Joint Task Force and the Coalition

Provisional Authority to dissolve them and, according to the transitional administrative law, to abolish or to put an end to all militias, whoever they are made up of, that are working and operating outside of the law. That includes Shi'a and Kurdish political parties, and integrating all of those militias into the new Iraqi army and the new Iraqi army formations.

The process has already started. One of the problems that we have faced recently with Moqtada Al-Sadr is the use of violence and arms to prove a point or to see recognition. Our position has been that there is really another way to be represented: the political process is open, and if one seeks recognition, there are elections and other ways to do it. One does not need to resort to violence in order to make a point.

That is the position of the Iraqi interim Government. There will be no place — no room — for militias in Iraq, apart from the one Iraqi army and the police forces. Yes, we do need our country to have control over security, authority over security, and this has been an issue we have discussed. We have differed sometimes with our Coalition friends. Security is a complex issue. It is not only the use of force; it definitely involves intelligence, political and economic issues, the closure of borders — so it is a multifaceted approach, the way we see it. We are making progress in training and in getting better intelligence. In particular, many new security agencies have been established recently. The Defence Ministry has been re-established, and the National Intelligence Service has been re-established. We are making progress with the border police and with the other military and security formations.

I will skip some of the questions, because I have answered some of them. I will go through some of the questions posed and remarks made by the Ambassador of Pakistan. I referred to 400 political parties, groups and associations. That is the number that we have managed to count; it is an ongoing process. One definitely cannot include everyone, but in the context of the political process the political conference is coming up, which will include others. We will have the elections — the local electoral commissions, let us say — in which they can participate. We are not trying to be exclusive; we are trying to be inclusive. But one definitely cannot include every Iraqi political, tribal or religious leader.

I think I have answered the question about the time frame. I tried to answer the question about the partnership. Concerning the reference to the arms embargo in the draft text, I think that this is the first time this has come up, which is a very hopeful sign for Iraq, which was under embargo for so many years under the previous regime — at least there is an opening, and we should build on that.

Concerning the international development fund monitoring board, I think we have discussed this issue with our friends, and we are going to raise it. Yes, we need a stronger Iraqi representation on that board and we must have a stronger say and not be merely symbolically represented. In fact, we need to be strongly represented on that board.

On the question of neighbours — the neighbours are very important and helpful, and we should engage them. I personally attended the most recent conference of Iraq's neighbouring countries, and our relations are very good. I would describe them as very progressive with all the countries — with Iran, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. We have been informing them and explaining to them how important Iraq's security and stability is, and we need their cooperation, we need their support. They can play a very constructive role in helping us stabilize, and we have introduced our list to them — what they can do to help us. We are reaching out to them, but at the same time it is very important — as, I think, they understand — that we, the Iraqi people, should freely determine our political future without anything being dictated or imposed, while at the same time respecting their legitimate national security interests in the region. That is how we are dealing with that issue.

With regard to the other question put by the representative of the Russian Federation, I have described the United Nations role we expect. We need a leading role for the United Nations: a truly engaged, positive role. That will not be easy, and assistance is needed from the Security Council and from Member States at large. Terrorists, who are blinded by hatred and a culture of death and killing, make no distinctions among humanitarian organizations and their representatives, Western diplomats or military commanders in the field. All of them have become "legitimate" targets for terrorists, and they need security and protection for their operations and their facilities. I think the draft resolution very clearly

addresses the need for a unit of multinational forces to protect such operations and installations.

On the question of weapons of mass destruction and the International Atomic Energy Agency, we understand that this issue is still outstanding — left over from previous resolutions. We have discussed it among ourselves in the new Administration. But at this stage it is too soon to address it.

The idea of an international conference has been on the table for quite some time. We Iraqis want as much international support and aid as possible to help us achieve our goal of a stable, peaceful and prosperous country. In my personal view — and I will be very honest and direct — I think an international conference is long overdue. Such a conference should have taken place much, much earlier. Now, I think, we have passed the time: we have a political plan; we have other arrangements. If we compare our situation with that of Afghanistan for instance, I think the time gap becomes apparent. Let us also answer the question of what a conference would achieve in terms of consolidating international support and involvement. We are asking for those things publicly and openly, with the United Nations as the main body in that connection. We have welcomed the United Nations; we have called on the United Nations; we have urged the United Nations to be re-engaged and to come and help us. In my personal view, internationalizing the issue could complicate the matter, although there are so many ways in which Member countries can help, bilaterally or through the Security Council or the United Nations.

Finally, I appreciated very much the kind words of the representative of the United Kingdom.

I think I have answered all the questions. I thank Council members for their patience.

The President: I thank the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq for the clarifications he has provided.

There are no further speakers on my list. The Security Council has thus concluded the present stage of its consideration of the item on its agenda.

The meeting rose at 6.05 p.m.

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Security Council

Distr.: General
7 June 2004

Original: English

Official communiqué of the 4983rd (closed) meeting of the Security Council

Held in private at Headquarters, New York, on Monday, 7 June 2004, at 3 p.m.

In accordance with rule 55 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the following communiqué was issued through the Secretary-General in place of a verbatim record:

"On 7 June 2004, the Security Council, pursuant to annex II, sections A and B of resolution 1353 (2001), held its 4983rd meeting in private with the troop-contributing countries to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).

"The Security Council and the troop-contributing countries heard a briefing under rule 39 of its provisional rules of procedure by Mr. Wolfgang Weisbrod-Weber, Acting Director of the Europe and Latin America Division of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

"Members of the Council, Mr. Weisbrod-Weber and representatives of participating troop-contributing countries had a constructive exchange of views."

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Security Council

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11 June 2004

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* Reissued for technical reasons.

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